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OBSERVATIONS ON THE STYLE OF VARRO¹

ANCIENT and modern scholars are so unanimous in their condemnation of Varro as a writer, that a study of his 'style' may seem to be valueless. Cicero paid ready tribute to his great contemporary's learning, but studiously forbore to say anything about his writing, a fact which was observed by Augustine, who admitted Varro's inferiority in this respect.² Quintilian, in a guarded way, makes the same criticism; for him Varro is 'plus scientiae collatus quam eloquentiae'.³ In recent times Norden has castigated the *De Lingua Latina* as exhibiting the worst Latin style of any prose work, and his opinion of the *Res Rusticae* is not much higher.⁴

Nevertheless some attention to Varro's manner of writing will not be unprofitable. To be confronted with the clumsiness and complexity of a Varronian period—if that is what it should be called—is to have a heightened admiration for the clarity and elegance of Caesar and of Cicero. Latin prose, in the hands of its greatest exponents, gives a deceptive impression of effortless ease, and cannot be fully appreciated unless one has become aware of the formidable technique which is concealed by the artistry. Nothing could more effectively sharpen one's awareness of what lies behind the successful prose-style than to contemplate failure in a Latin writer of the Ciceronian age. There are other and perhaps more important reasons. The text of both the *De Lingua Latina* and the *Res Rusticae*, despite the labours of editors, remains far from satisfactory, and the same can be said of many fragments. A better understanding of Varro's manner and peculiarities of writing may contribute to the establishment of the text, as indeed Keil has often shown in his Commentary on the *Res Rusticae*.⁵ Moreover, as a source of information, Varro exercised an enormous influence on later Roman writers, who drew upon his voluminous learning in a great variety of subjects. The more we know about his style, the greater likelihood there will be of our recognizing his influence, even when not specifically acknowledged, behind a later paraphrase.

Varro's style has not been altogether neglected. Apart from Norden's treatment, it has been the subject of monographs by Krumbiegel⁶ and Heidrich,⁷ and these (particularly the latter), after more than sixty years, still remain indispensable for the study of details. Keil has many illuminating stylistic observations scattered throughout his Commentary. Recently a short but useful essay on the style of the *Res Rusticae* has been contributed by Heurgon,⁸ and a few good pages are devoted to the subject in J. Collart's *Varro grammairien latin* (1954), pp. 336–40.

The discussion which follows is not intended to supersede what has gone before, or to give a complete account of Varro's style. It aims rather at correct-

¹ I am indebted to Professor E. C. Woodcock for criticism and advice on a number of points. I wish also to acknowledge assistance from the University of Sheffield Research Fund.

² *Civ.* 6, 2.

³ *Inst.* 10, 1, 95.

⁴ *Die antike Kunstsprosa*, i, 195 f.

⁵ H. Keil, *Commentarius in Varronis Rerum*

Rusticarum libros tres (Leipzig, 1891).

⁶ R. Krumbiegel, *De Varroniano scribendi genere* (Leipzig, 1892).

⁷ G. Heidrich, *Der Stil des Varro* (Melk, 1892). There appears to be no copy of this work in the British Isles.

⁸ J. Heurgon, 'L'effort de style de Varro dans les *Res Rusticae*', *Rev. de Phil.* xxiv (1950), 57–71.

ing, in certain respects, what seems to be an exaggerated view of the looseness of Varro's writing, and at examining, more carefully than hitherto, his habits of sentence-structure. The investigation has been restricted to the works which we possess in a tolerably complete state, the six extant books of the *De Lingua Latina*, and the *Res Rusticae*.

Norden was so struck by the contrast between Varro's apparently deliberate and uncompromising uncouthness on the one hand, and his occasional examples of carefully sought concinnity on the other, that he spoke of a 'Doppelnatur', in which there was a conflict, never resolved, between a taste for archaic and artless modes of expression and a penchant for the elaborate artificiality of Asianism. Norden's view is based largely on a casual remark of Cicero in a letter to Atticus (*Att.* 12. 6. 1): 'habes Hegesiae genus quod Varro laudat', and he supports it with three Varronian examples of this alleged Asianism (*ling.* 5. 5, 5. 9, and 6. 96), adding that similar passages abound ('wimmeln') in the *Res Rusticae*.¹ In fact, however, these are the only really striking instances of prominent concinnity that I have been able to observe in Varro, and they all involve a very obvious type of antithesis which would suggest itself even in colloquial speech, and which Varro could scarcely avoid, even if he had wanted to: *ling.* 5. 5 *quem puerum vidisti formosum, hunc vides deformem in senecta*. The fact, to which Norden draws attention, that the two clauses here contain the same number of syllables, should be regarded as fortuitous. A little further on in the same passage, where Varro has a similar antithesis to express, there is no attempt at *isocolon*, though, whether consciously or unconsciously, he permits himself chiasmus: *non, si non potuero indagare, eo ero tardior, sed velocior ideo, si quivero*.

ling. 5. 9 *cum poeticis multis verbis magis delecter quam utar, antiquis magis utar quam delecter*; *id.* 6. 96 *sed quoniam in hoc de paucis rebus verba feci plura, de pluribus rebus verba faciam pauca*. In both these examples the antithesis of the thought is so obvious, that it might be said to impose its own expression. Norden has taken Cicero's words too seriously; whatever Varro may have said about the Asianic style, his extant work provides no evidence that he made any conscious attempt to write in it. Nor, on the other hand, apart from his antiquarian predilection for archaic words and modes of expression, does he reveal any deliberate effort to avoid the fluency and balance of Ciceronian Latin. If an obvious parallelism or opposition of thought presents itself to him, he will not try to avoid the concinnity of language which is its natural expression. But for Varro it is the content of his work which matters, and he is not prepared to spend time over the form. When we consider his ceaseless passion for collecting and recording facts, and the enormous output that is attributed to him, it is clear that he must have written rapidly, and can have had neither the time nor the patience to pause over the shaping of a sentence, still less to revise what he had written. This is certainly the most probable explanation of the long periods that lose themselves, of the frequent anacolutha, and of the strangely misplaced subordinate

¹ A.K. i. 197. In an earlier article (*Rhein. Mus.* n.f. xlvi [1893], 547-51), to which further reference will be made, he quotes two of these examples (*ling.* 5. 5 and 6. 96) with the remark: 'Talia passim obvia in Varronis operibus'. One might add that, if one reads the whole context of *Att.* 12. 6. 1

in conjunction with Cicero's other references to Hegesias (*Or.* 226, 230; *Brut.* 286), one is bound to conclude that for Cicero the characteristic feature of H.'s style was, not concinnity, but unnatural disjointedness of utterance.

clauses which we so often encounter. This, too, is the reason for the many apparent breaches of grammatical agreement which have been attributed to him, and which, in most cases, when examined in their context, exhibit nothing more violent than the kind of ambiguity or sense-construction which readily occurs in colloquial speech or in rapid, unrevised writing. If Varro had been able to write with the fluency and elegance of Cicero, without at the same time sacrificing his speed of output, we may be certain that he would have done so. But life was short, and there was a vast amount of knowledge to collect and record. His attitude is shown in the first sentence of the *Res Rusticae*: *Otium si essem consecutus, Fundania, commodius tibi haec scribebam, quae nunc, ut potero, exponam cogitans esse properandum, quod, ut dicitur, si est homo bulla, eo magis senex.* He excuses the haste with which he is going to write on the grounds of his advanced age, but we may well believe that his encyclopaedic fever had long ingrained in him the habit of writing as rapidly as possible, without pause to recast or revise, or perhaps even to reread.

1. ANASTROPHE OF SUBORDINATING CONJUNCTIONS, PRONOUNS, AND ADVERBS

The most characteristic and pervasive feature of Varro's writing is his taste for postponing conjunctions, pronouns, and adverbs which are normally found at the beginning of the subordinate clauses which they introduce. This feature is fairly common in early Latin; Plautus, Terence, and Cato in the *De Agri Cultura* use it freely. Varro's contemporaries, Caesar and Cicero, show, by comparison, a marked restraint. Apart from phrases like *id ne accideret*, occurring at the beginning of a sentence, where a demonstrative pronoun takes first place in the same way as a connecting relative, the first book of the *Bellum Gallicum* yields only half a dozen examples. The same is true of Cicero's *De Senectute*; and even in the much greater compass of the first book of the *De Officis* instances are not much more numerous. On the other hand, in the second book alone of the letters to Atticus I have noted at least twenty-two examples. It seems reasonable to conclude that this kind of anastrophe, so far as prose was concerned, survived, in Cicero's day, mainly in colloquial writing, and was rarely invoked in a more formal style, except when deliberate emphasis was required, or for reasons of rhythm. Varro's wholesale adoption, in formal works, of a practice which, while still in regular colloquial use, had not established itself in literary prose, seems to have been, in part at least, the result of the reactionary antiquarianism which coloured his whole outlook.

Heidrich's treatment of this aspect of Varro's style suffers from an unduly mechanical approach. What is important is not the number of words which precede the postponed element, but its position in relation to the syntactical members of the clause. This may best be illustrated by a Ciceronian example: *Att. 2. 21. 4 et timeo tam vehemens vir tamque acer in ferro et tam insuetus contumeliae ne omni animi impetu dolori et iracundiae parcat.* According to word-count *ne* is here postponed to twelfth place, a position which Heidrich (p. 19) cannot surpass, even in Varro. In fact, however, the words preceding *ne* are, syntactically speaking, a single member, held together by anaphora and tricolon, and the anastrophe is no more violent than in, say, *Att. 2. 20. 9 iam charta ipsa ne nos prodat pertimesco*, or even in *Att. 2. 1. 9 Luceius quid agat scribam ad te*.

Rigid patterns cannot be imposed on language, least of all on colloquial language. But intelligibility is a rule which even popular speech must observe,

however unconsciously, and, to this extent, the placing of these postponed words cannot have been arbitrary. In fact, a survey of the practice, as it appears in Cato and in several plays of Plautus and Terence, enables three main types of anastrophe to be distinguished.

- (i) Type A. The postponed element is preceded by a single syntactical member (in early Latin consisting usually of one or two words), e.g.:
 - heus, senex, quid tu percontare ad te quod nihil attinet?* (Plaut. *Most.* 940)
 - quos mecum duxi, HUNG QUI ad carnificem tradenter* (Plaut. *Rud.* 857)
 - non ego dicebam in PERPETUOM UT illam illi dares* (Ter. *Haut.* 781)
 - dum studeo ILLIS UT quam plurimum facerem . . .* (Ter. *Ad.* 868)
- (ii) Type B. The postponed element is put immediately before the verb, e.g.:
 - metuo te atque istos expiare ut possies* (Plaut. *Most.* 465)
 - cum istiusmodi virtutibus operisque natus qui sit* (Plaut. *Rud.* 321)
 - ultra ad me venit, unicam gnatam suam*
 - cum dote summa filio uxorem ut daret* (Ter. *Andr.* 100-1)
 - aliquis, labore inventa mea quo dem bona* (Ter. *Haut.* 841)
 - si natabit, ea muries erit, vel carnem vel caseos vel salsamenta quo condas* (Cato, *agr.* 88. 2)
 - et quod optimum faenum erit, seorsum condito, per ver cum arabunt, antequam oenium des, quod edint boves* (Cato, *agr.* 53) (the postponed *quod* refers to *faenum*)
- (iii) Type AB. The postponed element is preceded by a single syntactical member, and followed immediately by the verb. This type, in short clauses often inevitable, is the one most commonly met with in early Latin, and includes most of the instances in which the preceding syntactical member consists of more than one word (or, if a prepositional phrase, of more than two):
 - CAPITE OBVOLUTO UT FUGIAT cum summo metu* (Plaut. *Most.* 424)
 - mali, RES FALSAS QUI IMPETRANT apud iudicem* (Plaut. *Rud.* 18)
 - patrem novisti, AD HAS RES QUAM SIT perspicax* (Ter. *Haut.* 370)
 - proin tu fac APUD TE UT SIES* (Ter. *Andr.* 408)
 - VILLAM AEDIFICANDAM SI LOCABIS novam ab solo* (Cato, *agr.* 14. 1)
 - et IDEM HOC SI FACIES ad arbores feraces* (ibid. 93)

In Varro's work as a whole relative pronouns show themselves most susceptible to anastrophe. In the *Res Rusticae* the instances in which *ut* and *ne* are thus used equal, if not outnumber, those with relative pronouns. After these, but at a long interval, come temporal and causal conjunctions, interrogative pronouns and adverbs, and *si*. In the *De Lingua Latina* Type AB predominates, and Type A is the least frequent, in the *Res Rusticae* A is still the least frequent, but B has become by far the most common. I add a representative selection of each type, drawn from both works.

Type A. *ling.* 6. 40 *de multitudine quoniam quod satis esset admonui*; 7. 4 *igitur de originibus verborum qui multa dixerit commode* (the genitive *verborum* does not destroy the unity of the prepositional phrase as a single syntactical member); *rust.* 1. 12. 4 *et repentinae praedonum manus quod improviso facilius opprimere possunt* (here, too, the three words before *quod* form a single syntactical member); 2. 1. 3 *et homines et pecudes cum semper fuisse sit necesse*

natura; 2. 1. 23 et alia signa, in omni pecore quae scripta habere oportet magistrum pecoris; 3. 7. 6 certum locum ut disclusum ab aliis rete habeat.

Type B. *ling.* 5. 79 *fiber ab extrema ora fluminis dextra et sinistra maxime quod solet videri . . . fiber dictus*; 9. 20 *verbum quod novum et ratione introductum quominus recipiamus, vitare non debemus*; 10. 26 *quare in his quoque partibus similitudines ab aliis male, ab aliis bene quod solent sumi in casibus conferendis . . .*; *rust.* 1. 3 *tu, inquit, et aetate et honore et scientia quod praestas, dicere debes*; 1. 20. 4 *ubi terra levis, ut in Campania, ibi non bubus gravibus sed vaccis aut asinis quod arant . . .*; 2. 2. 5 *et si quo vetustate dentes absunt, item binae pro singulis ut procedant*; 2. 4. 17 *in eorum partu serofae bis die ut bibant curant lactis causa*; 3. 13. 3 *ut non minus formosum mihi visum sit spectaculum, quam in Circo Maximo aedilium sine Africanis bestiis cum fiant venationes.* To this type we may also assign *rust.* 2. 7. 9 *equus matrem salire cum adduci non posset.*

Type AB. *ling.* 5. 80 *de animalibus in locis terrestribus quae sunt*; 6. 57 *e cella dei qui eloquuntur*; 7. 37 *ad bellum cum exit imperator*; 7. 56 *quod olim ascribebantur inermes armatis militibus qui succederent*; *rust.* 1. 31. 5 . . . *cum susum versus serpit, ad scapum lupini aliquam quem ut haereat* (the words *ad . . . quem* form a single syntactical member); 1. 40. 6 *meliore genere ut sit surculus, quam est quo veniat arbor*; 1. 45. 3 *nam prius radices, quam ex iis quod solet nasci, crescunt*; 2. 1. 19 *altera pars est, in futura quae sint observanda*; 2. 2. 17 *itaque deliniendum in nutricatu pabuli bonitate et a frigore et aestu ne quid laboret curandum*; 2. 9. 5 *quare a pastoribus empta melior, quae oves sequi consuevit, aut sine ulla consuetudine quae fuerit*; 3. 5. 7 *ibi enim, in prima volatura cum veniunt, morantur dies paucos requiescendi causa* (the Teubner text of Keil-Goetz wrongly has a comma after *volatura*); 3. 7. 8 *in turribus ac summis villis qui habent agrestes columbas*.

A characteristic form of this type in Varro is that in which the syntactical member preceding the postponed element is a complete clause: *ling.* 6. 73 *nam QUOD NON VOLT si putat, metuit, non sperat*; *rust.* 1. 2. 26 *SIQUEM GLABRUM FACERE VELIS quod iubet ranam luridam coicere in aquam*; 1. 5. 1 *relinquitar, QUOT PARTES EA DISCIPLINA HABEAT, ut sit videndum*; 2. 5. 15 *et providendum, QUO RECIPIUNT SE, ne frigidus locus sit*; 3. 16. 32 *QUOD AD PASTIONES SUM RATUS quoniam dixi.* Similarly there are examples of Type B in which one or more complete clauses precede the postponed word, e.g. *ling.* 5. 6 *quorum verborum novorum ac veterum discordia omnis in consuetudine communi* (sc. *est*), (sc. *eorum*) *QUOT MODIS COMMUTATIO SIT FACTA qui animadverterit, facilius scrutari origines patietur verborum* (Goetz-Schoell, following Mueller, put a full stop after *omnis*). But the difficulties involved are considerable (see G.-S., p. 245), and the above punctuation, which is adopted by Kent, seems more satisfactory, and certainly makes the passage more Varroonian); *rust.* 1. 3 *igitur, inquit Agrasius, quae diungenda essent a cultura cuiusmodi sint, quoniam discretum, de iis rebus quae scientia sit in colendo nos docete.* This last striking passage exhibits threefold anastrophe (*cuiusmodi, quoniam, quae*) of which the first two instances are enclosed, one within the other. The relative clause which precedes the postponed *cuiusmodi* is part of the oblique interrogative clause which precedes *quoniam*.

A small number of instances do not fall under any of the above types. *rust.* 1. 13. 2 *faciundum etiam plaustris ac cetero instrumento omni in cohorte ut satis magna sint tecta*; 1. 41. 4 *de his primis quattuor generibus quaedam quod tardiora* (sc. *sunt*), *surculis potius utendum*; 3. 16. 27 *cibi pars quod potio* (sc. *est*); 2. 1. 4 *e feris*

atque agrestibus ut arboribus ac virgultis decarpendo glandem, arbutum, mora, poma colligerent ad usum; 3. 15. 12 cum et aqua calida et frigida . . . epitonii versis ad unum quemque factum sit ut fluat.

II. PROLEPSIS OF THE SUBJECT OF A SUBORDINATE CLAUSE¹

Similar to the use of anastrophe in its effect on sentence-structure is the practice whereby what would be the subject of a subordinate clause appears in front of that clause, as object of the main verb. Deriving originally from parataxis,² the usage is frequent in early Latin, and survives, in the late Republic, in colloquial writing. Varro, as one would expect from his antiquarian leanings, offers a number of examples, though, compared with his use of anastrophe, they are relatively infrequent. I give first some typical examples from Plautus, Terence, and Cato.

tu facis me quidem vivere ut nunc velim (Plaut. *Rud.* 244)
quid tu me curas quid rerum geram? (ibid. 1068)
illum ut vivat optant (Ter. *Ad.* 874)
prius villam videat clausa ut sit (Cato, *agr.* 5. 5)
vectes ilagineos, acrifolios, laureos ulmeos facito ut sient parati (Cato, *agr.* 31. 1)

A few of Varro's instances are of the same simple type, e.g. *rust.* 3. 10. 4 *easque cellas provident ne habeant in solo umorem* (cf. *rust.* 2. 5. 18; *ling.* 9. 94; 10. 2). In others the prolepsis is complicated, if not obscured, by additional features such as an inserted relative clause, e.g. *ling.* 10. 29 *at duo inter se similiterne sint longiores quam sint eorum fratres dicere non possis si illos breviores, cum quibus conferuntur, quam longi sint ignores* (cf. *rust.* 2. 9. 15), or by further anastrophe, e.g. *rust.* 3. 16. 28 *alii aquam mulsam in vasculis prope ut sit curant*; *ling.* 6. 53 *hinc effata dicuntur, qui augures finem auspiciorum caelestum extra urbem agris sunt effati ut esset.* An unusual example with *fore ut* is found at *rust.* 1. 2. 8 *nec si potest reficere fructus, si videt eos fore ut pestilentia dispereant.*³ Keil in his note on this passage (*Comm.*, p. 13) wrongly cites, as an example of prolepsis, *rust.* 2. 9. 2 *cum sciam mulorum gregem, cum pasceretur et eo venisset lupus, ultra mulos circumfluxisse, et ungulis caedendo eum occidisse*, where *mulorum gregem*, the subject of *circumfluxisse*, is resumed, after the *cum* clause, by *mulos*.

Similar in principle to this kind of prolepsis are instances in which the main verb is passive, e.g. *ling.* 8. 23 *quae cuiusmodi sint aperientur infra*; 9. 43 *sed ut videantur quae sunt cuiusmodi sint*; *rust.* 1. 13. 2 *in primis culina videnda ut sit admota.*

III. RELATIVE CLAUSES

Next to anastrophe, the most distinctive feature of Varro's style is his handling of relative clauses. This is marked by a strong predilection for putting the relative before its antecedent,⁴ which, if it is a pronoun, is often omitted, even where normal usage would regard its presence as indispensable. Frequent, too,

¹ Heidrich, op. cit., p. 22.

² Schmalz-Hofmann, *Lat. Gramm.*⁵ (1928), pp. 654 f.

³ Professor Woodcock suggests that this may be due to the conflation, not unnatural in informal utterance, of 'eos disperituros' with 'fore ut', and quotes an analogous

incongruity with the Supine + *iri* in Quinilian, *inst.* 9. 2. 28 *reus parricidii . . . damnatum iri videbatur.*

⁴ As a matter of convenience I use the term 'antecedent' for that element to which the relative clause refers, irrespective of its position.

is the attraction of an antecedent noun into its relative clause. What strikes the reader most forcibly, however, is perhaps Varro's tendency to insert his relative clauses in an apparently haphazard fashion.

(i) *The relative clause precedes the antecedent*

(a) *Antecedent in the same case.* This is regular Latin usage in all authors. What makes it noteworthy in Varro is its frequency. The following examples are typical: *rust.* 1. 7. 2 *quod quae suo quicque loco sunt positæ, ea minus loci occupant;* 1. 40. 4 *et quae de arbore transferas, ut ea deplantes potius quam defringas;* 2. 1. 15 *quod enim alterius fuit, id ut fiat meum, necesse est aliquid intercedere.*

(b) *Antecedent in a different case.* Here Varro's taste for prior position of the relative clause sometimes seems perverse, and certainly leads to obscurity when the prounoun antecedent does not appear in its normal place at the head of the main clause. *ling.* 8. 28 *accedit quod quæcumque usus causa ad vitam sint assumpta, in his <convenit> utilitatem querere, non similitudinem* (convenit is a conjecture of A. Spengel); *rust.* 1. 17. 6 *iniciendam voluntatem praefectorum honore aliquo habendo, et de operariis qui praestabunt alios, communicandum quoque cum his, quae facienda sint opera;* 1. 17. 7 *ut quibus quid gravius sit imperatum aut animadversum qui* (qui = aliquo modo), *consolando eorum restituat voluntatem ac benevolentiam in dominum;* 3. 14. 1 *nam et idoneus sub dio sumendus locus cochleariis, quem circum totum aqua claudas, ne, quas ibi posueris ad partum, non liberos eorum, sed ipsas quæras* (here awkwardness is increased by the fact that Varro leaves his readers to supply the noun to which *earum* refers (*cochlearum* from the preceding *cochleariis*)).

The relative adverbs, *ubi*, *quo*, and *unde*, are treated in the same way. *ling.* 9. 71 *animadverunt, unde oriuntur, nomina dissimilia;* *rust.* 1. 40. 6 *postero anno cum comprehendit, unde propagatum est, ab altera arbore praecedit;* 2. 2. 7 *ubi stent solum oportet esse eruderatum et proclivum;* 2. 5. 15 *et providendum, quo recipiunt se, ne frigidus locus sit;* 3. 16. 23 *quocirca examen ubi volunt considere, eum ramum aliamve quam rem oblinunt hoc admixto apiastro.*

To what extent Varro's taste for this order can lead to obscurity is seen, for example, in *rust.* 3. 1. 9 *itaque cum putarem esse rerum rusticarum, quae constituta sunt fructus causa, tria genera . . .*, where the reader must struggle against a natural tendency to associate *quae* with the immediately preceding noun. Two striking instances are contained in the following passage: *rust.* 1. 9. 7 *non male, inquit, quae sit idonea terra ad colendum aut non, Diophanes Bithynos sribit signa sumi posse aut ex ipsa aut quae nascuntur ex iis: ex ipsa, si sit terra alba, si nigra, si levigata . . . ex iis autem quae enata sunt fera, si sunt prolixa atque [ea] quae ex iis nasci debent, EARUM RERUM feracia* (ea was deleted by Schneider). One would hesitate to accept the first instance, if it were not clearly confirmed in the latter part of the sentence (*ex iis autem quae enata sunt fera*). In the second there is a natural temptation, at first sight, to take the relative prounoun as a neuter plural, parallel with *prolixa*, and it is perhaps not surprising that the neuter plural *ea* found its way into the text. But when we read to the end of the sentence, it is clear that *quae* must be taken with *earum rerum*. A similar, though less violent, example, noted by Heidrich (p. 23), is *ling.* 8. 3 *nisi enim ita eset factum, neque discere tantum numerum verborum possemus . . . neque quae didicissemus, ex his, quae inter se rerum cognatio eset, appareret.*

(ii) *The antecedent prounoun is omitted*

When the antecedent prounoun would be in the same case as the relative,

its omission is easy, and is common enough in Latin prose generally.¹ Varro, however, freely omits antecedent pronouns of different case. *rust.* 1. 41. 2 *quae autem natura minus sunt mollia, vas aliquod supra (sc. ea) alligant; 2. 7. 3 hoc maiores qui sunt, (sc. eos) intellegi negant posse; 2. 6. 2 igitur asinorum gregem qui facere volt bonum, primum videndum (sc. ei) ut mares feminasque bona aetate sumat; 3. 2. 1 opinor, inquam, non solum quod dicitur 'malum consilium consultori est pessimum', sed etiam bonum consilium, qui consultit et qui consultitur, (sc. ei) bonum habendum; 3. 7. 8 item fere haec, in turribus ac summis villis qui habent agrestes columbas, (sc. eis) quoad possunt, imitandum.* In the following example of antecedent-omission, the relative clause is not in prior position: *rust. 3. 9. 7 (ut) . . . neque per eas quicquam ire intro possit (sc. eorum) quae nocere solent gallinis.*

In a number of examples the noun to which the relative pronoun refers appears in the relative clause. This kind of attraction of the antecedent is common enough when the relative clause is placed first, especially in early Latin (Schmalz-Hofmann, p. 711), but, for the sake of clarity, it is normal—particularly where the attraction involves a change of case—for the antecedent to be represented by a pronoun in the main clause. A couple of Varronian instances may illustrate this: *rust. 3. 2. 15 atque in hac villa qui est ornithon, ex eo uno quinque milia scio venisse turdorum denariis ternis; ling. 8. 10 quare duce natura <factumst>, quae imposita essent vocabula rebus, ne ab omnibus his declinatus putarent.* (*factumst* was supplied by A. Spengel to fill the lacuna in the manuscripts before the relative pronoun).

But Varro evidently did not feel the pronoun to be essential in such cases of attraction, for he omits it readily. *rust. 1. 52. 1 quae seges grandissima atque optima fuerit, (sc. eius) seorsum in aream secerni oportet spicas, ut semen optimum habeat; 2. 2. 12 quibus in locis messes sunt factae, (sc. in eos) inigere est utile; 2. 11. 6 qui aspargi solent sales, (sc. ex iis) melior fossili; 3. 13. 1 nam quem fundum in Tusculano emit hic Varro a M. Pupio Pisone, (sc. in eo) vidisti ad bucinam inflatam certo tempore apros et capreas convenire ad pabulum; 3. 16. 34 favi qui eximuntur, (sc. eorum) siqua pars nihil habet aut habet incunatum, cultello praesciatur.*²

(iii) Relative clauses in arbitrary or unnatural position

Varro shows a tendency to put relative clauses in unnatural positions, for which it is difficult to see any reason but carelessness. The clause often seems to be inserted into the sentence, or appended to it, as an afterthought, and is found separated from its antecedent, sometimes by a word, sometimes by a whole clause.

*rust. 1. 8. 5 huius (sc. vineae) genera duo: unum in quo terra cubilia praebet uis, ut in Asia multis locis, quae (sc. vinea) saepe vulpibus et hominibus fit communis; 1. 13. 2 faciundum etiam plaustris ac cetero instrumento omni in cohorte ut satis magna sint tecta, quibus caelum pluvium inimicum (quibus refers to *plaustris ac cetero instrumento omni*. It might be argued that, if there is any difficulty here, it is due to the postponement of the phrase *ut satis magna sint tecta*. But this phrase could easily have been postponed beyond the relative clause, with great improvement in clarity. The relative clause has all the appearance of an afterthought); 1. 45. 2 quae in seminario nata, si loca erunt frigidiora, quae mollia natura sunt, per brumalia tempora tegere oportet fronde aut stramentis; 1. 64 amurca cum ex olea expressa, qui est*

¹ Cf. Kühner-Stegmann, *Ausführliche lateinische Grammatik*, ii. 2. 281. 5.

² Examples are not lacking in Plautus: e.g. *Most. 1046 ostium quod in angporto est horti, pateteci fores.*

umor aquatilis, ac retrimentum conditum in vas fictile; 1. 69. 1 messum far promendum hieme in pistrino ad torrendum, quod ad cibatum expeditum esse velis; 2. prae. 4 itaque in qua terra culturam agri docuerunt pastores progeniem suam, qui (sc. pastores) considerunt urbem, ibi contra progenies eorum . . . fecit prata; 2. 11. 4 alii pro coagulo addunt de fici ramo lac et acetum, aspargunt item aliis aliquot rebus, quod Graeci appellant alii ὄπόν, alii δάκρυον (quod refers to coagulo); 3. 11. 2 saeptum altum esse oportet, ubi versentur, ad pedes quindecim, ut vidistis ad villam Sei, quod uno ostio claudatur (quod refers to saeptum). Heidrich (p. 24) adds *ling.* 5. 147 haec omnia postequam contracta in unum locum, quae ad victim pertinebant.

The separation of the relative pronoun from the noun which it qualifies is not unknown in other Latin prose-writers, and Kühner-Stegmann¹ goes so far as to suggest a principle, whereby a relative pronoun sometimes agrees with the more distant of two preceding nouns, when that is also the more important. But the passages cited by K.-S. (cf. also Schmalz-Hofmann, pp. 707, 795, and W. Kroll in *Glotta*, xv. 300) hardly justify this explanation. In most examples the separation is natural,² and none is so disconcerting as the Varroian instances above, except perhaps *ap.* Cicero, *Fam.* 10. 30. 1 ('quo die Pansa in castris Hirti erat futurus, cum quo (sc. Pansa) eram'), where the writer is Galba, and the reason probably negligence. From the Varroian examples given above one can only draw the conclusion that Varro wrote at such a speed that, when an additional thought struck him, he was unwilling to reshape and rewrite a sentence which he had begun, but inserted or appended the new thought as he went along. When the clause added was a relative clause, its more or less violent separation from the noun to which it referred made its awkwardness particularly conspicuous.

IV. OTHER SUBORDINATE CLAUSES

Whilst Varro, as we have seen, shows an exceptional tendency to put a relative clause before its antecedent, the frequency with which he causes other subordinate clauses (e.g. indirect question or command) to precede their governing verbs does not appear to differ greatly from that which is to be observed in Caesar and Cicero. In Varro, however, the 'pre-placement' is more prominent, because it is often accompanied by additional variations from normal word-order, such, for instance, as anastrophe: *rust.* 1. 46 *propter cuiusmodi res admiranda discrimina sunt naturae aliquot, ex quibusdam foliis propter eorum versuram, quod sit anni tempus ut dici possit*; 1. 1. 2 *et non solum ipse quoad vivam, quid fieri oporteat ut te moneam, sed etiam post mortem* (cf. 1. 5. 1). Sometimes the subordinate clause precedes, not only its governing verb, but the whole phrase in which that verb is contained: *rust.* 1. 2. 2 *et nos uti exspectaremus se reliquit qui rogaret*; 1. 9. 7 *non male, inquit, quae sit idonea terra . . . aut non, Diophanes Bithynos scribit signi sumi posse . . .* (cf. *ling.* 5. 6; *rust.* 1. 3, quoted on p. 5 above).

V. TYPES OF VARRONIAN NEGLIGENCE

Carelessness does not lend itself to classification, for the ways in which it

¹ Op. cit. ii. 2. 286. 9.

² e.g. in three instances (Caesar, *B.G.* 7. 59. 2; Sall. *Cat.* 48. 1; Tac. *Ann.* 1. 74. 1) the separating element is an ablative absolute phrase, and therefore easily isolated. In other cases it coalesces with noun or verb in its clause, in such a way as to form

virtually a single idea: Caesar, *B.G.* 1. 44. 3; 7. 50. 1 (adverbial phrase); Cic. *Mur.* 7; *Fam.* 9. 15. 1 (dependent genitive). The principle assumed by K.-S. would appear to be justified in Sall. *Iug.* 46. 2 and 81. 1, and (if the relative clause is genuine) in Cic. *Tusc.* 1. 3.

may manifest itself are virtually unlimited. But with a writer like Varro, who combined a taste for the language of a bygone day with the habit of writing so quickly that he probably gave himself no time to re-read what he had written, it becomes possible to isolate certain types of negligence as being specially characteristic. The frequent omission of *esse*, as copula (in the present tense) and as auxiliary verb, as well as of certain other verbs, is a well-known feature of early and colloquial Latin.¹ So, too, is economy in the use of pronouns and nouns.² The Twelve Tables provide examples of sentences in which two successive clauses have different subjects, neither of which is expressed, e.g. (Table 1) *si in ius vocat, ito. ni it, antestamino: igitur em capito*.³ Varro was predisposed to these and other colloquial features and, writing as rapidly as he did, he was led, not infrequently, into obscurity.

(a) *Omission of verbs*

In Varro the forms *est* and *sunt*, whether used as copula or as auxiliary verb with the perfect participle and with the gerund and gerundive, are freely omitted. This is true, not only in the *De Lingua Latina*, where their recurrence in the frequent etymologies would be intolerable, but also in the less austere writing of the *Res Rusticae*, e.g. *rust. 2 praef. 3 alia, inquam, ratio ac scientia (sc. est) coloni, alia pastoris. coloni ea (sc. sunt) quae agri cultura factum (sc. est) ut na- scerentur e terra, contra pastoris ea quae nata (sc. sunt) ex pecore*. This example also illustrates the fact that Varro is prepared to omit these forms in subordinate, as well as in main, clauses. The subordinate clauses in which this occurs are generally relative or causal (*quod, quoniām*), but there are examples with *si*: *ling. 9. 13 quod si viri sapientissimi . . . laudati (sc. sunt); rust. 2. 8. 5 hi si in palustribus locis atque uliginosis nati (sc. sunt), habent ungulas molles*.

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(b) *Omission of pronouns and nouns*

Attention has already been called to the frequent omission by Varro of pronoun antecedents to relative clauses. He shows a similar readiness to leave out the subject, less often the object, of a verb, though his practice in this respect is less arbitrary than has sometimes been thought. Pronouns, generally third person, are sometimes omitted in accusative and infinitive constructions, e.g. *ling.* 8. 42 *dicat* (*sc.* *se*) *non posse iudicare*; 9. 115 *id quod pollicitus est* (*sc.* *se*) *demonstratum*; 8. 42 *ignorare* (*sc.* *eos*) *apparet*; *rust.* 1. 69. 2 *ille flens narrat ab nescio quo percussum cultello* (*sc.* *patronum*) *concidisse, quem qui esset animadverte in turba* (*sc.* *se*) *non potuisse sed tantummodo exaudisse vocem, perperam* (*sc.* *se* or *eum*) *fecisse*.

Especially noticeable in the *Res Rusticae* is the use of a verb in the 3rd person singular with no subject expressed. The subject to be understood is the person most naturally and closely concerned with whatever is being said. This kind of omission appears in the Laws of the XII Tables, where the person is the litigant.

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may manifest itself are virtually unlimited. But with a writer like Varro, who combined a taste for the language of a bygone day with the habit of writing so quickly that he probably gave himself no time to re-read what he had written, it becomes possible to isolate certain types of negligence as being specially characteristic. The frequent omission of *esse*, as copula (in the present tense) and as auxiliary verb, as well as of certain other verbs, is a well-known feature of early and colloquial Latin.¹ So, too, is economy in the use of pronouns and nouns.² The Twelve Tables provide examples of sentences in which two successive clauses have different subjects, neither of which is expressed, e.g. (Table 1) *si in ius vocat, ito ni it, antestamino: igitur em capito*.³ Varro was predisposed to these and other colloquial features and, writing as rapidly as he did, he was led, not infrequently, into obscurity.

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In Cato's *De Agri Cultura*, where occasional examples occur, and in Varro's *Res Rusticae*, the person to be understood is the unspecified farmer, for whose benefit the treatise is written. Keil, in his note on *rust.* 1. 2. 21 (*Comm.*, p. 20), maintains that Varro only allows himself such omissions when the close proximity of a gerund or gerundive or of *oportet* makes the reference clear. Apparent exceptions to this rule—in particular 1. 13. 3 *cum velit* and 2. 10. 11 *detrahere possit*—are to be eliminated by emending the text.

It is true that in the majority of instances of this usage the omission follows closely on a gerund (or gerundive) or *oportet* (1. 2. 21; 1. 11. 2; 1. 12. 1; 1. 21; 1. 41. 3; 1. 52; 2. 1. 20; 2. 11; 3. 9. 21). On the other hand, there are examples which Keil appears to have overlooked: *rust.* 1. 22. 4 *quae minus multa quidem alii, sed tantum numerum culleorum scripsisse* (sc. *Catonem*) *puto, ne cogeretur quotannis vendere vinum* (it is possible to argue that the subject of *cogeretur* is Cato, but it is more natural, and makes better sense, to understand *cogeretur* of the unspecified farmer for whom Cato wrote); 3. 12. 4 *quis item nescit, paucos si lepores . . . intromiserit, brevi tempore fore ut impleatur? . . . quattuor modo enim intromisit* (intromisit Keil) *in leporarium, brevi solet repleri.* Here, it is true, the preceding interrogative *quis* helps to supply the subject for *intromisit*, but essentially the omission belongs to the same type as the others.

Moreover, in two instances quoted by Keil, 1. 40. 6 *ex arbore qua vult* etc. (where the omission of the subject extends over a succession of verbs) and 3. 5. 4 *diebus viginti antequam tollere vult turdos* etc., the preceding *oportet* is too far removed to enable the passages to be properly included under the 'rule'. It would seem, in fact, that Keil was not justified in assuming his 'rule'. Any principle which Varro followed was purely instinctive: he was unconsciously led to omit a subject by the implication of that subject contained in a gerund or in *oportet*, but it would be wrong to assume that he did not sometimes make the same sort of omission without the same justification. The passages which Keil wished to emend should probably be allowed to stand.

Most of the other examples of omitted nouns are of the type which one would expect to occur in a work written rapidly, and with little or no revision. Perhaps the most striking instance of a noun-object omitted is in *rust.* 2. 7. 9 *equus matrem salire cum adduci non posset, cum eum capite obvoluto auriga adduxisset et coegisset matrem inire, cum descendentem dempsisset ab oculis, ille impetum fecit in eum et mordicus interfecit.* The object of *dempisset* has to be supplied from *obvoluto* (*Iucundus* in the Aldine edition of 1514 inserted *velum*), and, though Keil (ad loc.) seems to regard the omission as natural, it demands some effort on the part of the reader. Generally, however, what is to be supplied is fairly clear; the surrounding context usually reveals what word is uppermost in Varro's mind. If the word itself does not occur, there is a cognate word which suggests it, and often an adjective by its gender will provide an additional clue. *ling.* 5. 25 *a puteis oppidum ut Puteoli, quod incircum eum locum aquae frigidae et caldae multae, nisi a putore potius, quod putidus odoribus saepe ex sulphure et alumine* (*locus* suggests itself readily as the noun to which *putidus* refers); 5. 162 *circum cavum aedium erat unius cuiusque rei utilitatis causa parietibus dissepta* (since, in this section, Varro is expressly concerned with the names of the parts of a *domus*, that is evidently the word to be supplied with *dissepta*); *rust.* 1. 4. 2 *nemo enim eadem utilitati non formosius quod est emere mavult pluris quam si est fructuosus turpis* (the noun to which *fructuosus* and *turpis* refer, and which Varro has in mind, is *ager*, as can be seen from the previous sentence: *nec non ea quae faciunt cultura*

honestiorem agrum, pleraque non solum fructuosiorem eadem faciunt . . . sed etiam vendibiliorem); 3. 4. 3 ut in eodem tecto ornithonis inclusum triclinium haberet, ubi delicate cenaret et alios videt in mazonomo positos coctos, alios volitare circum fenestras captos (evidently *turdos*, since the word occurs in the previous sentence); 3. 12. 4 itaque de iis (sc. leporibus, mentioned earlier in the section) Archelaus scribit, annorum quot sit qui velit scire, inspicere oportere foramina naturae, quod sine dubio alias alio habet plura (the subject of *sit* and of *habet*, and with which *alias* agrees, is surely *lepus*, not *annus*, as Heidrich, p. 53, suggests); 3. 16. 34 exemplio cum est maior, neque universam neque palam facere oportet, ne deficiant animum (there is no difficulty in supplying *apes* as the subject of *deficiant*. This part of the work is concerned with bees and their care, and, in particular, with the removal of combs from the hive. Section 33 ends thus: *si non quattuor eximas aut non aequae multum, et magis his assiduas habeas apes et magis fructuosas*); 2. 4. 3 ergo qui suum gregem vult habere idoneum, eligere oportet primum bona aetate . . . unicoloris potius quam varias (suum gregem and the feminine ending of *varias*¹ leave no doubt that the noun to be supplied is *sues*); 1. 8. 4 tertium, quod horum inopiae subsidio misit harundinetum, inde enim aliquot colligatas libris demittunt in tubulos fictiles (harundinetum suggests *harundines* with which *colligatas* agrees). Similarly in 3. 14. 1 cochlearii supplies the noun *cochleae*, and in 3. 16. 15 alvarium leaves no doubt that the noun to be understood a few words later with *rutundas* is *alvos*.

A few examples may be added in which the noun to be supplied is less obvious. *ling.* 6. 49 *sic monumenta quae in sepulcris, et ideo secundum viam, quo praetereuntes admoneant et se fuisse et illos esse mortales*. Krumbiegel (p. 63) takes this as a case of omitted subject (of *admoneant*), but it is better understood as a not unnatural identification of the *monumenta* with the persons whom they commemorate, and whose remains they conceal. *rust.* 1. 17. 7 *studiosiores ad opus fieri liberius tractando aut cibariis aut vestitu largiore aut remissione operis concessioneve, ut peculiare aliiquid in fundo pascere liceat, huiuscmodi rebus aliis, ut quibus quid gracius sit imperatum aut animadversum qui, consolando eorum restituant voluntatem ac benevolentiam in dominum*. The topic under discussion is the treatment of farm-hands, and in particular of overseers, who should be given special privileges and concessions, in order to strengthen their loyalty. The subject of *restituant* could be the 'unspecified' subject, of which a number of examples have been given above; and to take it as such would be to add a further exception to Keil's rule. If, with Schneider, we accept the *sit* which Ursinus inserted before *qui* (= *quo*), punctuating after *animadversum*, this interpretation is necessary; and it is still possible if, with C. F. W. Mueller followed by Keil (Comm., p. 59), we punctuate after *qui*, which is then taken closely with *animadversum*, in the sense of *aliquo modo*. However, it is perhaps more likely that the subject of *restituant* is the general idea of generous treatment, as described in the first part of the sentence. *rust.* 2. 4. 16 *itaque apud Plautum in Menaechmis, cum insanum quem putat, ut pietur, in oppido Epidanno interrogat 'quanti hic porci sunt sacres?'*. Heidrich (p. 58) suggests that possibly *Menaechmus* should be read, instead of *in Menaechmis*. But this is unnecessary; the prepositional phrase provides a sufficiently specific reference to enable the reader to supply some such subject as *ille* without great difficulty.

Finally, we consider two examples, quoted by Heidrich (p. 57), in which a 3rd person singular verb without a subject is apparently used to express what is applicable generally to all men. *ling.* 6. 71 *sic despondisse animum quoque dicitur, ut*

¹ *sus* appears twice in the immediately following context with a feminine adjective.

despondisse filiam, quod suae sponte statuerat finem; *ibid. 73 etiam spes a sponte potest esse declinata, quod tum sperat, cum quod volt fieri putat*. On the first passage Heidrich points out that the difficulty could be removed if *qui* were substituted for *quod*; in the case of the second Ritschl (*Acta Phil. Lips.* vi. 365) proposed to insert *quis* before *tum sperat*. But perhaps, since we are dealing with Varro, we should regard neither of these expedients as necessary. It is noteworthy that each of these passages is closely preceded by a *qui*-clause, in which the general application is as it were foreshadowed, and the subsequent lack of subject eased to a certain extent: *71 qui spoponderat filiam, despondisse dicebant; 72 itaque qui ad id quod rogatur non dicit, non respondeat, ut non spondet ille statim qui dixit spondeo si iocandi causa dixit*.

(c) *Change of subject*

Associated with Varro's tendency to omit nouns is his readiness to introduce, within the same sentence, sudden changes of grammatical subject, with nothing to indicate the change, except the context. An instance of this kind of variation is to be seen in the extract from the Twelve Tables already quoted (p. 10). That Varro exhibits it frequently—the examples quoted by Heidrich (p. 40) and by Keil (on *rust.* 2. 1. 4) are by no means exhaustive—is not, however, to be regarded as conscious archaism on his part. Such lack of precision is a characteristic of informal utterance in any language, not necessarily in its early stages, and in Varro it is simply a further indication of his unwillingness to allow the rapidity of his writing to be held up by what he would consider unnecessary meticulousness of expression. In fact, most of the examples, however disconcerting they appear in isolation, are much less so when read in conjunction with their contexts. The feature appears chiefly, though not exclusively, in the *Res Rusticae*, *ling.* 5. 180 *qui iudicio vicerat, suum sacramentum e sacro auferebat, victi (sc. sacramentum) ad aerarium redibat; rust.* 2. 1. 21 *quod morbosum pecus est vitiolum, et quoniam non valet, saepe magna adfcuntur (sc. homines) calamitate: 2. 2. 14 commodius servantur (sc. oves) si secretas pascunt (sc. pastores. The object eas is to be supplied); 2. 9. 10-11 cibum capere consuescunt (sc. canes, or if, as is probable, consuescunt is transitive, we must supply homines (subject) and canes (object)) interdiu, ubi pascuntur (sc. oves), vesperi, ubi stabulantur (sc. oves). Feturae principium admittendi faciunt (sc. homines) veris principio; tum enim dicuntur (sc. canes) catulire (further examples are to be found in sections 12 and 13); 3. 7. 7 columbas redire solere ad locum licet animadvertere, quod multi in theatro e sinu missas faciunt, atque ad locum redeunt (sc. columbae).*

In most cases not more than two possible subjects are involved in any particular sentence, but there are at least two examples of triple variation: *rust.* 2. 2. 15 *deinde matres cum grege pastum prodeunt, retinent (sc. pastores) agnos, ad quos cum reductae (sc. matres) ad vesperum, aluntur lacte (sc. agni) et rursus discernuntur; 3. 10. 4* (of geese) *cum excludit (sc. mater), quinque diebus primus patiuntur (sc. curatores) esse (sc. pullos) cum matre*. Finally, a peculiarly 'Varronian' example: *rust.* 3. 7. 4 *columbaria singula esse oportet ut os habeat (sc. columbarium), quo modo introire et exire possit (sc. columba)*. Not only do the verbs *habeat* and *possit* have different subjects, but both subjects must be supplied from the phrase *columbaria singula*.

(d) *Looseness of agreement*

Varro's style shows some looseness of agreement in respect of gender and of person, but his negligence in these matters, particularly in gender, is less gross

and arbitrary than commentators have supposed. After all, he was one of the best educated Romans of his day and we cannot attribute to him, without the most careful consideration of the text in question, breaches of fundamental grammar such as none but the uneducated could have committed.

(1) *Gender.* In the matter of gender the only real violation of strict agreement with which Varro can be charged is the equation of *res* with the neuter plural, e.g. *rust.* 1. 1. 11 *circumcisus rebus quae non arbitror pertinere ad agri culturam*; 2. 1. 3 *cum viverent homines ex his rebus, quae inviolata ultro ferret terra*; 1. 7. 4 *quas res duas sequentur altera illa duo*; 2. 7. 6 *quod eisdem rebus in emptione dominum mutant, ut in Manili actionibus sunt perscripta.* (1. 39. 3 *de singulis rebus videndum quae tempore locoque facias* is wrongly adduced by Keil (on 1. 1. 11) and Heidrich (p. 38), since *quae* is not a relative, but an interrogative, pronoun. The same is true, though less obviously, in the case of 1. 5. 4 *tertia pars quae de rebus dividitur, quae ad quamque rem sint praeparanda et ubi quaeque facienda.*) Two of the above passages, 1. 7. 4 and 2. 7. 6, involve no violation of agreement whatsoever, and merely illustrate the natural affinity between *res* and the neuter plural. Even the use of the neuter plural relative pronoun is a perfectly natural modification of strict usage. The equation of *res* and the neuter plural had already found literary expression in Lucretius; cf. 1. 57, with Bailey's note (p. 607 of his edition), and his remarks in his Prolegomena (p. 95).

Other examples of alleged violation of gender which are cited by Heidrich (p. 38) are not on close inspection substantiated. It is not so much Varro's grammar, as the interpretation of it, which is at fault. It will be worth while to discuss some of these passages in detail, because it is in this respect, more than in any other, that the carelessness of Varro has been exaggerated.

rust. 1. 16. 2 *quae vicinitatis invectos habent idoneos . . . propter ea fructuosa.* The reference is not, as Heidrich thinks, to *agros* in the previous sentence. The noun which is in Varro's mind, and which is to be supplied, is *praedia*, which appears early in the following sentence.

rust. 2. 1. 7 *sed etiam ab iis principibus duodecim signa multi numerant ab ariete et tauro, cum ea praeponerent Apollini et Herculi.* Since *aries* and *taurus* here are not actual animals, but *signa*, it is perfectly appropriate that the neuter pronoun *ea* should be used to refer to them.

rust. 2. 9. 1 *in suillo pecore tamen sunt quae se vindicent, verres, maiales, scrofae. prope enim haec apris, qui in silvis saepe dentibus canes occiderunt.* Since *quae* and *haec* refer to a group of animals of different gender, the use of the neuter needs no justification.

ling. 5. 38 *ubi frumenta secta, ut terantur, arescunt, area. propter horum similitudinem in urbe loca pura areae.* *horum* (= *harum rerum*) expresses Varro's thought more adequately than *harum* (sc. *arearum*) would have done, in that it distinguishes the thing which is called *area* from the name itself.

ling. 5. 98 *aries† qui eam dicebant ares, veteres nostri ariuga, hinc ariugas. haec sunt quorum in sacrificiis exta in olla, non in veru coquuntur, quas et Accius scribit et in pontificiis libris videmus.* It is not necessary here to discuss the corrupt first sentence, on which it will be sufficient to refer to the apparatus of Goetz-Schoell, and now to that of J. Collart in his edition of Book 5 (p. 64).¹ It seems to be certain that the last word of this sentence is a feminine plural form, and to this *quas*, which also appears to be firmly established, must refer. Varro

¹ J. Collart, *Varro de lingua Latina, Livre V* (Paris, 1954).

cannot, in close succession, have associated two relative pronouns of different gender with the same feminine antecedent. Augustinus, who was followed by K. O. Mueller and R. G. Kent, must have been right in changing *quorum* to *quarum*. If Varro wrote *haec* as a feminine plural (cf. Keil on *rust.* 3. 6. 2), it is easy to see how a misunderstanding of it could have caused *quarum* to be changed. Alternatively, it would have been equally easy, once *quorum* had entered the text, for *hae* to become *haec*.

The examples considered so far have all involved the use of a neuter plural. Heidrich (pp. 38-39) draws up a list of passages in which he sees a striking use of neuter singular pronouns referring to nouns of a different gender. In many of these instances it is clear that what Heidrich regards as a violation of gender-agreement is correct Latin in Varro or any other author. Take, for example, *ling.* 5. 34 *ager dictus in quam terram quid agebant, et unde quid agebant fructus causa. ali*< i>*, quod id Graeci dicunt ἀγρόν*. *id* is right here, and *eum* would be wrong; it is equivalent to *eam rem*, and refers, not to *ager*, but to the concept to which the name *ager* was given. Similarly, in *ling.* 5. 119 *lucerna post inventa, quae dicta a luce aut quod id vocant λύχνον Graeci, id* refers, not to *lucerna*, but to the thing which the Romans call *lucerna*, the Greeks *λύχνος*.

rust. 1. 2. 26 *iubet ranam luridam coicere in aquam, usque qua ad tertiam partem decoixeris, eoque unguere corpus.* In the course of the sentence the frog has become a brew, to which a feminine pronoun could no longer appropriately refer. In a similar passage, 3. 16. 28 *aliu uam passam et ficum cum pisierunt, affundunt sapam atque ex eo factas offas apponunt ibi*, Heidrich rightly recognizes that *ex eo* refers to the mixture.

ling. 5. 105 *hinc panarium, ubi id servabant.* There is no reason to suppose that Varro's readers would imagine (as Heidrich seems to do) that he was treating *panis* as neuter. *id* is equivalent to *eam rem* ('that commodity'), and produces more elegant Latin than *eum* would have done.

ling. 5. 159 *vicus Ciprius a cipro, quod ibi Sabini cives additi considerunt, qui a bono omni*ne* id appellarunt.* *id* is here quasi-cognate—'gave it that name', a perfectly natural use, though both Kent and Collart fail to recognize it in their translations.¹

rust. 1. 48. 2 *arista et granum omnibus fere notum, gluma paucis. itaque id apud Ennium solum scriptum scio esse.* We should probably supply *vocabulum* with *id*; at any rate it is significant that that word occurs twice in the immediately following context.

rust. 2. 2. 3 *ventrem quoque ut habeat pilosum. itaque quae id non habent, maiores nostri apicas appellabant.* *id* ('that feature'), not *eum*, is the natural way to refer to *ventrem pilosum*. The same is true of 3. 11. 1 *primum locum, quo est facultas, eligere oportet palustrem . . . si id non, potissimum ubi . . .*, where Heidrich's suggestion that *fieri potest* could be supplied is unnecessary.

rust. 1. 31. 5 *vicia dicta a vinciendo, quod item capreolos habet ut vitis, quibus cum susum versus serpit, ad scapum lupini aliumve quem ut haereat, id solet vincire.* Keil (Comm., p. 89) takes *id* to mean the point which the vetch has reached ('*id quo pervenit*'). An alternative explanation would be that the generalizing effect of the words *aliumve quem* justifies the use of *id* rather than of *eum*.

A difficult passage is *rust.* 1. 3 *de iis rebus quae scientia sit in colendo nos docete, ars id an quid aliud* (for the corrected text see Keil's note and p. 10 above), where

¹ Lewis and Short give no instance of this use of the neuter pronoun with *appello*. However, cf. Seneca, *Contr.* 2. 2. 3 *socer—hoc enim te appellabo quamdiu vixeris.*

Heidrich makes *id* refer to *scientia*. We must observe, first, that the manuscript text at this point is seriously dislocated, and Keil's restoration, though probable, cannot be regarded as certain; and secondly, that, even if we accept Keil's text, it is at least possible to interpret it in such a way that *id* refers, not to *scientia*, but to *colendo*: 'Now that the character of those things which should be dissociated from agriculture has been determined, about that subject what science there is—I mean in the matter of cultivation—*instruct us*,¹ whether it is an art or something else.' This translation, though inelegant, is closer, I believe, to Varro's methods of composition than Keil's interpretation (*Comm.*, p. 24), which would take *de iis rebus* closely with *in colendo*, as equivalent to 'de iis rebus quae ad culturam pertinent'. Having written the words *quae scientia sit*, Varro realized that the phrase *de iis rebus* was insufficiently clear, and did not provide the necessary contrast to *quae diuulgenda essent a cultura*. Rather than rewrite his phrase, therefore, he added the explanatory words *in colendo*.

Two passages, in which Varro appears to attach the neuter relative *quod* to a masculine antecedent, I have discussed elsewhere.² They are *rust.* 1. 8. 6 *vinctu*, *quod antiqui vocabant cestum* and 3. 7. 2 *incedunt in locum unum*, *quod alii vocant peristerona, alii peristerotrophion*. A survey of Varro's use of defining relative clauses in the *Res Rusticae* shows that in most cases, and invariably when the defining clause completes its antecedent, the relative pronoun agrees with the antecedent; in a smaller number of passages, in which the antecedent is complete in itself, and sometimes forms a more or less complex phrase, the pronoun agrees with the predicate.³

In 1. 8. 6 *cestum* is certainly masculine, and since the word *vinctus* does not occur elsewhere, we are justified in concluding that *vinctu* is a corruption of an original neuter noun, possibly *vinclo*. In 3. 7. 2 the adjective *unum* gives a sort of self-completeness to *locum*, and enables *quod* to be regarded either as equivalent to *quam rem*, or as agreeing with the neuter half of the predicate, *peristerotrophion*, which has occurred twice in the immediately preceding context.

Of Heidrich's examples few now remain. *rust.* 3. 12. 6 *tertii generis est* (sc. *lepus*) *quod in Hispania nascitur, similis nostro lepori ex quadam parte sed humile, quem cuniculum appellant* shows a genuine and natural looseness of expression due to the fact that Varro had both *genus* and *lepus* in mind. In *ling.* 5. 16 *Asia in quo etiam Syria*, A. Spengel retained *in quo* 'ut satis Varronianum', but we should probably follow Laetus and Mueller in reading *in qua*. A difficult passage is *rust.* 2. 7. 2 *aetas cognoscitur et equorum et fere omnium qui unguis indivisa habent et etiam cornutarum, quod equus . . .* etc. If the text is sound, Keil's explanation, that Varro wrote *qui* because he had in mind *muli* and *asiini*, the only animals, apart from the horse, which have the uncloven hoof, and *cornutarum*, because he was thinking of *pecudes*, is the most likely one, and is in keeping with other examples already given where Varro's noun has to be supplied.

(2) *Number*. Varro shows a marked tendency, in the same sentence or in two successive sentences, to pass from singular to plural, or vice versa, when

¹ The Latin text of the early part of the sentence here translated is quoted on p. 5 above.

² *Hermes*, lxxxv. 1. 126-8.

³ In the article referred to I included under predicate-agreement *rust.* 1. 8. 4 in *tubulos fictiles cum fundo pertuso, quas cuspides appellant*. *quas*, however, is Keil's emendation

of the manuscript reading *quos*, which, if we retain it, as we probably should, is an example of 'normal' agreement (cf. Schmalz-Hofmann 636, sect. 210b). Professor W. S. Watt kindly pointed out to me this oversight, and I am glad to take the opportunity of correcting it.

referring to one and the same noun. This practice is not elegant, but most of Varro's passages are characterized by nothing more than an inaccuracy which, in unpremeditated language, is perfectly natural and intelligible. In a few cases Varro's critics have failed to see that his change of number is justified, and indeed demanded, by the sense. The residue of difficult instances is not large.

This sort of variation appears in its most characteristic form when Varro first uses a noun in a 'typical' or 'generic' sense, and then refers to it by an equivalent plural; e.g. *rust.* 2. 8. 2 *nullum asinum a partu recentem subiunt equae, cuius lacte ampliores funt*; *ling.* 5. 94 . . . *vindemiator vel quod vinum legit dicitur vel quod hi viti id demunt*; *rust.* 2. 3. 7 *ne colonus capra natum in fundo pascat. harum enim dentes inimici sationi*; 2. 4. 19 *a partu decem diebus proximis non producunt ex haris matrem, praeterquam potum. praeteritis decem diebus sinunt exire pastum in propinquum locum villae, ut crebro reditu lacte alere possint porcos*; 3. 9. 14 *ne quae serpens accedat, quarum bestiarum ex odore solent interire*. A similar change from a plural to a generic singular is seen in the following passages: *rust.* 2. 9. 3-4 (dogs) *facie debent esse formosi . . . pedibus magnis et latis, qui ingredienti ei displodantur*; 2. 8. 4 (asses) *hos pascimus praecipue faeno atque hordeo . . . itemque ut ineat equas per origas curamus* (*itemque*—Keil for MS. *idemque*); 2. 11. 7 (sheep) *tondas* (sc. *oves*) *recentes eodem die perungunt vino et oleo . . . et si ea tecta solet esse . . . etc.* (similarly in *rust.* 2. 7. 3, on the subject of horses, and in 3. 12. 4, of hares). In *rust.* 3. 7. 9 there is a change from plural to singular, and back to plural: *nihil columbis secundius. itaque diebus quadragenis concipit et pascit et incubat et educat. et hoc fere totum annum faciunt*.

To the same category belong the following: *rust.* 2. 3. 6 *non multo aliter tuendum hoc pecus* (sc. *caprinum*) *in pastu atque ovillum; tamen habent sua propria quadam*; 3. 12. 6 *alterius generis est* (sc. *lepus*), *quod in Gallia nascitur ad Alpis, qui hoc fere mutant, quod toti candidi sunt*. Not quite so easy is the transition from a collective singular in *rust.* 1. 49. 1: *cum peraruit (herba), de his manipulos fieri a vehi ad villam*.

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These examples are too numerous and striking to be dismissed as mere errors of haste. The agreement of relative pronouns must, for the educated Roman, have been a matter of instinct, and he was not likely to get it wrong however rapidly he wrote. Keil (on *rust.* 1. 17. 3) suggests that Varro uses *in quo* in the sense of 'in quo negotio' or 'in qua parte', and it is true that there are occasional instances of such a use in Cicero's letters, e.g. *fam.* 1. 9. 7 *tota vero interrogatio mea nihil habuit nisi reprehensionem illius tribunatus: in quo omnia dicta sunt libertate animoque maximo de vi, de auspiciis . . . etc.*; *ib.* 4. 2. 4 *restat ut discedendum putem. in quo reliqua videtur esse deliberatio . . . etc.*; *ib.* 12. 23. 3 *habes formam rei publicae—si in castris potest esse res publica; in quo tuam vicem saepe doleo . . .* (where some editors have changed *in quo* to *in qua*). It is to be noted, however, that in all these passages the words *in quo* occur at the beginning of clauses which are sufficiently separate from what has gone before to be regarded as new sentences. The relative pronoun can therefore, without violence, refer to the sense of the previous clause as a whole. But this is not true of the majority of instances in Varro, in which the relative is clearly and closely associated with a plural antecedent. One must conclude that Varro was using *in quo* as an indeclinable relative adverb ('wherein') analogous to the adverbial *quo* or *qua*. Whether this was a current colloquial usage or an innovation of Varro himself, we cannot say; probably the latter, since, had the use gained any wide currency, it must have left some other trace in Latin literature.

(e) *Use of the gerundive*

Varro's use of the gerundive is typical of his style as a whole, in that it shows his taste for the archaic and the colloquial, as well as the occasional irregularity produced by haste. He displays a tendency (not, however, consistently followed) to use the impersonal gerundive with a direct accusative object, where his contemporaries would have used the personal form. In *rust.* 1. 20 and 21, for example, there are five instances of such use: *quos . . . parandum, hos . . . non emendum, ita (eos) . . . subigendum, haec . . . valentiora parandum, canes . . . habendum.* On the other hand, in the two following chapters, 22 and 23, there are no

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(e) *Use of the gerundive*

Varro's use of the gerundive is typical of his style as a whole, in that it shows his taste for the archaic and the colloquial, as well as the occasional irregularity produced by haste. He displays a tendency (not, however, consistently followed) to use the impersonal gerundive with a direct accusative object, where his contemporaries would have used the personal form. In *rust.* 1. 20 and 21, for example, there are five instances of such use: *quos . . . parandum, hos . . . non emendum, ita (eos) . . . subigendum, haec . . . valentiora parandum, canes . . . habendum*. On the other hand, in the two following chapters, 22 and 23, there are no

examples of the impersonal gerundive with an object, but five of the personal: *haec . . . praecipienda, quaedam . . . serenda, ea discriminanda, locus eligendus, virgulta serenda*. With *locus eligendus* we may compare the use of the impersonal gerundive in *rust.* 3. 8. 1 *locum constituendum proinde magnum ac multitudinem alere velis*. Varro, indeed, is quite capable of using both forms side by side in the same sentence: 3. 16. 37 *deinde concutiendum (eas) leviter ipso vaso, ut manu non tangas, et ponendae in sole*.

A peculiarity which occurs three times in the *Res Rusticae* is the association, with a gerundial or gerundival phrase, of a present participle in the accusative referring to the unspecified person who is in Varro's mind, and who, if the equivalent *oportet* + infinitive construction were being used, would appear (if expressed) in the accusative case. This sense-construction, though violent enough from the strictly grammatical point of view, is a convenient inaccuracy, and would cause no difficulty in informal language: *rust.* 1. 23. 3 *quaedam etiam serenda non tam propter praesentem fructum quam in annum prospicentem*; 2. 7. 14 *dandum hordeum, cotidie adicentem minutatim*; 3. 9. 14 *prodigendae in solem et in stercinum . . . quod ita abiores sunt; neque pullos, sed omne ornithoboscion . . . evitantem calorem et frigus*.

The last passage (3. 9. 14) illustrates another Varronian inaccuracy which might also be described as a sense-construction, and of which there are three examples. Because *prodigendae* is equivalent to 'oportet prodigere eas (sc. gallinas)' or 'prodigendum est eas', Varro continues, as if this were the construction, with the accusative *neque pullos, sed omne ornithoboscion*. The other two passages are: 3. 3. 4 *neque non etiam quaedam adsumenda in villam sine retibus aucupis, venatoris, piscatoris, ut glires, cochlias, gallinas*; 3. 9. 4 *scilicet genera ei tria paranda, maxime villaticas gallinas*. It may be significant that these passages all occur in the third book of the *Res Rusticae*, and comparatively close to one another; Varro's haste to complete the work had perhaps become more pressing than ever. It seems clear, when we consider the three passages, that Kruenberg's explanation of 3. 9. 4, mentioned earlier (p. 10), is wrong.

(f) Anacoluthon

In the general sense of looseness of syntax, a number of passages already examined may be described as examples of anacoluthon. Strictly speaking, however, this term is applied to sentences in which a writer passes from one construction to another grammatically inconsistent with it, often through the influence of an intervening clause or parenthesis. Such changes of construction may be conscious and deliberate, especially when the intruding passage is so long as to break the continuity of the reader's thought, and in such cases a writer will often introduce the new construction by a resumptive particle such as *sed*, *tamen*, *igitur*, or the like. But Varro shows little sign of being conscious of his anacolutha.

rust. 1. 63 *sub terra qui habent frumentum in iis quos vocant sirus, quod cum periculo introiit recenti apertione, ita ut quibusdam sit interclusa anima, aliquanto post promere, quam aperueris, oportet*. The intervention of the *quod*- and *ut*-clauses has led Varro to slip from a 3rd person plural to a generalizing 2nd person singular, which persists in the following sentence, *far quod in spicis condideris . . . etc.* *rust.* 2. 9. 16 *villatico vero gregi in fundum satis (sc. est) esse duo, et id marem et feminam. ita enim sunt adsiduiores, quod cum altero item alter fit acrior, et si alteruter aeger est, ne sine cane gres sit*. The words *quod . . . aeger est* are Keil's very probable restoration

of the manuscript reading *quod cum altero idem fit acrior et si alter videm fiter aeger est*, though even this corrupt text reveals the structure of Varro's sentence. He is giving two reasons for keeping on a farm a pair of dogs, male and female. The first reason is a statement of fact, followed by a subordinate *quod*-clause; the second, preceded by its own subordinate conditional clause, is expressed by the grammatically incongruous *ne . . . sit*.

Varro, however, is capable of such incongruity without the excuse of intervening clauses. Perhaps the most striking instance of this is *rust. 2. 4. 12 non minus res admiranda cum mi esset dicta in Arcadia, scio meisse spectatum suum, quae prae pinguitudine carnis non modo surges non posset, sed etiam* (sc. tam pinguis esset) *ut in eius corpore sores exesa carne nidum fecisset et peperisset mures.*

A peculiar type of anacoluthon is seen in a number of passages in which Varro uses both a causal conjunction and a relative pronoun, where one or the other is out of place, e.g. *rust. 1. 1. 2 quare, quoniam emisti fundum, quem bene colendo fructuosum cum facere velis . . . experiar.* The closest parallel to this which I have found is *ling. 7. 76 iubar dicitur stella Lucifer, quae in summo quod habet lumen diffusum, ut leo in capite iubar.* Keil, on 1. 1. 2 (Comm., p. 5), quotes several instances of similar confusion. *rust. 3. 2. 13 duo enim genera cum sint . . . de quibus et Poenus Mago et Cassius Dionysius . . . quaedam . . . in libris reliquerunt* (where the presence of *cum* makes *quibus* incongruous). A close parallel is 3. 16. 2, in which, after a *cum*-clause, *a quo* is similarly out of construction. (*rust. 3. 16. 18*, which appears to show an inconsistent relative of the same type, will be discussed later.) Somewhat different is *rust. 2. 1. 3 et homines et pecudes cum semper fuisse sit necesse natura, sive enim aliquod fuit principium generandi . . . sive contra principium horum exstitit nullum, . . . necesse est humanae vitae ab summa memoria gradatim descendisse ad hanc aetatem*, where *enim* throws the preceding *cum*-clause out of construction.

An incongruous relative pronoun, where a concessive conjunction might have been expected, is seen in *ling. 6. 39 Democritus, Epicurus, item alii qui infinita principia dixerunt, quae unde sint non dicunt, sed cuiusmodi sint, tamen faciunt magnum.*

quod (conjunction) and *enim* are combined in the following two passages: *rust. 1. 13. 4 quod enim quam recens quod confracuit melius; 1. 55. 1 quae manu stricta (sc. olea) melior ea quae digitis nudis, quam illa quae cum digitabulis, durities enim eorum quod non solum stringit bacam, sed etiam ramos glubit.* Heidrich (p. 63) takes both these as examples of colloquial abundance. Whilst such abundance is undoubtedly an occasional feature of Varro's writing (see Heidrich, pp. 62 ff.), Keil is much more likely to be right in explaining 1. 13. 4 as an archaic-colloquial intensifying use of *enim* (cf. Schmalz-Hofmann, pp. 619, 680). Keil adduces a clear example of this use in *rust. 2. 4. 8 ut volentur in luto, quae enim illorum requies*, but it is doubtful whether he is right in accounting for 1. 55. 1 in the same way. An intensifying *enim* preceding the causal conjunction or relative pronoun to which it belonged would be quite unparalleled, not to say illogical. It is more probable that in 1. 55. 1 *enim* appears through a careless incongruity of construction, encouraged perhaps by Varro's habit of postponing such conjunctions as *quod*.

Anacoluthon is no doubt the explanation of the irregularity in *rust. 2. 9. 2 cum scio mulorum gregem cum pasceretur <et> eo venisset lupus, ultro mulos circumfluxisse et unguibus caedendo eum occidisse.* Keil sees in *mulorum gregem* prolepsis of the subject of *pasceretur*, but none of the other examples which he cites (on 1. 2. 8, Comm., p. 13) is really comparable (see p. 6 above).

A special type of anacoluthon was examined by E. Norden in an article mentioned earlier: 'De genere quodam dicendi Varronian' (*Rh. Mus.*, n.F. xlvi [1893], 547-51). In this usage 'praeponitur substantivum generale, cui cum species debeant subiungi, potius adiunguntur'. After quoting a few examples from early Latin, e.g. Cato fr. p. 18. 24 (Jordan): *mittit adversum illos imperator Karthaginiensis peditatum equitatumque, quos in exercitu viros habuit strenuissimos*, Norden proceeds to collect a number of Varronian passages in which he finds the same feature. The clearest instances are the first part of *rust.* 1. 55. 1 (quoted above) *quae manu stricta* (sc. *olea*), *melior ea quae digitis nudis quam illa quae cum digitabulis* and 2. 4. 9 *nuptiarum initio antiqui reges ac sublimes viri in Etruria in coniunctione nuptiali nova nupta et novus maritus primum porcum immolant*. We may accept, also, as belonging to the same archaic type, *rust.* 2. 5. 10 *transmarini* (sc. *boves*) *Epirotici non solum meliores totius Graeciae, sed etiam quam Italiae*. On the other hand, some of Norden's passages do not seem to be relevant. In 1. 4. 2 *ea . . . pleraque* (n.pl.) is hardly less natural than *ea omnia*, and parallels in other Latin authors would not be hard to find. The following are more probably to be regarded as cases of attracted antecedent of a relative clause, with omission of pronoun (see p. 8 above): *rust.* 1. 52. 1 *quae seges grandissima . . . etc.*; 2. 11. 6 *qui aspargi solent sales . . . etc.* (both quoted in full on p. 8). To these we may add a passage quoted by Krumbiegel (p. 44) as an instance of anacoluthon: *rust.* 1. 27. 2 *vere sationes quae sunt*, (sc. *iis*) *terram rudem proscindere oportet*. In 3. 3. 8 *neque enim erat magnum id saepum, quod nunc ut habeant multos apros ac capreas complura iugera maceris concludunt* Norden takes *complura iugera* in apposition to *quod*; Keil wishes to read *habeat* (with *quod* as subject). But surely we should regard *quod* as a conjunction, equivalent here to 'whereas' (Schmalz-Hofmann, pp. 722 f.; Kühner-Stegmann, *Lat. Gramm.*, ii. 2. 321 f.). It may be worth while to draw attention to the fact that Lucretius, at 1. 221, uses *quod nunc* in just this sense.

Pruned to this extent, Norden's examples of the archaic apposition pattern give less support to his claim to see the same feature in *rust.* 2. 5. 18 *quae exscripta de Magonis libris armentarium meum crebro ut aliquid legat curo*. *aliquid* is difficult, and Keil's explanation (rejected by Norden), that it is to be taken adverbially with *legat*, may not be right (*aliquid significare* in Cic. *Sest.* 10 is not a sound parallel). On the other hand, if *aliquid* is taken as a pronoun, *crebro* is awkward, for it naturally suggests the rereading of the same passage, which Varro obviously cannot have intended. Perhaps Keil's interpretation should not be entirely ruled out.

VI. SOME CHARACTERISTIC PASSAGES

The special features of any writer's style need to be studied in isolation if they are to be understood, but, to form an adequate idea of his manner of writing as a whole, we must look beyond the limits of the short phrase or sentence. Having examined the salient peculiarities of Varro's sentence-structure, and the types of negligence to which he is most prone, we may profitably consider some characteristic passages in which they are exhibited, and then go on to contemplate a few of his longer periods.

ling. 6. 60 *ab eo quoque potest dictum* (sc. *esse*) *nominare, quod res novae in usum quoniam additiae erant, quibus ea novissent, nomina ponebant*.

quoniam is Augustinus' correction of the MS. reading *quomodo*. Here we observe the omission of *esse* in the Perfect Pass. Infinitive after *potest*, anastrophe of the

conjunction *quom*, and the placing of the relative clause before its antecedent (*nomina*). The subject of *ponebant* (here *homines*) is omitted. Vertranus emended *ea* to *eas*, and he has been followed by modern editors, but, in view of Varro's readiness to equate neuter plural pronouns with *res* (see p. 15 above), the MS. reading is probably correct.

ling. 7. 44 tutulati dicti hi, qui in sacris in capitibus habere solent ut metam; id tutulus appellatus ab eo quod matres familias crines convolutos ad verticem capitis quos habent vitta velatos dicebantur tutuli.

vitta is a virtually certain conjecture of K. O. Mueller; *velatos* is Laetus's correction of the MS. *velatas*. We notice the omission of the auxiliary verb with *dicti* and *appellatus*. The second part of the sentence, baffling at first sight, becomes intelligible as soon as we remember Varro's taste for anastrophe. In this case, not only has the relative pronoun been postponed, but its antecedent *crines convolutos*, which is the subject of the main verb, has been attracted into the relative clause, and consequently appears in the accusative case. (For a similar though less startling instance of attraction together with anastrophe cf. *rust. 3. 16. 34* *favi qui eximuntur, si qua pars (eorum) nihil habet . . .*) The construction is: 'quod crines convoluti, quos matres familias ad verticem capitis habent vitta velatos, dicebantur tutuli'. We may note also, in passing, the agreement of the verb *appellatus* with the predicate, instead of with the subject. Krumbiegel (p. 13) quotes several other instances of this feature in Varro.

ling. 8. 27 praeterea quoivis utilitatis causa quaeque res sit inventa, si ex ea quis id sit consecutus, amplius eam scrutari cum sit nimium otiosi, et cum utilitatis causa verba ideo sint imposita rebus ut ea significant, si id consequimur una consuetudine, nihil prodest analogia.

quoivis and *eam* are corrections, by K. O. Mueller and Augustinus respectively, of the manuscript readings *quod ius* and *ea*. Vertranus emended the *ea* before *significant* to *eas*, but, as in *ling. 6. 60* above (and for the same reason), probably unnecessarily. The relative clause *quoivis . . . sit inventa* is followed by its antecedent (*id*). There is anastrophe of *si* and, in the following clause, of *cum*.

ling. 9. 15 et hi qui pueros in ludum mittunt, ut discant quae nesciunt verba quemadmodum sribant, idem barbatos qui ignorabunt verba quemadmodum oporteat dici non docebimus, ut sciant qua ratione conveniat dici?

Here anastrophe of *quemadmodum* occurs twice. *hi qui . . . mittunt*, with its apparently hanging nominative, looks like an example of anacoluthon, and is so taken, for instance, by Kent. But it is preferable, perhaps, to regard it as an instance of the relative clause preceding its antecedent (*barbatos*), the demonstrative pronoun, which properly belongs to *barbatos*, being attracted into the relative clause. It would thus be analogous to the attraction noted in *ling. 7. 44* above.

rust. 1. 7. 3 hoc licet conjectura videre ex aliquot rebus, ut nuces integras quas uno modio comprehendere possis, quod putamina suo loco quaeque habet natura composita, cum easdem, si fregeris, vix sesquimodio concipere possis.

This passage has puzzled commentators. Schneider wished to delete *cum*, Ursinus *si*. Keil (*Comm.*, p. 32) thinks that *nuces* is nominative, and that the verb *sunt* is omitted, comparing *rust. 1. 46*, which is relevant, and *3. 5. 2*, which is not. The sentence is quite intelligible as it stands, if we recognize the

Varronian tricks: anastrophe of *quas* and of *cum*, and prior position of the relative clause. The construction is: 'ut cum ("as when") easdem nuces, quas integras uno modio comprehendere possis . . . si fregeris (sc. eas), vix sesquimodio concipere possis'. The instance singled out *ex aliquot rebus* is expressed by the hypothetical clause *cum . . . concipere possis*, the full extent of which is not immediately obvious because of the anastrophe of *cum*.

To illustrate Varro's period-building we begin with a few shorter and comparatively successful specimens, before venturing on some of the tangles of words which were apt to result when Varro became involved in a more ambitious structure.

ling. 7. 109 sed quod vereor ne plures sint futuri qui de hoc genere me quod nimium multa scripserim reprehendant, quam quod reliquerim quaedam accusent, ideo potius reprimendum quam procudendum puto esse volumen.

The thought has presented itself to Varro in the form of a natural and simple antithesis, which he could not, without perversity, express otherwise than in a balanced sentence.¹

ling. 9. 11 cum vituperandus non sit medicus qui e longinqua mala consuetudine aegrum in meliorem traducit, quare reprehendendus sit qui orationem minus valentem propter malam consuetudinem traducat in meliorem?

The concinnity of this sentence has been essentially imposed by the thought, and owes little to Varro's conscious art. Had he considered it worth while to take pains with the form, he would surely have avoided the lame repetition of the phrase 'in meliorem traducere', rather than merely mitigate it by a change of order. In fact, where the thought is a simple comparison or contrast, and Varro is not tempted into parenthetic digression, he can express himself, if not with elegance, at least without uncouthness or obscurity.

ling. 9. 13 quod si viri sapientissimi, et in re militari et in aliis rebus multa contra veterem consuetudinem cum essent ausi, laudati (sc. sunt), despiciendi sunt qui potiorem dicunt oportere esse consuetudinem ratione. rust. 1. 4. 4 ita enim salubritas, quae ducitur e caelo ac terra non est in nostra potestate, sed in naturae, ut tamen multum sit in nobis quo, graviora quae sunt, ea diligentia leviora facere possimus.

But when, as often happens, Varro is moved in the course of a sentence to digress for the sake of explanation or illustration, the result may be chaotic.

rust. 3. 16. 18 et quidam dicunt, tria genera cum sint ducum in apibus, niger, ruber, varius, ut Menecrates scribit, duo, niger et varius, qui ita melior, ut expedit mellario, cum duo sint (in) eadem alvo, interficere nigrum, cum sit cum altero rege, esse seditionis et corrumpere alvom quod fuget aut cum multitudine fugetur. (in added by Keil.)

Heidrich (p. 29) and Keil (*Comm.* pp. 289 f.) both explain this in the same way; the original thought was 'quidam dicunt nigrum esse seditionis', and the expansion of this, first by *tria genera . . . interficere nigrum*, and then by *cum . . . rege*, caused the structure to be dislocated. Earlier editors had altered the first *et* to *ut*, making *ut quidam dicunt* parallel to *ut Menecrates scribit*, the *qui* then becoming an incongruous relative, similar to those noted above in 3. 2. 13 and 3. 16. 2 (p. 21). But the *Oratio Obliqua esse seditionis et corrumpere alvom* still

¹ Cf. Cicero, *Or. 166* semper haec, quae opponuntur contraria, numerum oratorium necessitate ipsa efficiunt etiam sine industria.

remains a stubborn obstacle, and Merula's 'quem scit' for *cum sit* (*cum altero rege*) is too patently artificial to require serious consideration. Varro is evidently here quoting the views of his authorities. At the beginning of the sentence he is diverted from his main object, which is to state that the two sorts of queen-bee should not be allowed to coexist in the same hive, by the desire to draw his readers' attention to a discrepancy in his authorities about the number of types of queen-bee. (In fact, this observation appears to rest on his own misunderstanding of Aristotle, *Hist. Anim.* 9. 40. 175, as Keil (p. 290) points out.) What happened to Varro's sentence next is not clear. Did he add the relative clause as a further piece of parenthetical information (perhaps from Menecrates), and then complete his main clause as well as he could now remember it? If we supply *nigrum* with *esse seditionis*, the period certainly has a tenuous grammatical consistency, but the thought is very unbalanced, since Varro is now saying less in the culminating part of his period than he has already said in the previous relative clause. Or ought we to regard the period as ending at *nigrum*, the words *cum sit . . . fugetur* being an explanatory addition, drawn from Varro's authorities? This would improve the latter part of the passage so far as the sense is concerned, but the earlier part would now be in a worse condition, for, in addition to an incongruous relative, the verb *dicunt* (unless we accepted the emendation of *et* to *ut*) would be left without a construction. All that we can say with certainty is that Varro began his period without a clear idea of how he was to end it.

ling. 8. 31 *quod si quis duplicum putat esse summam, ad quas metas naturae sit perveniendum in usu, utilitatis et elegantiae, quod non solum vestiti esse volumus ut vitemus frigus, sed etiam ut videamur vestiti esse honeste, non domum habere ut simus in tecto et tuto solum, quo necessitas contruserit, sed etiam ubi voluptas retineri possit, non solum vasa ad victum habilia, sed etiam figura bella atque ab artifice (ficta), quod aliud homini, aliud humanitati satis est; quodvis sienti homini poculum idoneum, humanitati nisi bellum parum; sed cum discessum est ab utilitate ad voluptatem, tamen in eo ex dissimilitudine plus voluptatis quam ex similitudine saepe capitur.* (ficta was supplied by L. Spengel. nisi is Aldus's correction of the MS. si.)

The period sets out promisingly enough, until Varro reaches the word *elegantiae*. Here he feels the need for illustration (*quod . . . honeste*), but one illustration leads to a second, and the second to a third. Even now the situation might be saved, since the illustrations are syntactically parallel. But Varro decides that he must explain the illustrations, and, not content with that, he adds a parenthesis (*quodvis . . . parum*) to illustrate his explanation! The original sentence has become hopelessly lost, and, in this case, he himself recognizes the fact, and abandons it (*sed cum discessum est ab utilitate . . .*).

The same disruptive effect of accumulated explanation is to be seen in the following passage: *rust.* 1. 41. 4 *e quibus parvis quod enasci coliculi vix queunt—omnia enim minuta et arida ad crescendum tarda, ea quae laxiora, et secundiora, ut femina quam mas et pro portione in virgultis item: itaque ficus, malus punica et vitis propter femineam mollitiam ad crescendum prona, contra palma et cypressus et olea in crescendo tarda: in hoc enim umidiora quam aridiora—quare ex terra potius in seminaris surculos de ficeo quam grana de fico expedit obruiere, praeter si nequeas, ut siquando quis trans mare s'mina mittere aut inde petere vult.*

The explanation *omnia enim . . . in virgultis item* is expanded by a further

explanation of *virgultis*. By the time he has completed this, Varro has lost sight of his opening clause, as the grammatically incongruous *quare* shows. These last two passages fully bear out the belief that Varro wrote without pausing to shape his sentences, adding fresh thoughts as he went along, and paying little attention to the architectural soundness of his longer 'periods'. When he began such a period, he can seldom, if ever, have known how it was to end, so that when, by a devious route, he does sometimes reach a conclusion which is grammatically consistent with the beginning, we have the impression that it has happened by accident rather than by the writer's conscious effort, as, for instance, in *rust.* 2. 9. 6 *Publius Aufidius Pontianus Amiteminus cum greges ovium emisset in Umbria ultima, quibus gregibus sine pastoribus canes accessissent, pastores ut* (i.e. 'ea condicione ut pastores') *deducerent in Metapontinos saltus et Heracleas emporium, inde cum domum reduissent qui ad locum deduxerant, e desiderio hominum diebus paucis postea canes sua sponte, cum dierum multorum via interesset, sibi ex agris cibaria praebuerunt atque in Umbriam ad pastores redierunt.*

What happened when luck was against Varro is to be seen from the following monstrosity:

ling. 9. 34 qui autem duo genera esse dicunt analogiae, unum naturale, quod ut ex *⟨s⟩atis* nascentur *lentibus* *⟨lentis⟩* sic ex *⟨lupino⟩* *lupinum*, alterum voluntarium, ut in fabrica, cum vident scenam, ut in dexteriore parte sint ostia, sic esse in sinistro simili ratione factam, de his duobus generibus naturalem esse analogiam, ut sit in motibus caeli, voluntarium non esse, quod ut quoique fabro lubitum sit possit facere partes scenae: sic in hominum partibus esse analogias, quod ea⟨s⟩ natura faciat, in verbis non esse, quod ea homines ad suam quisque voluntatem fingat, itaque de eisdem rebus alia verba habere Graecos, alia Syros, alia Latinas: ego declinatus verborum et voluntarios et naturales esse puto, voluntarios quibus homines vocabula imposuerunt rebus quardam, ut ab Romulo Roma, ab Tibure Tiburtes, naturales ut ab impositis vocabulis quae inclinantur in tempora aut in casus, ut ab Romulo Romuli Romulum et ab dico dicebam dixeram. (*⟨s⟩atis*—Vertranius, for *natis*; *lentibus* and *lupino* supplied by L. Spengel; *eas*—Laetus, for *ea*.)

We need not attempt to analyse this tangle. It is sufficient to observe that Varro's exuberance of explanation and illustration results in such an accumulation of subordinate clauses that he forgets how his sentence began, and the first part of the period is abandoned without a main verb. The second part is more successful, partly because it is much shorter, but chiefly because the main clause is put first, thus ensuring that at least the general sense is complete.

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Note. While this article was in the press, a learned Reader, Mr. R. Burn, suggested (p. 12, on *rust.* 2. 7. 9) that *id* may have dropped out between *descendenti* and *dempisseret*. This would certainly ease the passage, and also provide a thoroughly Varronian use of *id* (see p. 16).

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		1. 2. 21	12	1. 65	19
6. 2	19	1. 2. 26	5. 16	1. 69. 1	9
6. 3	11	1. 3	5, 9, 10, 16f.	1. 69. 2	11
6. 19	10	1. 4. 2	12f., 22		
6. 39	21	1. 4. 4	24	2, praeft. 3	10
6. 40	4, 11	1. 5. 1	5. 9	2, praeft. 4	9
6. 49	13	1. 5. 4	15	2. 1. 3	4f., 15, 21
6. 53	6	1. 7. 2	7	2. 1. 4	5f.
6. 55	11	1. 7. 3	23f.	2. 1. 7	15
6. 57	5	1. 7. 4	15	2. 1. 15	7
6. 60	22f.	1. 8. 4	13, 17n.	2. 1. 19	5
6. 71	13f.	1. 8. 5	8	2. 1. 20	12, 19
6. 73	5, 14	1. 8. 6	17	2. 1. 21	14
6. 96	2	1. 9. 7	7, 9	2. 1. 23	5
		1. 11. 2	12	2. 2. 3	16
7. 4	4	1. 12. 1	12	2. 2. 5	5
7. 37	5	1. 12. 4	4	2. 2. 7	7
7. 44	23	1. 13. 2	5, 6, 8	2. 2. 12	8
7. 56	5	1. 13. 3	12	2. 2. 14	14
7. 76	21	1. 13. 4	21	2. 2. 15	14
7. 109	24	1. 16. 2	15	2. 2. 17	5
		1. 17. 3	19	2. 3. 6	18
8. 3	7	1. 17. 6	7	2. 3. 7	18
8. 8	11	1. 17. 7	7, 13	2. 3. 9	18
8. 10	8	1. 20	19	2. 4. 3	13

<i>Res Rusticae (cont.)</i>	<i>Page</i>	<i>Res Rusticae (cont.)</i>	<i>Page</i>	<i>Res Rusticae (cont.)</i>	<i>Page</i>
2. 4. 8	21	2. 9. 15	6	3. 9. 4	10, 20
2. 4. 9	22	2. 9. 16	20 f.	3. 9. 7	8
2. 4. 12	21	2. 10. 11	12	3. 9. 14	18, 20
2. 4. 16	13	2. 11	12	3. 9. 21	12
2. 4. 17	5	2. 11. 4	9	3. 10. 2	18
2. 4. 19	18	2. 11. 6	8, 22	3. 10. 4	6, 14
2. 5. 10	22	2. 11. 7	18	3. 11. 1	16
2. 5. 15	5, 7	3. 1. 9	7	3. 11. 2	9
2. 5. 18	6, 22	3. 2. 1	8	3. 12. 1	10, 19
2. 6. 2	8	3. 2. 13	21	3. 12. 4	12, 13, 18
2. 7. 2	17	3. 2. 15	8	3. 12. 6	17, 18
2. 7. 3	8, 18	3. 3. 4	20	3. 13. 1	8
2. 7. 6	15	3. 3. 8	22	3. 13. 3	5
2. 7. 9	5, 12	3. 4. 3	13	3. 14. 1	7, 13
2. 7. 14	20	3. 5. 4	12	3. 15. 12	6
2. 8. 2	18	3. 5. 7	5	3. 15. 2	21
2. 8. 4	18	3. 7. 2	17	3. 16. 15	13
2. 8. 5	10	3. 7. 4	14	3. 16. 18	24 f.
2. 9. 1	15	3. 7. 6	5	3. 16. 23	7
2. 9. 2	6, 21	3. 7. 7	14	3. 16. 27	5
2. 9. 3-4	18	3. 7. 8	5, 8	3. 16. 28	6, 16
2. 9. 5	5	3. 7. 9	18	3. 16. 32	5
2. 9. 6	26	3. 8. 1	20	3. 16. 34	8, 13, 23
2. 9. 10-11	14	3. 9. 2	18	3. 16. 37	20
2. 9. 11	18			3. 17. 10	11

THE RIDDLES IN VIRGIL'S THIRD ECLOGUE

Damoetas. Dic quibus in terris—et eris mihi magnus Apollo—
tris pateat caeli spatium non amplius ulnas.

Menalcas. Dic quibus in terris inscripti nomina regum
nascantur flores, et Phyllida solus habeto.

EDITORS and commentators ancient and modern have not responded very well to the challenge of the two riddles which round off the contest between Damoetas and Menalcas at the end of *Eclogue 3* (104-7). The first is generally regarded as impossibly difficult; the second as impossibly easy. Critics take refuge in quoting Servius' despairing statement: *sciendum aerigmata haec sicuti pleraque carere aperta solutione*. Yet it is most unlikely that Virgil would introduce insoluble or meaningless riddles into the *Bucolica*. If there is no solution the lines become pointless, even tasteless; and these are not epithets to be applied lightly to Virgil's poetry.

In the fog of perplexity which has descended upon commentators they have mostly fallen into that cardinal error of criticism which consists in losing sight of the actual words used by the author under appraisal. Thus Conington-Nettleship-Haverfield remark on the second riddle: 'The flower is the hyacinth. . . (If this traditional explanation be the right answer to the riddle, it is absurdly easy. Servius saw this and tries to redeem its credit by supposing a trap; the hyacinth, he says, grows in all lands, not in any special one.)' Even Rose, who is generally helpful, fails in this instance.¹ Virgil's question is not 'What', but 'Where', and the vitally important words *quibus in terris* and *nascantur* have been lost to view. If Virgil is vague here it is with a calculated vagueness. *Quibus in terris* can mean indifferently 'in what land' or 'in what lands'; *nascantur* can mean indifferently 'are born (i.e. grow)' or 'have their birthplace (i.e. first came into being, first grew)'.

One of the few surviving fragments of Euphorion's *Hyacinthus* reads:²

πορφυρέ ίάκινθε, σὲ μὲν μία φῆμις ἀοιδῶν
'Ροιτεῖς ἀμάθουσι δεδουπότος Αἰακίδαο
εἴαρος ἀντέλλειν γεγραμμένα κωκύονοσαν.

This, as Skutsch, following Rohde, saw, must have led on to another *φῆμις*, in accordance with which the hyacinth sprang from the blood of Hyacinthus, slain on the banks of the Eurotas.³ Here surely is the point of the second riddle, which is of the 'Heads I win, Tails you lose' variety. If the victim answered 'In Lacedaemon' the questioner would reply 'No, in Rhoetea'; if he answered 'In Rhoetea' the questioner would reply 'No, in Lacedaemon'. This may be one reason why no answer is attempted. *Caret aperta solutione* is, in fact, a fair verdict, though I do not think Servius meant his words to be taken in quite this

¹ *The Eclogues of Virgil* (Sather Classical Lectures, 1942), pp. 40 and 225.

² Powell, *Collectanea Alexandrina*, Euphorio f. 40 (= ΣK Theocr. x. 28).

³ Skutsch, *Aus Vergils Frühzeit*, p. 80. Rohde, *Der griechische Roman*, p. 97, n. 3. Ovid mentions both stories in *Metamorphoses*, 10. 162 ff., and 13. 394 ff., and links them together. Cf. Pliny, *N.H.* 21. 66.

sense. There are plenty of parallels for this kind of ambiguity in ancient oracular literature. A close analogy is the story of the wicked man who tried to trick the Delphic oracle by consulting it with a live sparrow hidden in his hand. He asked whether what he held was alive or dead, planning to squeeze the bird to death if the Pythia replied 'Alive', and to produce the live sparrow if she replied 'Dead'.¹ Virgil himself in *Aeneid* 3 tells how Aeneas settles in Crete in the mistaken belief that this is the fulfilment of Apollo's command: *antiquam exquirite matrem*.

Before examining the first riddle it is necessary to clear the ground by briefly considering the story repeated in Servius from Asconius (or possibly Cornutus)² that Virgil had been heard to say that he had set a trap for the critics in this passage; for they would ferret it out if anything were hidden more carefully than usual. Virgil, we are assured, was alluding in fact to a profligate Mantuan called Caelius, who squandered his wealth and was left at the end with only three ells of earth to lie in. Many commentators have accepted this solution. If they are right, there is little more to be said. It must, however, be remarked that if this is the true answer the lines become even more pointless and tasteless than if there is no answer. There is no very valid reason to doubt the authenticity of Servius' story. If authentic, it must surely mean, as Büchner has seen, that Virgil was tired of the pedantry of much contemporary criticism, and registered his contemptuous disapproval by this outrageous pun.³ It is one of the ironies of literary history that Virgil's satirical protest has itself been misinterpreted by the commentators. Taking his quip literally they have sought and found in the riddle precisely that frigid erudition and lack of critical judgement to which Virgil was objecting.

Properly regarded Servius' story is an invaluable piece of evidence deriving from Virgil himself as to what approaches are open and what closed in attempting a solution of the first riddle. Its words are to be accepted as bearing substantially their surface meaning. The reader is not to look for far-fetched ambiguities of language or for subtleties of meaning beyond the grasp of the educated reader. Some degree of equivocation is not, however, ruled out—this is, after all, a riddle. The solution of the second riddle propounded above also gives some assistance in tackling the first. In accordance with the conventions of amoeban verse one would expect the first riddle to be capped by the second; and the formal resemblance between them, in particular the repetition of the four opening words, points in the same direction. One may then look for equivocation also in the first riddle of such a kind that more than one correct reply is possible, and one may suspect that the riddle is set in a frame of reference which is literary. Taken together with the pointers that Virgil himself has supplied these considerations put out of court the clever but overingenious solution recently proposed by J. J. Savage.⁴ It may be added that they also put out of court almost all other solutions advanced by critics old and new.⁵

¹ See Parke and Wormell, *The Delphic Oracle*, ii, n. 580. The story is found in Babrius, but it originated much earlier, and can be plausibly traced back as far as the fifth century B.C. (*ibid.* i. 390 and n.).

² Philargyrius and the Berne Scholia attribute the first part of the story to Asconius, and the second to Cornutus.

³ P.-W., *R.E.* II. xv. 1194, s.v. P. Vergilius Maro.

⁴ 'The Riddle of Virgil's third Eclogue', *Classical Weekly* (1954), pp. 81–83.

⁵ For a characteristically full and entertaining review of such solutions see J. H. Voss, *Vergil's ländliche Gedichte*, i. 119 ff.

'Say in what land(s) heaven's span is but three ells broad.' If we assume that the words bear substantially their surface meaning, it is natural to think of a model. I believe that Martyn was on the right lines when he suggested 'a celestial globe or sphere'.¹ The lively Roman interest in astronomy and astrology during Virgil's lifetime and indeed throughout imperial history needs no emphasis. In particular Cicero, by his repeated descriptions of Archimedes' orrery started a literary tradition which was to have a surprising diversity and vitality, extending as it does through Ovid and Manilius to Claudian and Martianus Capella, while in prose the ingenuity with which Archimedes had constructed his model was used as proof that a Mind controls the workings of the universe.² Marcellus, as Cicero testifies in the *de Re publica*, had brought Archimedes' orrery to Rome, where, no doubt, Cicero examined it. It is doubtful if any of the other writers who allude to it had actually seen it. All may well have derived their information from Cicero. As Vogt has pointed out, Ovid's expression (*Fasti* 6. 277) *in aere clauso* looks very much as if he had misread Cicero's *in aere illo* (*aere* being the ablative of *aes*) in the *de Re publica*.³

In the *de Natura Deorum* 2. 88 Cicero describes an equally wonderful planetarium made by Posidonius, and links it with Archimedes' orrery, which it closely resembles.⁴ Here, I suggest, is the key to the puzzle. This book was given to the public by Cicero late in 45, when Virgil was about to begin work on the *Eclogues*, if he had not already done so: and *Eclogue* 3 is generally agreed to be amongst the earliest. Cicero had an appreciative reading public, and a new work would be eagerly studied on its appearance. Where Posidonius' planetarium was to be found is not known, but it is a reasonable guess that it was at Rhodes.⁵ As for the size of the model, a span of 4½ feet is what one would expect in such a complicated piece of mechanism. The account of Archimedes' orrery in the *de Re publica* suggests that it could be moved from place to place without much difficulty, and Gallus sets it in motion unaided.

The first riddle has then a double answer like the second. If the victim thought the reference was to Archimedes and answered 'At Rome', the questioner would reply 'No, at Rhodes'; if he thought the reference was to Posidonius and answered 'At Rhodes', the questioner would reply 'No, at Rome'. Whereas, however, the second riddle depends for its point on a double

¹ J. Martyn, *Bucolicorum Eclogae Decem* (London, 1749), ad loc.

² Heiberg, *Quaestiones Archimedae* (Copenhagen, 1879), pp. 33 ff. and 41 ff., is still the fullest and most discriminating treatment. He cites Cicero, *de Re pub.* 1. 21–22, *Tusc.* 1. 63, *Nat. Deor.* 2. 88; Ovid, *Fasti*, 6. 277 ff.; Claudian, *Carm. min.* 51; Martianus Capella, 6. 583–5; Lactantius, *Div. Inst.* 2. 5. 18; Sextus Empiricus, *Math.* 9. 115; Iulius Firmicus, *Math.* 6. 30. 26; Cassiodorus, *Var. ep.* 1. 45. Add to these Manilius, 4. 266–7. Archimedes wrote a special work *Περὶ σφαιρούσας*, see Carpus ap. Pappus 8. 2–3; Proclus, in *Eucl.* p. 41. The most recent discussions are E. J. Dijksterhuis, *Archimedes* (Copenhagen, 1956), pp. 23 ff., and A. S. Pease, *Ciceronis de Natura Deorum* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), loc. cit.

³ Vogt ap. Schlachter, *Der Globus, seine*

Entstehung und Verwendung in der Antike (Stoicheia 8), p. 51, n. 1. Bömer, *Die Fasten*, ad loc., has called attention to Vogt's suggestion.

⁴ Both models were no doubt hydraulically operated, cf. Manilius 4. 266–7. See Hultsch, *Zeitschrift für Math. und Phys.* (1877), pp. 106 ff.; P. Tannery, *Rev. de Philol.* (1893), pp. 213 ff., citing Pappus 8. 1026. 2–4. Tannery argues that the Posidonius of *Nat. Deor.* 2. 88 is not the philosopher, but a skilled craftsman; Balbus, however, refers to him as *Posidonius, familiaris noster*, which in the context seems decisive against this view.

⁵ Reinhardt, *P.-W.*, *R.E.* xliii. 567 s.v. Poseidonios, says: 'Ein Stolz seines rhodischen Hauses war sein Uranologium, das er nach eigenen Plänen hatte anfertigen lassen und das er seinem Freunde Cicero vordermonstrierte.'

tradition, each version of the legend being equally well known and equally probable as the correct reply, the situation in the first riddle is somewhat different. Archimedes' orrery was indeed famous, but it seems likely that few would have heard of Posidonius' planetarium outside the pages of the *de Natura Deorum*. The analogy here in ancient oracular literature is with such prophecies as that traditionally given to Hesiod. Being advised by the Pythia that it was his fate to die in the Grove of Nemean Zeus, he avoided Nemea, only to meet his death in a grove of Nemean Zeus on the confines of Aetolia.¹ In this kind of equivocation it is part of the trap that one alternative is very familiar, the other almost unknown.

I suspect that Virgil gives a clue to the solution of the first riddle in lines 40–42, where the answer to the rhetorical question *quis fuit alter?* seems most likely to be *Archimedes*.² The fact that his name, alone amongst those suggested by the ancient commentators, could not be fitted into a dactylic hexameter³ tells strongly in his favour. So does his close personal friendship with Conon. Critics have tended to pass him over because of line 42, but there is good evidence that he did apply himself to the determination of the solstices and the accurate measurement of the year.⁴

I suggest then that the riddles are literary *γρῖφοι*, depending for their solution on an acquaintance with hellenistic Greek and contemporary Latin literature. Virgil might reasonably assume in his reading public familiarity with Euphorion and with Cicero's philosophical writings. If this explanation is accepted it involves a reassessment of the tone and purpose of the third *Eclogue* as a whole. Despite touches of Theocritean vividness and rustic coarseness it is not meant to be a realistic picture of country life—lines 84–87 should have put critics on their guard. What is here encountered is that characteristic blend of naturalism and artificiality, of ingenuousness and sophistication, which gives the Eclogues their peculiar flavour and special charm.⁵

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¹ See Parke and Wormell, *The Delphic Oracle*, ii, n. 206.

² So Scaliger, *De Emendatione Temporum* (1598), i, *De Periodo Syracusana*, p. 55.

³ Martianus Capella, loc. cit., emulates Procrustes by squeezing *Archimedes* into a pentameter.

⁴ See Ptolemy, *Syntaxis Math.* 3. 2 (*Hipparchus loquitur*); Ammianus Marcellinus 26. 1. 8; and in general P. Tannery, *L'Astronomie ancienne*, p. 69.

⁵ K. Ohlert, 'Zur antiken Räthselpoesie', *Philologus*, lvii (1898), 599, quotes from the Strasburger Räthselbuch a parallel to the first riddle, the solution to which is 'A well'. I do not think this does more than attest Virgil's success in catching the authentic note of folk-poetry, and illustrate the fact that his work has such vitality that it confers a long lease of life on his ancient commentators, even when they are wrong.

AN EARLY INSCRIPTION AT ARGOS¹

ἐν[έρα δ]αμιοργοί ἐ[ν]ασσαντο· Ποταμός καὶ Σθενέλας οὐχεδαμίδα καὶ
Ίπομέδον καὶ Χάρον ὁ Αρχεσίδα καὶ Ἀδραστος καὶ πορθαγόρας καὶ Κτέτος ὁ
Μίντονος καὶ Αριστόμαχος καὶ Ἰχονίδας. S.E.G. xi. 336.

THE lettering of this inscription begins at the very top of the block, just below the straight edge, and stops half-way down the block, the lower part being smoothed but uninscribed. As the inscription is not set centrally on the block, it is probably the continuation of an inscription which ran on a block once superimposed upon it. Doubtful letters are those which are marked by the dot underneath; and W. Peek reported in *Ath. Mitt.* lxvi (1941), 200 n. 2, that he had seen the top of the *v* which Vollgraff suggested in the restoration *ἐ[ν]ασσαντο*. The inscription is dated to the seventh century B.C. by epigraphists. The stone itself was seen in 1729 by Fourmont and rediscovered in 1928 by Vollgraff; it was in the wall of a Venetian tower on the Larissa or acropolis of Argos. No one knows whence the Venetians had taken it. Therefore Vollgraff's suggestion that it had originally been set up in *porta arcis regiae* is no more than an attractive speculation.

When Vollgraff republished this inscription in *Mnemosyne*, lix (1932), 369–93, he traced the connexion of some of the names it mentions with heroes of mythology, and he concluded an interesting and learned article with the following summary of his views. 'Phidon Argivus, regio loco natus, post consilio tyrannus factus nomine demiurgi, ostio arcis antiquae Larissae non proavorum, quorum dignitatem abiuraverat, stirpem insculpi iussit, sed principum civitatis seriem, quos ante se, maximam partem regio, sicut ipse, sanguine exortos, quasi demiurgorum vicem suo arbitrio rempublicam strenue gessisse sumebat.' 'Phidon of Argos, born to a royal station but then designedly made tyrant under the title of demiurgus, gave orders that the entry to the old citadel, the Larissa, should be inscribed not with the lineage of his ancestors, whose distinction he had disclaimed, but with a list of leading personalities of state who, he assumed, had vigorously conducted the administration at their own discretion, being as it were a line of demiurgi leading up to himself—although they had been for the most part of royal blood, like himself.' This is a remarkable and, I think, unlikely hypothesis. Phidon was the leading member of the Temenidae, the most famous Dorian house not only of Argos but also of the Peloponnese. His royal blood constituted the greatest claim any man could have to govern Argos, and in addition it was the greatest claim Argos had to rule over the Peloponnese. We hardly need the evidence of Ephorus (in Strabo 358) that Phidon set out as the descendant of Heracles to reconstitute the heritage of Temenus, gain control of cities once held by Heracles, and celebrate the games first instituted by Heracles. We could more readily imagine Agesilaus disowning descent from Heracles or Augustus disowning descent from Julius Caesar; for the seventh century B.C. was an age of religious faith and aristocratic tradition in which, as Grote rightly observed (*History of Greece*, ii. 425), 'this legendary title (of Phidon) was always seriously construed and often admitted as conclusive'. Nor was Phidon in any sense a usurper. He

¹ I express my gratitude to Sir Frank Adcock and Professor A. Andrewes, who kindly read this paper and gave me the help of their comments.

held royal office, according to Aristotle (*Politics* 1310^b17-27 *βασιλεῖας ὑπαρχούσης*), before he became a tyrant. Indeed he was cited as an example of those early tyrannies which arose ἐκ τῶν βασιλέων παρεκβανόντων τὰ πάτρια καὶ δεσποτικατέρας ἀρχῆς δρεγούμενων, and not of those which arose ἐκ τῶν αἰρετῶν ἐπὶ τὰς κυρίας ἀρχάς, for example τὰς δημιουργίας. There was every reason for him to retain the honourable title *βασιλεὺς* and consequently no reason to adopt that of *δαμιοργός* instead.

The steps by which Vollgraff reached this conclusion seem to me unconvincing. He claimed that some of the names occurred in early Argive mythology. They do, and this is to be expected in a seventh-century inscription, whatever meaning is attached to it; for the members of the aristocratic families which held office were no less conservative in their use of names, we may suppose, than the Alcmeonids of Attica or the royal families of Sparta, Molossia, and Macedonia. But let us consider each one of the leading personalities of state whom Vollgraff supposes Phidion preferred to his own ancestors. The first 'Potamos' (the P being doubtful) is an uncommon name, which is known only at Athens in the second and third centuries A.D. Vollgraff thinks it is not a name at all but a river (not even 'the river', for the article is not there¹), and he identifies the river as the Inachus; and he concludes that the eponymous hero of the river, namely Inachus, is intended. A riddling reference of this nature is improbable and so far as I know unparalleled in an official document. I see no reason why the Argives or Phidion should have hesitated to say Inachus if they meant Inachus.

The next man, 'Sthenelas, son of Echedamidas', rejoices in a patronymic, as do two others. Vollgraff does not comment on this special distinction. Are we to suppose that these three 'leading personalities of state' were less well known to the Argives than the other six? Yet the other six include Ichonidas who has no connexion with any mythology anywhere. In another way the patronymic of Sthenelas is embarrassing for Vollgraff's interpretation. He produces three heroes of the name Sthenelos, the sons respectively of Capaneus, Perseus, and Crotopus; but Phidion, it appears, passed over these heroes in favour of the son of an unknown figure, one Echedamidas who rivals Ichonidas in obscurity.² The second man with a patronymic is Charon, son of Archesilas. Now Archesilas, Vollgraff points out, may be a variant of 'Agesilas', a 'cognomen Pluti'. Having got thus far, Vollgraff wisely doubts whether Phidion would have chosen the ferryman of the dead as his predecessor in office—distinguished indeed but funereal: 'interpretatio', he writes, 'quam minime urgere velim'. Yet a reader who was expected to deduce Inachus from Potamos might be misled by so familiar a name as Charon. The third man with a patronymic, 'Ctetus, son of Minton', has a good mythological name in Ctetus, which Vollgraff equates with Cteatus. There was a Cteatus whom Heracles killed at Cleonae (Pausanias 2. 15. 1); but he was a son of Poseidon (Pindar, *Olympian* 10. 24), whereas this Ctetus had a father Minton whose name is not found anywhere else.

Those who have no patronymic offer less of a problem. Ipomedon, taken to be Hippomedon,³ has an echo in a hero Hippomedon of Lerna, known to Euripides (*Phoenissae* 126). Adrastus is the name of the famous king of Argos

¹ Cf. Tod, *G.H.I.*, no. 4, where ὁ ποταμός is the Nile.

² *Iliad* 2. 564; 19. 116; and Pausanias 2. 16. 1; 2. 19. 3. Vollgraff says that Sthenelas

is a variant of Sthenelos.

³ So Vollgraff, though it is surprising to find no *h* and one *pi*.

who was worshipped later at Sicyon (Hdt. 5. 67). Then comes Orthagoras. Here Vollgraff sees a choice between the seventh-century tyrant of Sicyon,¹ and a 'genius quidam phallicus' (Aristoph. *Ecclesiazusae* 916 f.). Next Aristomachus, that great-grandson of Heracles who failed to occupy the Peloponnese, as Vollgraff points out. And last and least Ichonidas, *nomen ignotum*, of which Vollgraff remarks 'heroicum hoc certe nomen non esse videtur'.

The leading personalities of state whom Phidion is said to have selected as his predecessors in office may be listed as follows: Potamos = ? Inachus, Charon = ? the ferryman of the Styx, Adrastus, and Aristomachus, all of whom were active *before* Temenus made Argos into a Dorian state; then Ipomedon = ? Hippomedon of Lerna, a pre-Dorian hero, Ctetus with a name like Cteatus son of Poseidon who was killed near Cleonae by Heracles, but with an unknown father, and Sthenelas comparable in name but not in patronymic with Sthenelos, a king of Argos; lastly Orthagoras = ? a contemporary tyrant of Sicyon or a *genius quidam phallicus*, and an unknown person called Ichonidas. This list is such that one must conclude Phidion was not trying to choose predecessors in office at all.

The correct explanation of this inscription is surely that we have a list of leading magistrates at the end of a decree.² Vollgraff thinks *οἰδε* would be required for such an interpretation. This word may have been on the stone above our stone, or it may have been omitted as in other lists (e.g. Tod, *G.H.I.*, nos. 53, 57, 75). The word *δαμιοργός* is often the title for the leading magistrates in a Dorian state, and in the passage to which we have referred (*Politics* 1310^b-22) Aristotle names the *δαμιοργία* as an important elective office. The word *ἐφανέσσαντο*, if correctly restored,³ could be used only of the highest magistracy and probably only at a time when there was no *βασιλεία*. The number nine is a multiple of the three Dorian tribes (Hylleis, Pamphylois, and Dymanes), and it is likely that the nine *damiorgoi* are a college of magistrates representing the three tribes. The names of the magistrates were placed at the end of a decree of state, and the patronymic was added when necessary to distinguish between two or more men of the same name. Some names are new to us, others are traditional,⁴ and that is after all what we should expect of a seventh-century document.

¹ Vollgraff elevates Orthagoras to the status of a hero or god at Sicyon. This is partly because he distrusts the tradition that Orthagoras was, as he puts it, 'coqui filius'; but there is little doubt that the office of *μάγευτος* which Andreas held was a religious office concerned with sacrifice, similar to that of the *κρεοδαίτης* at Sparta (Plu. *Mor.* 644 b).

² When this paper was in draft, Mr. A. G. Woodhead kindly lent me a copy of M. Th. Mitsos' *Ἄργολική Προσωπογραφία* (Athens, 1952), and I found that he expressed doubts about Vollgraff's interpretation in his note on *Ποταμός* and suggested that the *damiorgoi* were members of a college. Otherwise Vollgraff's interpretation has been accepted, e.g. recently in *Historia*, vi (1957), 141 n. 2 and 391.

³ At the end of line 1 of the inscription

Fourmont allowed three letters where Vollgraff allowed one letter; and Vollgraff's excellent photograph on p. 392 indicates that Fourmont may be correct since line 4 extends farther to the right than lines 1 and 2. An imperative form of such a verb as in *S.E.G.* xi. 314, line 12, should perhaps be restored.

⁴ M. Th. Mitsos, *op. cit.*, gives seven other instances at Argos of Aristomachus, which is a common name elsewhere (e.g. in Molossia, *S.G.D.I.* 1334); one other instance at Argos of Archesilas, Hippomedon, and Orthagoras; and no other case at Argos of the remaining five names. If the T in Potamos is uncertain like the P, then it may be possible to read Sōdamos of which there are three examples at Argos and one incomplete name 'odamos' in *Mnemosyne*, xlvi (1919), 164 n. ix, line 12.

The appearance of a board of nine *damiorgoi* in the seventh century under conditions which suggest they were the leading and probably the eponymous magistrates is paralleled by a board of six *damiorgoi* at Argos in a sixth-century inscription where they appear to be eponymous magistrates (S.E.G. xi. 314).¹ Here too we have a multiple of three Dorian tribes. Now a fifth-century inscription gives the 'king' at Argos as the eponymous official (Tod, *G.H.I.* 33). We may conjecture that the *βασιλεύς* was out of favour in the latter part of the seventh century (to which our inscription should be dated), because that office had been rendered unpopular through the despotic behaviour of its last holder, Phidion the so-called tyrant. There is therefore some justification for saying that this inscription provides a *terminus ante quem* *floruit Phidion*.

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¹ The phrase *ἐπὶ τῶν δεοντῶν δαμιοργοντον* is followed by a list of six names placed on the left-hand side of the stone as in our inscription. If the three Dorian tribes alone were represented in this office, then the admission of a fourth tribe at Argos, the Hyrnathioi, to equal status must have been

later than either inscription; a suitable time was the crisis after the battle of Sepcia (Hdt. 6. 83; Arist. *Politics* 1303^a τὴν αγκάθησαν παραδέξασθαι τῶν περιοίκων τινάς; Plu. *Mor.* 243 τῶν περιοίκων ποιησάμενοι πολίτας τοὺς ἀριστούς); but there may be some other explanation of the numbers nine and six.

'Opinion has been divided as to whether this means that Aphrodite was really smiling but pretending to be angry, or rather that she wore a smile but was really angry.'

A. S. F. Gow, *ad loc.*

THE problems of this passage were concisely stated by M. Platnauer more than thirty years ago¹ and his suggestions for their solution have been adopted and developed in A. S. F. Gow's *magnum opus*. Its authority—so the present writer suspects—is liable at this point to eclipse the meaning of the text

ἡνθέ γε μὰν ἀδεῖα καὶ ἀ Κύπρις γελάοισα,
λάθρη μὲν γελάοισα, βαρὺν δ' ἀνὰ θυμὸν ἔχοισα,
κεῖπε κτλ.

'(1) If Aphrodite came <sweetly>² smiling, it is absurd to say in the next line that she was hiding her smile. . . . (2) The antithesis to "hiding her smile" is "showing her anger". So Cholmeley and Legrand.' These statements of M. Platnauer are in themselves unexceptionable. He sought to overcome the difficulties thus summarized by the suggestion that *λάθρη* here meant, not 'secretly' but 'treacherously' ('craftily' Gow). Having thus eliminated the need for an antithesis to 'hiding' he would ascribe to *ἀνὰ-ἔχοισα* the meaning 'con-
tinue'.³

But *λάθρη* means neither 'treacherously' nor 'craftily'. What is done *λάθρη* is 'not seen' and/or not meant to be seen. This fact (or intention) may have various implications—the relevant action may be 'crafty' or 'treacherous' or much else—but these implications arise from the context; they are not inherent in the adverb itself. *Λαθραία Κύπρις* may be deemed to be, for example, 'pleasant', or 'immoral', but obviously this is not to say that in *παρελέξατο λάθρη* (*Il.* 2. 515; cf. *Od.* 15. 430) the adverb means anything but 'unobservedly'. When Priam *πολὺν χρυσὸν ἐκπέμπει λάθρα* (*Eur. Hec.* 10), he may, or may not, have acted 'prudently', yet no one would quote this verse to show that *λάθρα* means 'prudently'. Actions which shun witness naturally are often evil actions; even so, *λάθρα*, in contexts of this kind, itself merely indicates that they are 'unseen'. Plotting, for instance, *ἐπιβουλεύειν*, necessarily happens *λάθρα* (*Soph. O.R.* 618); the notion of 'treachery' here arises from the verb and not from the adverb; it colours the whole context but not the adverb outside the context. Menelaus reports that Agamemnon was killed *λάθρη* (*Od.* 4. 92) and Telemachus fears that the suitors may do the same to him (17. 90): these are

¹ *Class. Quart.* xxi (1927), 202.

² < > *addidi*; 'with a sweet smile' tr. Gow.—It need no longer be argued that *ἀδεῖα* is plur. neut. (and not fem. sing.), esp. since M. Platnauer has quoted valid parallels (*Class. Quart.* xxiv [1930], 31; more *opib* Gow, *ad loc.*, and Schwyzler, *Griech. Gramm.* i. 581, n. 2). The reciprocal interchange between *ἀδεῖα* and *ἀδεῖα* is in itself natural (cf. Theocr. 3. 20 *ἀδεῖα τέρψις*;

Schwyzler, *loc. cit.* 474, n. 2). Could it be that, besides, Theocritus was prompted by Hesiod, *Theog.* 40 (with unorthodox punctuation) *τῶν δ' ἀκάματος ρέει αὐθῆ | ἐκ στομάτων, ἔδει γελῆ δέ τε δώματα πατρός*? The proem of the *Theogony* seems to have been in Theocritus' mind also when writing 7. 43.

³ In this detail he was not followed by Gow.

'treacherous' deeds—this implication again being inherent in the context; but *λάθρη*—supplemented, in the former passage, by *ἀνωστί* 'unexpectedly'—indicates the 'secret' procedure in the treacherous act. Similarly, when Neoptolemus is slain in the temple of Apollo (*Eur. Andr.* 1117 ff.), the conspirators *κεντοῦσι λάθρα*. Again a 'treacherous' act, assuredly; but *λάθρα* says that Neoptolemus failed to 'notice' it—he had his eyes elsewhere, *κατ' ὅμηρον θεῶν*.

λάθρη then indicates, always, that an action is 'unobserved' or is meant to be so.¹ In a context of murder and plotting, secrecy serves a sombre and 'treacherous' intention;² in a context of love, courtship, and smiles, a different one. If, in Theocritus, Aphrodite was said to have been smiling *λάθρη*, she did so 'secretly' (however difficult that may be to visualize) and not 'treacherously'. Nor is there any gain in replacing the English adjective by the all but synonymous 'craftily'. This word may be better suited, in an English translation, to the assumed context (for, what 'treachery' could Aphrodite be suspected of?), but the Greek text will bear out this nuance as little as the other.

We are back where we started. If Aphrodite came 'with a sweet smile', 'it is absurd to say that she was hiding her smile'. The fact, though, is, she did not come 'with a sweet smile'. The smile of *φιλομειδῆς Αφροδίτη* is here sought in vain; *μειδᾶν*, and not *γελᾶν*, corresponds with English 'to smile'; and that not only etymologically. *Γελᾶν* denotes a sentiment—such as delight, satisfaction, amusement—which often expresses itself outwardly by laughter; often, but not necessarily. The heart may be said to 'laugh'; for example, *Od.* 9. 413 *ἔρδον δ' ἐγέλασσε φίλον κῆρ*. 'Εγέλασσε could not here be replaced by *μειδῆσε*, for *μειδάν* denotes a facial expression—as *γελάν* need not do. The Homeric phrase *ἡδὺ γελᾶν* in particular never denotes a 'sweet smile'. This *γέλως* is *ἡδύς* because, always, it expresses the delight over (or satisfaction with) some happening—a happening which most often consists in some harm or suffering undergone by others. In short, *ἡδύς γέλως* normally denotes 'Schadenfreude'; a sentiment 'sweet' to him that indulges in it but rarely to others. The most familiar instance is *Il.* 2. 270: when Thersites is struck by Odysseus, the Greeks *ἀχνύμενοι περ ἐπ'* *αὐτῷ ἡδὺ γέλασσαν*. Similarly they laugh at Aias' misfortune during the funeral games (23. 784); so does Paris when his arrow has hit Diomedes (11. 378); so do the suitors at the fight of Odysseus and Irus (*Od.* 18. 35 and 111; 21. 376 is similar). No 'sweet smile' in these passages. And where there is not specifically 'Schadenfreude', there is, at any rate, satisfaction (*Od.* 16. 354).³ Of special relevance for the Theocritus passage is the

¹ Eur. *Cycl.* 552 *οὐτος, τι δῆς; τὸν οἶνον* *ἐπινίεις λάθρα;*

² As illustrated, for example, by Andoc. 4. 15 *λαθραῖον φόνον ἐπιβουλεύειν*. Murderers have their reasons for keeping their doings 'in the dark'; so have lovers. A modern translator may perhaps use the adjective 'treacherous' in the former passage (though—is not 'treason' really a different matter?), and possibly also when rendering *ἄγνης λαθραῖον* in Aesch. *Ag.* 1230 (hardly, however, in the cognate *Prom.* 1077); but not so for *λαθραῖα Κίνησις*. This may seem obvious, but the consequence for the Theocritus passage has not been drawn.

³ It follows that Zeus (*Il.* 21. 508) does not beam a 'sweet smile' on the wounded Artemis; he rather seems 'amused' by her misfortune. In *Od.* 20. 358 the greatest of poets uses the traditional phrase with unique effect: the suitors *ἡδὺ γέλασσαν* over Theoclymenus' prophecy; madness makes them greet their doom with merriment.—It further follows that Lycidas, in Theocritus' *Thalysia* (42 and 128), neither 'smiles sweetly' nor 'laughs pleasantly'. He is 'satisfied' and 'delighted', first, with Simichidas' modesty and, later on, with his 'bucolic' performance.

same phrase used of Aphrodite in the Homeric Hymn addressed to her (5. 49); *ἡδὺ γελοιόσασα* the goddess boasts of her might. Thus also in Theocritus: she is 'delighted' with her victory over Daphnis; but she keeps this delight *λάθρη*. So does Clytaemestra in the *Choephoroi* (738 ἐντὸς ὁμμάτων γέλων κεύθουσα), and so Orestes and Pylades expect her to do in Euripides' *Orestes* (1122 ἐνδόθεν κεχαρμένη).

'The antithesis to "hiding her smile" is "showing her anger".' We have replaced 'smile' by 'delight'; which would now be the correct antithesis? Could it be any other than 'showing (faked) sorrow'—like Clytaemestra's in the two passages just quoted (*σκυθρωπός* and *ἐκδακρόντας*)? *Λάθρη* certainly calls for an antithesis of the kind;¹ one remembers similar contrasts between outward appearance and inward sentiment, for example, in Sophocles² and Euripides.³ M. Platnauer, though, translated *βαρὺν θυμόν* by 'anger' and A. S. F. Gow by 'heavy wrath'—which both yield an imperfect antithesis to 'delight'. The Greek phrase is the poetical equivalent of *βαρύθυμία* which, with the cognate adjective and verb, is frequent in post-classical literature. L.S.J. quote some instances but are somewhat vague as to their meaning—which ranges from 'dejection' and 'distress' to 'anger' and 'vengefulness'.⁴ The latter nuance may be instanced from *3 Macc.* 6. 20, Appian, *B.C.* 2. 20, and Plut. *Alex.* 9 (669A);⁵ the former from Callim. 4. 215 and 6. 81, Jos. *Ant.* 16. 322 (= 10. 5), and several passages in Plutarch, in which the combination with *λύπη* and *όδυρμοί* is significant.⁶

On this evidence, and particularly in view of Callimachus' use of the adj. *βαρύθυμος*, one will ascribe to *βαρὺν θυμόν* the connotation which fits the context uniquely. Aphrodite comes delighted by the proof of her might, but she holds back the visible expression of this delight and feigns an expression of grief. It needs few, if any, words to show that the progress of the story thus becomes satisfactory—as it does not on any other interpretation. Her address to Daphnis is permeated by her feeling of triumph yet cloaked in an affectation of sympathy—she even terms *ἀργαλέος* that Eros by whom her adversary has been overcome. Daphnis sees through her affectation; he calls her *βαρεῖα*—i.e. 'ruthless in the exercise of her power' (like her son, 3. 15)—and hence *νεμεσοσατά*, i.e. 'deserving of men's hatred'; which is duly bestowed upon her (*θνατοῖσιν ἀπεχθῆς*). And then Daphnis' invective.

This interpretation necessitates ascribing to *ἀνέχειν* in 5. 96 the meaning *prae se ferens* or *ostentans*, and I must concede that I cannot adduce a close parallel for this nuance in the meaning of this verb. I am here in the same situation as Wilamowitz in 1906. He wrote:⁷ 'ἀνέχειν, antithetically opposed to *λάθρη μὲν γελάοισα*, is for aught I know unique. *Ἀνέχειν χεῖρας, οὐσ, πεύκας, πυρά*—all these are concrete notions. . . . Not that I have any doubts about it; but I

¹ Cf. Eur. *Io* 944 *λάθρα* contrasted with *φανέρα*.

² Phil. 1272 (Neoptolemus *ποτός* in appearance but *ἀπρός λάθρα*; cf. O.R. 386).

³ Hipp. 414 *μισῶ δὲ καὶ τὰς σώφρονας μὲν ἐν λόγοις, | λάθρη δὲ τόλμας οὐ καλὰ κεκτημένας.*

⁴ This applies also to simple *βαρύτης* and *βαρύνομαι*. The range of meaning of the English 'being vexed' is comparable, while Arist. *Eth. Eud.* γ 3, 1231^b15 is enlightening

with regard to the Greek concept: *λυπεῖσθαι ταύτην τὴν λύπην ήν καλούμεν θυμός*.

⁵ Also, for example, in *De def. or.* 14 (417d) and, similar to this, *Pyrrh.* 26 (401a). The only classical instance known to me, Eur. *Med.* 176, seems to belong here.

⁶ *Trag. an.* in fine (477e); *Mar.* 50 (429a); *Alex.* 70 (704a); cf. also Clem. *Alex.* *Strom.* 5. 30. 5 (p. 663 P. = ii. 345. 28 St.) *βαρύθυμίας καὶ όδυρμοίς κατεσθίειν τὴν φυχήν*.

⁷ *Textgeschichte der griech. Bukoliker*, 24 n. 2.

should be glad to have an older instance of ὁργὴ or ἔπωρα ἀνέχειν *prae se ferre*.' Even so, the distance between the postulated meaning and those actually attested is not really forbidding, for ἀνέχειν 'to hold up' and, intransitively, 'to jut up, rise' occurs fairly frequently down to the Roman age (e.g. in Josephus and Plutarch). I find no difficulty in imagining Aphrodite 'holding up' her faked expression of grief like a banner or garment covering her true sentiment. This after all would not by any means be the only place where Th. uses his language in a manner which we cannot parallel.¹ What we have to beware of is the temptation of founding our interpretation on assumptions contrary to established Greek style and idiom. *Ἡδὺ γελᾶν* does not mean 'to smile sweetly', nor λάθρη 'craftily'.

The preceding interpretation may tentatively be summarized by the translation:

... Kypris came, delighted,
—inwardly delighted, while pretending grief—
and said: . . .

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¹ See, for example, 2. 126 εὖδον and 137 ἔφόβησε. Delphis could not possibly have promised Simaetha that he would 'sleep' but, if anything, that he would 'keep his peace'. This nuance of εὖδω is, to the best of my knowledge, unattested (but cf. εὖδει θάλασσα and οὖπω κακὸν τόδ' εὖδει); and yet it requires much boldness to replace the uniform wording of papyri and manuscripts

by, say, εὖδε. In 5. 137, Jacobs's brilliant conjecture ἔφόβησε is contradicted by 23. 48; hence one will have to acknowledge that the meaning of the transmitted verb is here restrained so as to yield what the context requires; namely, impulsion by passion (and not by fear). Generally, the judicious characterization of Theocritus' language by Gow (vol. i, p. lxvi) may be compared.

SEX. CLODIUS—SEX. CLOELIUS

PEOPLE who trust modern indexes will suppose that the name of Sex. Clodius, the disreputable henchman of Publius, comes twice in the *Ad Atticum* letters, 14. 13. 6 and 14. 13 A. 2. The manuscripts¹ give it as follows:

14. 13. 6 cloelii *EZ^t*: cellii *M¹*: celii *RP*: clodii *M² bdms*
14. 13 A. 2 cloelium *EZ^t*: celium *RPM¹*: clodium *M² bdms*

But there is no doubt that the 'Clodius' of 14. 14. 2 and 14. 19. 2 is Sextus. The manuscripts have:

14. 14. 2 cloelio *EOR*: clolio (clel-?) *M¹*: clodio *PM² bdms*
14. 19. 2 cloelio *R*: cloclio *P*: clolio *M¹*: clodio *M² bdms*
Ibid. cloelio *R*: cloclio *P*: celio *M*: celio *ds*: clodio *bm*

In 14. 13 A. 3 and 14. 13 B. 3 our texts are rather reprehensibly ambiguous. *Clodium* of the latter could be P. Clodius, *Clodio* of the former his young son; but Sextus is intrinsically more likely in both cases. The manuscripts have:

14. 13 A. 3 cloelio *E*: clolio *M¹*: clodio *RPM^c bdms*
14. 13 B. 3 cloelium *ER*: clolium (clel-?) *M¹*: clodium *PM^c bdms*

In 15. 13. 3 Tyrrell-Purser hesitate between Sextus and the L. Clodius of 12. 30. 1. The manuscripts have:

cloelium *RMZ^t* *Lamb. marg.* ('v.c.'): clodium *Pbdms*

In 10. 8. 3 I do not know that anyone has identified Atticus' client with Sextus. The manuscripts do:

cloelium *Mdm*: cloclium *RP*: clodium *O²bs*

I say the manuscripts make this identification because no one who knows the textual tradition of these letters will now need to be told that *cloel-*, not *clod-*, was the reading of the archetype in all nine passages: and because to the best of my knowledge no variant *cloel-* is found in any of the dozens of passages which name some Clodius (-a) other than Sextus.

Having got so far I sought for Sextus elsewhere in Cicero's correspondence. I found him only in *Q.Fr.* 2. 5. 4 where Sjögren's apparatus gives:

Clodio *Manutius*: celio (coe-, Cae-) *ANV*: cellio *P*: c(o)ecilio *M³GH*.

Editors of course read *Clodio*.

In the Speeches, however, the name occurs fourteen times: *Dom.* 25,² 26, 47, 48, 50, 83, *Har. Resp.* 6, 59, *Sest.* 133, *Cael.* 78, *Pis.* 8, 23, *Mil.* 33, 90. I need only say that according to A. Klotz's apparatus the manuscripts strongly attest

¹ A good deal of this information is already available in Moricca's apparatus—quite enough to reveal the truth, blunders and omissions notwithstanding.

² *Sex. Clodio, socio tui sanguinis, qui sua lingua etiam sororem tuam a te abalienavit. Iam illa socio tui sanguinis, quae vulgo linguae Latinae nimium securi de nexu gentili*

interpretati sunt, aliter intellegenda. Socius igitur Publili sanguinis, hoc est sororis, Sextus quod Clodiae lingua favebat quam Publius incestabat. Spurcius tamen latere credo, quod ex eis quae ad Prop. 3. 16. 19 ('Propertiana', p. 188) scripseram eruere mihi visus sum.

cloel- or something very like it in all these passages except *Pis.* 8 and 23. In these two Klotz is silent, but Mr. R. G. M. Nisbet tells me that *cloel-* has some manuscript authority.

The only other ancient author besides Cicero to mention Sextus seems to be Asconius. In *Asc.* 15 (Stangl) P and M twice read *cloelium*, while S has *clodium* in the first case and *proculum* in the second. In 32, 40, 41, and 46 editors record no variant.

So Sex. Cloelius is unmasked—for his praenomen cf. *T.L.L.*, *Onomasticon*, ii. 503. 17–21.

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AUCTORITAS, DIGNITAS, OTIUM

'AUCTORITAS' was naturally one of Cicero's favourite concepts. In the ideal republic power lay with the people, *auctoritas* with the Senate ('Cum potestas in populo, auctoritas in senatu sit', *De leg.* 3. 28). Alternatively, in a balanced state, *potestas* would lie with the magistrates, *libertas* with the people, but still *auctoritas* would be the property of the Senate, 'in principum consilio' (*De rep.* 2. 57).

This *auctoritas*, which was the Senate's function in government, was, as Mommsen said, 'an indefinite word, evading strict definition'. Instructions went out to priests and others 'auctoritate senatus' (Mommsen, *Staatsr.* iii. 2.³ 1033, n. 2), and Livy frequently wrote of laws whose initiation lay in a senatorial decree as introduced 'ex auctoritate patrum'. By the end of the Republic, however, an effective resolution of the Senate was a *senatus consultum*, while *senatus auctoritas* in the strict technical sense—which, Dio tells us (55. 3. 5), could not be expressed in Greek—was an ineffective resolution of the Senate. It reflected the will and intention of a majority of the senators present and voting on a specific resolution, and was indeed recorded as such in the Journal of the Senate, but it was a resolution to which effect could not constitutionally be given, either because one of the tribunes had vetoed it after it was passed (*Ad fam.* 1. 7. 4; 8. 8. 6-8) or because of some procedural irregularity.

Apart from Dio's statement, the only evidence for *senatus auctoritas* in the sense of 'a resolution made ineffective through tribunician veto' is supplied by Cicero's correspondence and is both late and sparse—a vetoed decree on the restoration of Ptolemy Auletes in 56 (*Ad fam.* 1. 7. 4), the three *auctoritates* reported by Caelius in October 51 (*Ad fam.* 8. 8. 4 ff.), and a letter of Cicero in the same year (*Ad Att.* 5. 2. 3).¹

The Senate gave the sanction of its *auctoritas* to the decisions of the people, and was the *consilium* of the magistrates, who were themselves 'in auctoritate senatus'. ('Huius ordinis auctoritate uti magistratus et quasi ministros gravissimi consilii esse voluerunt (maiores nostri)', *Pro Sest.* 137.) But the Senate was no more than the sum of its members; so that the exercise of *auctoritas* and *consilium* was the function of the individual senator, in particular of the senior senators who spoke first and whose opinions could be expected to sway the House.

Anyone who spoke in the Senate gave *consilium*. A senior senator who spoke early in the debate spoke with *auctoritas* and, if things went properly, made the side on which he spoke the winning side. So Cicero paid tribute to the assistance which he had received in 63 from the 'consilium et auctoritas' of L. Lucullus (*Acad.* 2. 3) and of P. Servilius Vatia and M. Lucullus (*De dom.* 132). Yet the senior senator's *auctoritas* did not depend on his success in carrying the House with him. Rome's tragedy in 51, Cicero thought five years later, was that the 'consilium et auctoritas' of the consul Ser. Sulpicius Rufus went unheeded: 'cuius si essemus et auctoritatem et consilium secuti, togati potius potentiam (Caesaris) quam armati victoriam subissemus' (*Ad fam.* 6. 1. 6). If, by his own later account, Cicero had been listened to in early 49,

¹ There is a nice municipal parallel for this meaning of 'auctoritas' from Veii in A.D. 26, Dessau, *I.L.S.* 6579.

Pompey would have gone to Spain and Caesar would have been allowed to stand in absence for the consulship, 'sed victa est auctoritas mea' (*Ad fam.* 6. 6).

'Dic, M. Tulli.' The whole essence of republicanism lay in free senatorial debate, with the seniors taking the lead, on the current problems of the day. This Caesar effectively abolished. The world of the dictator was one in which there was no more place for 'consilium' and 'auctoritas'. 'Cum dominatu unius omnia tenerentur neque esset usquam consilio aut auctoritati locus' (*De offic.* 2. 2). So Cicero wrote when Caesar was dead. He wrote the same in 46, in the *Brutus*, when Caesar was alive. The state, he said, had no more use for the only arms which he knew how to wield, 'consili, ingeni, auctoritatis arma' (*Brutus* 7). 'In qua urbe modo gratia, auctoritate, gloria floruimus, in ea nunc his quidem omnibus caremus' (*Ad. fam.* 4. 13. 2 (46 B.C.); cf. 6. 10. 2.)

The earlier you spoke in a senatorial debate, the greater your *auctoritas*. In the interval between the election and the end of the year the consuls-designate spoke first; so before 1 January they had *auctoritas* as consuls-designate, after 1 January *imperium* as consuls.

After the consuls-designate, the *consulares*. Then the praetors-elect, the praetors, and the *praetorii*. In the good old days junior senators did not presume to speak, even if given the opportunity. They acknowledged the greater wisdom of Age, and voted as the consulars had voted (*Dion. Hal.* 7. 47. 1).

It was a feature and in part a cause of the failure of republicanism at the end that the repositories of *auctoritas* in the Senate were so little fitted for their responsibility or, alternatively, were so easily frightened from discharging it.

We do not know how well D. Junius Silanus spoke as consul-designate when he opened the debate on the punishment of Catiline's associates on the Nones, since, of our two main authorities, Cicero's interest does not extend beyond himself, and it was Sallust's object to minimize the importance of other speeches in order to emphasize the importance of that comparatively junior senator, the tribune-elect Cato. But, Catulus perhaps excepted,¹ no consular, it seems, had anything important to say.

In the first debate on the food crisis on 7 September 57—when, admittedly, there were hooligans about, throwing stones²—only three *consulares*—out of a possible number of about seventeen—attended (*Ad Att.* 4. 1. 6), 'quod tuto se negarent posse sententiam dicere'. On the following day, when the issue was already settled and the danger was evidently over, they were all there: 'omnes consulares nihil Pompeio postulanti negarunt.' Again in early 43 we hear the same story: 'erat firmissimus senatus, exceptis consularibus' (*Ad fam.* 12. 5. 2).

If *auctoritas* is *ἀξίωμα* in Greek, so possibly is *dignitas*. There is more evidence than Mommsen's faulty restoration of the Latin of the *Res Gestae* to establish the very close relationship of the two concepts. 'Praestiti auctoritate.' 'Auctoritate praestans' is a phrase which occurs at least once in Cicero (*Pro Cuent.* 107) and once in Valerius Maximus (7. 2, ext. 17); and if the expression 'dignitate praestans' does not exist in surviving Latin, that is no more than an accident. Tacitus' 'dignitas', as we know, 'started, grew, and advanced' (*Hist.* 1. 1). The senatorial order's *dignitas* was greater than that of the equestrian order (*De dom.* 74; *Suet. Vesp.* 9. 2). There were 'gradus dignitatis' (*De rep.*

¹ Plutarch, *Cic.* 21. 4. The roll call of *consulares* in *Ad Att.* 12. 21. 1 is a roll call, no more.

² *De dom.* 5 ff.; 8, 'Primum dico senatoris

esse boni semper in senatum venire nec cum his sentio qui statuunt minus bonis temporibus in senatum ipsum non venire.'

1. 43), and you could speak of 'princeps dignitate' (*Phil.* 1. 34). Augustus could perfectly well have written 'dignitate omnibus praestiti'; only he did not.¹

The two words were very closely linked, the one static, the other dynamic. *Auctoritas* was the expression of a man's *dignitas*—though in his early *De inventione* 2. 166 Cicero had put it the other way about: 'dignitas est alicuius honesta et cultu et honore et verecundia digna auctoritas'.

In politics a man's *dignitas* was his good name—that 'bona aestimatio' on which Gaius Gracchus laid such stress.² It was his reputation and standing. The concept was one of overwhelming importance to every outstanding politician of the late Republic. Florus rightly trumpeted the word when he was describing the first association of the three dynasts in 59 B.C. Cato's intransigence, he says, drove Pompey to prepare defences (*praesidia*) for his *dignitas*; Crassus was well-butressed with birth, wealth, and *dignitas*; so the three combined, 'Caesare dignitatem comparare, Crasso augere, Pompeio retinere cupientibus' (2. 13. 9-11). Ten years later Caesar's complaint of Pompey was that he wanted nobody to be his equal in *dignitas* (*B.C.* 1. 4. 4). M. Marcellus, consul in 51, who started the agitation for Caesar's recall from Gaul, 'sibi omnem dignitatem ex Caesaris invidia quaerebat': so Hirtius wrote (*B.G.* 8. 53). Marcellus staked the whole of his reputation on his success in turning people's feelings against Caesar.

Caesar at once made tremendous play with his own *dignitas* when the Senate sought to deny him the advantages promised by the legislation of 52. This is evident from all three contemporaries who constitute our primary sources for the clash—Caesar himself, Hirtius,³ and Cicero. Cicero's evidence is best of all (*Ad Att.* 7. 11, mid-January 49), 'atque haec ait omnia facere se dignitatis causa.'

The emotional strength of Caesar's appeal to the claim of *dignitas* could not possibly have been heightened. His *dignitas*, he declared in negotiation with Pompey's first envoys at Ariminum at the start of 49, was something on which he would stake his life: 'sibi semper primam fuisse dignitatem vitaque potiorem' (*B.C.* 1. 9. 2).⁴ Cicero could not complain of such extravagant language. In 56, defending Sestius, he had spoken in similar terms (*Pro Sest.* 48) of his own conduct in 58: 'cum omnia semper ad dignitatem retulisset nec sine ea quicquam expetendum esse homini in vita putassem'

It was perhaps because of the very strong association of 'dignitas' with Caesar's 'treason' in 49 that Augustus did not like the word, and found 'auctoritas' an acceptable alternative. As a word, it was at least untarnished.

Caesar was a man strong enough in the worldly adjunts of power to fight for his own *dignitas*, and to uphold it. Not so Cicero.

In January 55 Cicero wrote sadly to tell Lentulus Spinther that his dream of life as an elder statesman—'dignitas in sententis dicendis, libertas in re publica capessenda'—was shattered (*Ad fam.* 1. 8. 3). The acquittal of Gabinius in October 54 drove him to tell Quintus, 'nullam esse rem publicam, nullum senatum, nulla iudicia, nullam in ullo nostrum dignitatem' (*Ad Q.f.* 3. 4. 1).

¹ Pliny states (*Pan.* 19. 1 f.; 61. 2) that magistrates and administrators lost nothing of their *auctoritas* in Trajan's presence, that it was in *dignitas* that he overshadowed them.

² The phrase occurs three times in his speech against the *lex Aufidia*, *O.R.F.*², 187 f.

(*Aul. Gell.* 11. 10).

³ *B.G.* 8. 6. 2 and 24. 4 on Caesar's care for his own *dignitas* in Gaul; 50. 4; 52. 4; 53. 1 on his *dignitas* in Rome in and after 51.

⁴ Cf. *B.C.* 1. 7. 7; 1. 8. 3.

His augurship came in 53; in 51, the battle of mons Amanus. A *supplicatio* and a triumph would have made full amends for 58 and 56. Hence his feverish anxiety for both. He secured the first; the second vanished in the humiliating suspense of living almost under open arrest in south Italy in the winter of 48/47 before Caesar's return. There followed the horror of dynastic rule.

He had resolved, 'desiderio pristinae dignitatis', to speak no more in public (*Ad. fam.* 4. 4. 4). But in September 46 he broke silence with his rapturously intemperate *Pro Marcello* and later in the year he spoke successfully for Ligarius. From Corcyra Cn. Plancius wrote to congratulate him on the recovery of his *dignitas*: 'mea meam pristinam dignitatem obtinere' (*Ad. fam.* 4. 14. 1). 'And so I have,' Cicero replied, 'if loyal feeling for the state and winning good men's approval of those loyal feelings is all that *dignitas* amounts to; but if in *dignitas* you include the power of translating those loyal feelings into action or of defending them with complete freedom, then "ne vestigium quidem ullum est reliquum nobis dignitatis".' 'Imago veteris meae dignitatis', he had written a little earlier to Ligarius (*Ad. fam.* 6. 13. 4; cf. 6. 10. 2). All 'dignitatis gradus' were destroyed, he wrote of this period a little later in the *De officiis* (2. 65).

Caesar was killed, and for a few months, as it seemed, *dignitas* was restored, even *auctoritas*.

So much for 'dignitas'. But what of 'dignitas' and 'otium' in conjunction? What of 'otiosa dignitas'? What of 'cum dignitate otium'?

In view of the excitement which this latter phrase has caused its appearance is surprisingly infrequent.¹ Cicero used it three times. In *Pro Sestio* 98, in March 56, he said that it was the object and duty of the statesmen of the Optimates to direct their course like steersmen to the attainment of 'cum dignitate otium'. In the famous letter which he wrote more than two years later to Lentulus Spinther to explain the state of the political world to which in a few months' time Lentulus would be returning from Cilicia, and to explain particularly the change in Cicero's own position within that political world since Lentulus' departure three years earlier (*Ad. fam.* 1. 9. 21), he remarked, 'As I have said on a large number of occasions, the goal of all us politicians should be "cum dignitate otium"', and, in between, at the very beginning of the *De Oratore*, finished in 55, he wrote, 'When I think over the old days and recall them to my mind, as I often do, the men above all others to be envied, as it seems to me, are those who, living when government was at its best, were highly distinguished for the offices which they had held and for the fame of their achievements, and could hold steadily to a course which enabled them as they pleased to be safe and active—"in negotio sine periculo"—or "in otio cum dignitate".'

Its three appearances belong, then, to the three years 56-54. 'Otium cum libertate' and 'otium cum servitio' are expressions found in Sallust's version of the speech made by the consul Lepidus in 78 (*Hist.* 1. 55. 9 and 25 M.; cf. 3. 48. 13 M.). Was Sallust having fun, as he sometimes did, in parodying Cicero's sententious utterances? Or did Lepidus in fact use those expressions in 78? In which case Cicero will have made play with a familiar form of expression in 56 and later. Others, indeed, may even have spoken of 'cum dignitate otium' before he did.

Cicero's earliest association of the two words in what survives of his writing

¹ For the latest discussion of this concept, with a survey of the differing views of earlier scholars, see Ch. Wirszubski, 'Cicero's *Cum*

Dignitate Otium: a reconsideration', *J.R.S.* xliv (1954), 1-13.

was in the speech which he made to the people on the day after his return to Rome, on 5 September 57. Praising Pompey's part in securing his restoration, he said, 'mihi unus uni privato amico eadem omnia dedit quae universae rei publicae, salutem, otium, dignitatem' (*Post red. ad pop.* 16). 'Otium', like 'dignitas', could have more than one meaning. When used of individuals, it was 'private' or 'retired', as opposed to 'active public life'. It was the state of the man who turned his back on public life, and it was also the state of the man who had played his full part in public life and retired from it. As such, it was either creditable or discreditable—'honestum' or 'inhonestum'. 'Otio prodimur', as the younger Pliny was later to say (*Pan.* 82. 9). The 'otium' of idle self-indulgence was discreditable; it was concerned not with 'dignitas' but with 'voluptas' (*Pro Sest.* 138). Sallust's late-developing moral sense austerely forbade him to devote his retirement from public life to farming or hunting ('servilia officia'), but approved of his becoming a historian (*Cat.* 4). This, certainly, was 'honestum otium'. Cicero uses the same epithet frequently of his own absorption in scholarly writing in the years in which he was forced to withdraw from public life.¹ But for Cicero this was only a second-best life. It lacked *dignitas*. For to desert active life for scholarship and writing, when a free choice was open to you, was dereliction of duty. 'Cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra officium est' (*De offic.* 1. 19 and 69–71).

In public life 'otium' stood for peace and freedom from disturbance.² It was relief after war, 'otium ab hostibus'. So Sallust wrote, of the period following the end of the great wars of the second century B.C. (*B.I.* 41, 4), 'Quod in advorsis rebus optaverant otium, postquam adepti sunt, asperius acerbiusque fuit.' And if 'otium' was freedom from external assault, it was also freedom from internal disorder, from 'tumultus' and civil war; this was 'otium domesticum' (*De leg. agr.* 2. 9)—'salus communis atque otium' (*Pro Sest.* 5 and 15). 'Deus nobis haec otia fecit.' From this it was not a long step to using the word for acceptance of the *status quo*, acceptance of existing political and social conditions, of 'religiones, auspicia, potestates magistratum, senatus auctoritas, leges, mos maiorum, iudicia, iuris dictio, fides, provinciae, socii, imperi laus, res militaris, aerarium' (*Pro Sest.* 98; cf. 137). This equation was made frequently by Cicero from 63 onwards (e.g. *De leg. agr.* 2. 8; 3. 4; *Pro Sest.* 137).

Placid acceptance of the existing régime was naturally viewed differently by the supporters and beneficiaries of that régime—the 'natio Optimatum' in the language of Clodius and the late-republican *Populares* (*Pro Sest.* 96; cf. 137)³—and by its enemies and critics. Acceptance of existing conditions, Lepidus declared in 78, in Sallust's version of his speech, was tantamount to the abandonment of liberty; 'otium' was 'otium cum servitio' (*Hist.* 1. 55. 25 M.).

The retort of the conservative politician was the retort of Maître Pangloss, an assurance to the proletariat that all was for the best in the best of all possible worlds. This is the theme of an important section of the *Pro Sestio* where, brave, muddled, and illogical, Cicero hides under an ornamental profusion of fine oratory the political barrenness of his own thought and the thought of his political friends. That change and reform is a function of organic life in any

¹ *Ad fam.* 4. 4. 4; 7. 33. 2; *Acad.* 1. 11; *De offic.* 2. 4; 3. 3. In *Ad fam.* 5. 21. 2 the use of 'honestum otium' is different and, in fact, in Cicero's writing, unique. See Wirszubski, op. cit. 8.

² See Wirszubski, op. cit. 4–6 for further references to the use of 'otium'.

³ Schol. Bob. ad *Pro Sest.* 132 (139 St.) says that the phrase 'natio Optimatum' was Vatinius' invention.

healthy society, and that a great many reforms were urgently needed in the corrupt hooligan world of Clodius, C. Cato, and the heroic Milo is not as much as suggested. The political world is divided sharply into good men and bad, Optimates and criminals. All are Optimates who respect the constitution and love peace (98 f.); such men abound at every social level, from freedmen upwards. The best men even of the proletariat are Optimates by decent instinct. 'Omnes optimates sunt qui neque nocentes sunt nec natura improbi nec malis domesticis impediti' (97)—all who are honest and solvent. Populares and Optimates were, therefore, one and the same. The so-called Populares who preached revolution were, properly considered, 'ficti et fallaciter populares' (*De dom.* 77); or, if they lay debased claim to the title, then in striking paradox it could be said, 'populum ipsum non esse popularem'.

At the top level of political society were the political leaders of this great army of good men, the 'propugnatores reipublicae' (*Pro Sest.* 101), the 'principes' (138), with their policy, the 'consilium principum' (cf. 136). These were men who did not seek popular applause, and rarely won it (140 f.).

How were the facts of recent history to be squeezed into this extraordinary mould?

First the false 'populares' of Cicero's political world had to be distinguished from such men as the Gracchi. Bribery was the convenient differential. A man like Clodius had no hope of securing political support unless he paid for it. Who could imagine the Gracchi buying votes? Support for them had been genuine support (104 f.).

Were the Gracchi then Optimates? It had to be admitted that they were not, and that in fact the great prototypes of optimiate politicians—Scaurus, Metellus Numidicus, and Catulus—opposed that kind of genuinely 'popular' politician. Here was a crux indeed, and Cicero did his poor best to solve it. 'Multitudinis studium aut populi commodum ab utilitate rei publicae discrepabat' (*Pro Sest.* 103). The optimiate politicians were right in their opposition and—we can hardly believe the evidence of our ears here—the people admitted the fact because, when all the fuss and bother of these popular reforms was over, and when a real crisis arose, it was to these same optimiate 'principes' that the people turned for advice—advice, moreover, which they followed. 'Ac tamen, si quae res erat maior, idem ille populus horum auctoritate maxime commovebatur' (*Pro Sest.* 105). Wisely Cicero contents himself with making this extraordinary claim, and does not illustrate it by a single example.

'Cum dignitate otium' stood out in contrast to 'otium sine dignitate'.¹ When, too late, good men (*boni*) woke up to the existence of sinister plotting on the part of seditious 'populares' and, for the sake of momentary peace (*otium*), made concessions to them rather than face a show-down, they achieved 'otium sine dignitate' (100), 'otium quod abhorreat a dignitate' (98). If they woke up altogether too late, of course, they lost 'otium' and 'dignitas' too (100).

Against this background we view Cicero's pipe dream of the contemporary political world. People and optimiate politicians, he claimed, saw eye to eye. 'Iam nihil est quod populus a dilectis principibusque dissentiat.' The people had no demands to make, and it did not want civil war. 'Nec flagitat rem ullam neque novarum rerum est cupidus.' 'Et otio suo et dignitate optimi cuiusque et universae rei publicae gloria delectatur' (104). This is the 'cum dignitate

¹ What today might be called 'the Munich spirit'.

otium' of the *Pro Sestio*—freedom from disturbance (*otium*), and respect for the government and its members, who themselves deserve respect.

It is a mistake to make a problem of Cicero's saying 'dignitate optimi cuiusque' instead of 'dignitate senatus' or 'dignitate rei publicae'.¹ The 'dignitas' of the government, in particular of the Senate, was the 'dignitas' of its members—'dignitatem rei publicae sustinent' (*De dom.* 3)—especially its senior members; and so the young man for whose inspiration this tract for the times was inserted into Sestius' defence was reminded that the Senate was open to merit, to all citizens, whatever their origins (*Pro Sest.* 137).

In all the five surviving speeches delivered by Cicero in this winter following his recall from exile there is, explicit or implied, a contrast between orderly government, such as he thought to have been restored (*De dom.* 25), and the complete breakdown of government in 58 under two men whom, without insult to the office, you could not call consuls (*De dom.* 62; 91), the 'novus dominatus' (*De dom.* 68), the banishment of Cicero and of the Republic with him (*De dom.* 87), and the prolonged triumph of gangsterdom which followed his exile. Clodius, the prince of gangsters, was the enemy of peaceful government—'oti et pacis hostis', 'cui salus esse in otio nulla posset', he had said of him in the *De domo* (12 f.)—while in his own recall there lay 'spes oti et concordiae'. 'Otium' had disappeared during his exile; and so had the 'dignitas' of government, 'in republica ab aliis oppressa, ab aliis deserta, ab aliis prodita' (*De dom.* 2).

With the restoration of what at least by contrast seemed settled conditions, to talk of 'otium' and 'dignitas' was no more a mockery.² A peaceful and contented populace, a responsible, effective, and respected government—that was 'otiosa dignitas', 'cum dignitate otium' (*Pro Sest.* 98). Guiding the ship of state through the stormy seas stirred up by the 'seditiosi', the stern, hard-working and dutiful 'principes' were determined to jettison none of the traditional institutions of the Republic, to hold on course and make for harbour, 'oti illum portum et dignitatis' (98 f.). The 'otium' which they sought was for others, not themselves (139; *Post red. ad pop.* 1).

That is what in the *Pro Sestio* 'cum dignitate otium' meant. But with the readjustment in Cicero's own position in politics two or three months after the *Pro Sestio* was delivered, the phrase was given a new twist, and applied by Cicero to himself, to his own 'otium' and his own 'dignitas'.

The opening remark of the *De Oratore*, which was finished in 55, introduces the new conception.³ 'Otium' is now retirement, the condition of the elder statesman. His active political life, his consulships and proconsulships are at an end. He is 'consularis', one of those Fathers of the House whose *sententia*, delivered at a very early stage in a senatorial debate, could have such a powerful influence in swaying the vote of the House. This influence was his *dignitas*. It was this life of influential and independent elder-statesmanship, the effective exercise of 'consilium' and 'auctoritas', that was snatched from Cicero when he made his capitulation in 56. 'Quae enim proposita fuerat nobis, cum et honoribus amplissimis et laboribus maximis perfuncti essemus, dignitas in

¹ See Wirszubski, op. cit. 9.

² In *Pro Sest.* 98, 'Neque rerum gerendarum dignitate homines efferri ita convenit ut otio non prospiciant', 'rerum gerendarum' is an intrusion. The meaning

must be that no one should pursue careerism (as Caesar was to do in 49) to the detriment of the country's peace. On this, Wirszubski, op. cit. 9 f.

³ *Vide supra*, p. 46.

sententis dicendis, libertas in re publica capessenda, ea sublata totast, nec mihi magis quam omnibus', he wrote to Spinther in early 55 (*Ad fam. 1. 8. 3 f.*). 'Otium' he might hope still to enjoy, but not 'dignitas'. 'Dignitatem quidem illam consularem fortis et constantis senatoris nihil est quod cogitemus.' He had, therefore, to descend to the retirement of the author and scholar. This was 'honestum otium', but it was acceptable only *faute de mieux*. It was not the retired statesman's choice.

There is finally the appearance of 'cum dignitate otium' in *Ad fam. 1. 9. 21*, where Cicero revives, with a sad and sinister difference, the language of the *Pro Sestio*. The whole plan and purpose of the letter makes his meaning clear. He had to justify to Spinther his change of political front in 56. He revives the image of the statesman-governor, steering the ship of state. In the *Pro Sestio* he stayed on course, battling through the stormy seas of popular agitation to reach harbour, 'cum dignitate otium'. Here in *Ad fam. 1. 9. 21* is the same steersman with the same object in view: 'cum omnibus nobis in administranda re publica propositum esse debeat, id quod a me saepissime dictum est, cum dignitate otium.' But this time the seas are too strong, and he must change course: 'in navigando tempestati obsequi artis est.' He must make for a different harbour, but one which will give the same good shelter, 'cum dignitate otium'. This, by his capitulation in 56, Cicero has done. As he had already told Lentulus, he had lost the hope of 'dignitas' as an active retired politician for himself, it must be the 'cum dignitate otium' of the *Pro Sestio*—'peace in our time and respect for the government'—that, at whatever sacrifice to himself, he has changed course in order to secure. 'Neque delendum, etiam si id fieri posset, summorum civium principatum'; refusal to recognize the undeniable power of the dynasts, persistence in opposition which was doomed to ineffectiveness, would not, for the Roman world at large, promote 'cum dignitate otium'.¹

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¹ This paper was read to the Oxford branch of the Classical Association in January 1959, and I have been helped both

by discussion which followed the paper then and by comments by Mr. J. R. Hawthorn of Bradfield College, who read it in typescript.

THE MANUSCRIPT A OF SOPHOCLES AND ITS RELATION TO THE MOSCHOPULEAN RECENSION

PROFESSOR KAMERBEEK in a recent article¹ raises some interesting questions about the value of the manuscript of Sophocles Parisinus gr. 2712, universally known as A. Ever since the time of Brunck, who was the first to use this manuscript extensively, it has been considered second only to Laurentianus XXXII 9 (L) as a source of correct readings and as a witness of the old, i.e. pre-Byzantine, tradition of Sophocles.² But the importance of A has been seriously challenged by Alexander Turyn,³ who has sought to show that in *Ajax*, *Electra*, and *Oedipus Tyrannus*—the three plays which constitute the Byzantine Triad of Sophocles—A's text is principally that of the recension of Manuel Moschopulus (fl. c. A.D. 1290)—or, more strictly, the version of that recension which includes scholia by Maximus Planudes and some slight variations in the poetic text.⁴ Turyn has pointed out that, although A is not wholly⁵ dependent on this Moschopuleo-Planudean recension, its variants, because drawn from other known sources, are of no importance and its entire text in these three plays is worthless to a modern editor who wishes to reconstruct the *pre-Byzantine* tradition of the Triad. Turyn uses these conclusions, together with evidence from the four other plays (a different problem, which I shall not discuss here) to prove that the text of A is an edited one throughout: it is, in fact, no more than an anonymous Byzantine recension, to be classed henceforth with those of Moschopulus, Thomas Magister, and Triclinius and not to be treated as a valuable witness of the old tradition.⁶

One ought not to discuss A without mentioning A's family, the group of manuscripts which Turyn has called the 'Paris class', with the symbol π . This group consists of A and two other manuscripts, U (Marcianus gr. 467) and Y (Vindobonensis philosoph. philol. gr. 48). Turyn has shown⁷ that these two manuscripts are A's *gemelli*, which means that such editorial activity as we detect in A ought properly to be attributed to π , the common source of A, U, and Y. But for the purpose of this discussion we may generally confine ourselves to the manuscript A alone.⁸

¹ *Mnemosyne*, S. IV, xi. 1 (1958), 25 ff.

² For modern championing of A see A. Dain, *Sophocle I. Les Trachinierres, Antigone* (ed. Budé), Introduction, pp. xliii ff., 'le Parisinus gr. 2712 est un manuscrit précieux par le choix important de leçons anciennes qu'il nous a conservées.'

³ 'The Sophocles Recension of Manuel Moschopulus' in *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, lxxx (1949) (pp. 139 ff. on A); and 'Studies in the Manuscript Tradition of the Tragedies of Sophocles', *Illinois Studies in Language and Literature*, xxxvi (1952) (pp. 173 ff. on A). I shall quote these two important works as 'Recension' and 'Studies'.

⁴ 'Recension', pp. 125 and 144.

⁵ For examples of A's divergences from Moschopulus see 'Recension', p. 145.

⁶ But in *Philoctetes*, *O.C.*, *Trachiniae*, *Antigone* Turyn argues that A's original stock is derived from the Laurentian and Roman families, with many Byzantine interpolations ('Studies', p. 177).

⁷ 'Studies', pp. 173 ff.

⁸ The date of A is an important and much-discussed problem. If A is late-thirteenth-century as Dain asserts (op. cit., p. xliii), there may be some difficulty in supposing it to derive from a manuscript (π) itself already affected by Moschopulus' recension of c. 1290. But Turyn thinks A is a product of the fourteenth century, and I find it difficult to see how one can date a manuscript of this period with extreme precision (i.e. to within a few years) if there is no other indication than the hand itself. Turyn has effectively replied to criticisms of his dating of A in

Leaving aside the problem of A's behaviour in *Philoctetes*, *Oedipus Coloneus*, *Trachiniae*, and *Antigone*, Professor Kamerbeek asks the question, did A in fact depend almost wholly on Moschopulus in the Triad?—a question which Turyn's evidence, full as it is, does not perhaps wholly dispel from our minds. It is clear enough that A has borrowed heavily from Moschopulus, as Turyn's list of readings shows,¹ and Professor Kamerbeek does not attempt to deny it, but he does also see many non-Moschopulean elements in A's text and, from the detailed evidence which he sets out (from *Oedipus Tyrannus*), concludes that A must be the descendant of a *third ancient branch* of the Sophoclean stemma: distinct, that is, from the 'Laurentian' family (Turyn's symbol λ , comprising L and A [Leiden B.P.G. 60 A, the 'Leiden palimpsest']) and the 'Roman' family (Turyn's symbol ρ , comprising G [Dindorf's Γ , Florence Conv. Soppr. 152], R [Vaticanus gr. 2291], M [Modena a. T. 9. 4, containing scholia only], and Q [Parisinus suppl. gr. 109, which is not relevant to our present discussion as it does not contain *Oedipus Tyrannus*]). This 'Roman' family is now generally thought to form a second branch of the old tradition, ultimately derived from the same archetype (Turyn's symbol ω) as the 'Laurentian' branch.²

According to Professor Kamerbeek's view of A as a basically old manuscript, some of the Moschopulean readings in A would be accounted for by supposing that the scribe of A, as well as using a manuscript of the 'third branch' of the ancient tradition as his exemplar, had access to a copy of the recension of Moschopulus. The remaining agreements between A and Moschopulus would be explained on the assumption that Moschopulus himself used a manuscript of this third family when he was composing his edition. Thus, on this hypothesis, when A agrees with Moschopulus the explanation may be (a) that A took the reading direct from Moschopulus, or (b) that A and Moschopulus both took it from a common source—the third ancient family of manuscripts.

This seems to me to be going rather too far. I shall try to prove from a detailed examination of Professor Kamerbeek's evidence that there is no need to posit a third branch of the ancient tradition and that A's text is, as Turyn maintains, essentially a made-up text, based largely on Moschopulus in the Triad, and familiar also with the two versions (λ and ρ) of the old tradition which we know to have existed distinct from one another as early as c. A.D. 1000.³ Unless A can be shown to contain (in the Triad) non-Moschopulean readings which could not have been derived from λ or ρ and which it would clearly be beyond a Byzantine editor to conjecture, it would seem uneconomical to assume that yet another version of the text of Sophocles was current from

¹ 'The Byzantine Manuscript Tradition of the Tragedies of Euripides', *Illinois Studies in Language and Literature*, xliv (1957), 89, note 146, where he remarks: 'I do not understand how anyone can ignore the fact that the Paris 2712 must be posterior to the Moschopulean edition of Sophocles if it contains [as it does] some Moschopulean scholia on the Sophoclean triad.' On these scholia see Turyn, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, lxvii, 161.

² 'Recension', p. 143.

³ I leave for another occasion a fuller discussion of this family. Professor Kamerbeek himself accepts the existence of ρ as a

distinct ancient family: 'Nunc tantum non constat eos nobis testes esse alterius rami memoriae mediaevalis iuxta L (et A) ex una stirpe enati.' On the Roman family see Turyn, 'Recension' and 'Studies' and Vittorio De Marco, 'Sulla tradizione manoscritta degli scolii sofoclei' in *Studi Italiani di filologia classica*, n.s. xiii (1936), 3–44, and 'De scholiis in Sophoclis tragodias veteribus', in *Memorie della R. Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei*, classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, Anno CCCXXXIV (1937), serie VI, vol. vi, fasc. ii.

⁴ The text of Sophocles in the Suda (c. A.D. 1000) is heavily on the side of ρ .

early times. And unless A can be shown to offer readings of value *besides* those which it shares with dozens of Moschopulean manuscripts, we should surely not be justified in supposing that Moschopulus derived the better of these readings from an ancestor of A, when the simplest interpretation of the facts would suggest that A has no greater claim to distinction than any other Moschopulean manuscript.

We must first examine Professor Kamerbeek's third group of readings, A's divergences from Moschopulus. If these non-Moschopulean readings in A are also at variance with λ and ρ they may well be very significant. But if A in disregarding Moschopulus agrees with one or other of the two ancient families I do not think we can justifiably see any special significance in this. A Byzantine editor might be expected to be familiar with λ and ρ , as Turyn indeed assumes π to have been¹ and as Moschopulus was.

As witnesses for the text of Moschopulus I shall use Vaticanus gr. 50 (Turyn's symbol Xa), representing the pure Moschopulean recension, and Vindobonensis philosoph. philol. gr. 161 (Turyn's symbol Xr) together with Vindobonensis philol. suppl. gr. 71 (Turyn's symbol Xs), representing the Moschopuleo-Planudean recension, to which Turyn finds A to be more closely related. This relationship is, indeed, borne out by at least two of Professor Kamerbeek's first four instances in his Group 3, which he quotes as non-Moschopulean readings in A in agreement with λ and ρ . Here A, as well as agreeing with LGR, closely agrees with the Moschopuleo-Planudean reading against that of the pure Moschopulean text. Thus A's agreement with $\lambda\rho$ is here irrelevant: all that is proved is merely that A follows the Planudean version of Moschopulus' text.

1214 ὁ πάνθ' ὄρῶν χρόνος Ι δικάζει A Xr Xs LGR

οἱ πάνθ' ὄρῶν χρόνος Ι ὁ δικάζει Xa (Xs p.c.)

1314 ἐπιπλάμενον A Xr Xs LGR

ἐπιπλόμενον Xa

At 159 the reading of LGR, which A offers, was known as a variant at least to Xr, and A itself offers the Moschopulean reading *supra lineam*. It may well be, therefore, that π derived both these readings from a Moschopulean manuscript which, like Xr, knew both readings.

159 κεκλόμενος A (in textu) Xr (in textu) LGR (κεκλήμενος G, κυκλό-
μενος R)

κεκλομένῳ A s.l. Xr s.l. Xa Xs

At 1267 A does seem to diverge from Moschopulus in favour of λ and ρ :

ἐκειθ' ὁ τλήμων ALGR

ἐκειτο τλήμων Xa Xs

ἐκειθ' ἡ τλήμων Xr

(Xr's reading probably does not count as evidence that $\dot{\epsilon}kei\theta'$ ὁ was known to Moschopulus as a variant). But, as I remarked above, there is nothing to be surprised at in A's familiarity with the old tradition.

Potentially more interesting and significant are the rest of the cases quoted in Group 3, where A is said to embrace a reading unknown to Moschopulus and

¹ 'Recension', p. 145. It is important to remember that Turyn nowhere suggests that A is exclusively Moschopulean.

to λ and ρ alike. But here I have found Xa, Xr, and Xs (or one or other of them) quite often agreeing with A, and I should certainly regard these manuscripts as typically Moschopulean.¹ They are, indeed, used by Turyn as paradigms of Moschopulean manuscripts. Professor Kamerbeck does not indicate which manuscripts he has used as witnesses of the Moschopulean tradition, but I do not think he would cast doubts on Turyn's whole identification of the Moschopulean recension.²

If, then, one is justified in using Xa, Xr, and Xs as representative of the Moschopulean text, the following readings of A from Group 3 cannot be said to diverge from his recension. (Of course, these readings may not all be *originally* Moschopulean, i.e. conjectures of Moschopulus' own: sometimes he may have used an ancient variant, or a correction made by the *deteriores*,³ or an alternative version known to him from a lexicographical work, in preference to a corrupt or obscure reading offered by λ and ρ .)

874 $\mu\acute{a}rav$ A Xa Xr Xs *Sudae codd. nonnulli (sub Y 15)*
 $\mu\acute{a}chav$ LG *fons Sudae (μηχανὴ Sudae codd. AFV, ε μάχαν ἀ)*
 $\mu\acute{a}chην$ G s.l. R
 $\mu\acute{a}trην$ ΣLGR *Gyp* Xr s.l.

The correction $\mu\acute{a}rav$ of the obviously corrupt $\mu\acute{a}chav$ (-ην) of LGR need not be attributed to Moschopulus: it had found its way into the whole class of *deteriores* (manuscripts ultimately related to λ and ρ but not preserving the old texts in their original uninterpolated state) and, as Turyn says, 'the *deteriores* restored the authentic reading on the basis of the scholia'.⁴ $\mu\acute{a}trην$ in the scholia and as a variant in G was after all an obvious hint. (The fact that $\mu\acute{a}rav$ is read by some of the Suda's manuscripts is not significant here, because these manuscripts (MBG etc.) are frequently interpolated, while the original reading of the Suda is more likely to be found in AFV.)

904 $\mu\acute{a} \lambda\acute{a}θη$ A Xr Xs
 $\mu\acute{a} \lambda\acute{a}θοι$ LGR Xa

This seems to be another instance of A's following the Moschopuleo-Planudean version.

926 $\epsilon\acute{i} \kappa\acute{a}tio\theta'$ A Xa Xr
 $\epsilon\acute{i} \kappa\acute{a}tio\theta'$ LGR Xs

Turyn⁵ quotes $\kappa\acute{a}tio\theta'$ as a Thoman reading and reports Moschopulus as reading $\kappa\acute{a}tio\theta'$, but the testimony of Xa and Xr shows that $\kappa\acute{a}tio\theta'$ was at least known to Moschopulus as a variant. Even if $\kappa\acute{a}tio\theta'$ could not have been known to the editor of π through Moschopulus, there is no reason to suppose that he could not have had access to Thoman manuscripts.

957 $\sigma\acute{a}μάντωρ γενοῦ$ A Xa Xr Xs *Lyp Gyp*
 $\sigma\acute{a}μήνας γενοῦ$ L a.c. GR

¹ They have the usual Moschopulean (Xa) and Moschopuleo-Planudean (Xr, Xs) scholia.

² The identification was made by means of the scholia, see Turyn, 'Recension'.

³ On the *deteriores*, divided into two families ϕ and ψ , basically affiliated to λ and ρ , see Turyn, 'Studies', chapters ix, x, xi.

⁴ 'Studies', p. 143. I think it unlikely,

however, that 'Gyp recorded the reading $\mu\acute{a}trην$ from the *deteriores*'. It seems to me more probable that $\mu\acute{a}rav$ was originally in the text (η to explain the α in lyrics), then $\mu\acute{a}trην$ was written out in full above $\mu\acute{a}rav$ in a later copy, and survived as a variant (hence *Gyp*) after the corruption $\mu\acute{a}chav$ had got into the text.

⁵ 'Studies', p. 60.

There is no question here of a split between A and Moschopulus—both adopt the ancient reading *σημάντωρ* which was not completely ousted from L and G. (Perhaps Professor Kamerbeek means to refer to A's omission of *οὐ* in the same verse, which is quoted by Turyn¹ as one of A's departures from Moschopulus:

μοι σημάντωρ	A, also V ² H ³ Δ ⁴
μοι οὐ	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{σημάντωρ} \\ \text{σημήνας} \end{array} \right.$ LGR Xa Xr Xs

The manuscripts with the symbols V, H, and Δ mentioned above all belong to the branch of *deteriores* which Turyn calls ψ and which derives ultimately from the Roman family. It may be that there is some affinity between A and ψ here, but it seems more likely that A's omission of *οὐ* is a purely accidental slip, the sort of error that any scribe might make at any time, no matter what he had as his sources.)

1011 ἐξέλθη A Xa Xr Xs
ἐξέλθοι LGR

1301 τῶν μακίστων A Xa (L p.c.)
τῶν κακίστων L a.c. A GR Xr Xs⁵ (*μείζονα τῶν μηκίστων* Xa s.l. Xs s.l.)

Professor Kamerbeek regards this as a very significant reading, and indeed, if it were not clear from *μακίστων* in Xa and from the gloss *μηκίστων* in Xa and Xs that Moschopulus was at least familiar with the correct version, one would be impressed by A's independence here. But this independence would be no more than apparent, for *μακίστων* is the Byzantine vulgate reading. It seems possible, also, that L's correction *μακίστων* was made by the first⁶ hand in L, not by a later corrector or by the scribe of A himself, who, as Turyn⁷ has shown, introduced many of A's readings into the text of L. (For this reason I have usually avoided reporting the reading of L p.c. and so confusing the issue.) If this is so, we must assume that *μακίστων* was known to the ancient tradition, but soon became corrupted because of its extremely close resemblance to the familiar *κακίστων*. *μακίστων*, however, was not lost sight of altogether and was seen by Byzantine editors, π among them, to be right.

Professor Kamerbeek thinks it doubtful whether a Byzantine editor was capable of conjecturing *μακίστων* for *κακίστων*, but Byzantine editors must have been at least as well aware as modern ones of the similarity of μ and π in minuscule and therefore of the possibility of this sort of corruption. And in this particular case the emendation would be extremely easy: *κακίστων* makes bad metre as well as poor sense and *μείζονα* gives a clear hint of what ought to follow. There is no doubt that Byzantine editors were capable of emending simple anapaests; we need go no further than line 1299 of this same play, where Moschopulus emends a faulty anapaestic line:

τίς ὡ τλῆμον LAGR
τίς ο' ὡ τλῆμον Moschopulus, Thomas, Triclinius.

¹ 'Studies', p. 174.

² Marciianus 468, Pearson's symbol Ven.

³ Laurentianus XXXII. 40.

⁴ Laurentianus. Conv. Soppr. 41.

⁵ Professor Kamerbeek rightly points out here that the typically minuscule corruption *κακίστων* for *μακίστων* tends to

disprove Dain's otherwise doubtful theory that L was transcribed from an uncial manuscript.

⁶ As far as I can tell from the facsimile of L the μ appears to be a contemporary correction. Jebb and Dindorf both thought so.

⁷ 'Recension', pp. 140, 146.

In addition to their ability to correct metrical errors Moschopulus and his contemporaries seem to have had no mean knowledge of Greek: not every editor would see, as Moschopulus saw, that *εἰσέπασεν* ought to replace *εἰσέπεσεν* at *Oedipus Tyrannus* 1252, for example.

Two readings from Group 3 show A diverging from Moschopulus.

1130 ξυνήλλαξας AV4
ξυνάλλαξα Xa Xr Xs LAGR

Here, instead of the Moschopulean (and ancient) reading, A offers a *lectio facilior*, which may perhaps be derived from the ψ branch of the *deteriores* (cf. 957 *supr.*) or may simply be a reading of A's own, quite accidentally shared by ψ .

More important is A's reading at 1108:

ἐλικανίδων A a.c.
ἐλικανιάδων A p.c. (*prima manu, ut videtur*) Xa Xr Xs LGR

ἐλικανίδων is generally adopted as the right reading, to avoid synizesis.¹ But even though A before correction appears to offer a uniquely correct reading, there are several reasons why we should hesitate to see any great significance in this. First, A's correction ἐλικανιάδων appears to be by the first hand, which would suggest that A's scribe merely made a slip which he saw and corrected himself. Secondly, even if the α had been put in a later hand,² we should have to take into account the possibility of A's scribe making a slip which he did not notice—a very easy thing to do when writing word-endings of this sort. Finally, I have found no evidence from the manuscript U or from the Aldine text (which was based on the manuscript Y) that the reading ἐλικανίδων was known to the rest of the π family.

It seems most likely, therefore, that ἐλικανίδων was a purely accidental error made and corrected by A's scribe, who was copying from an exemplar reading ἐλικανιάδων in common with all other Sophocles manuscripts.

It is clear from our examination of the readings in Group 3, *A contra Moschopulum*, that A diverges very rarely from Moschopulus and that these divergences are unimportant.³ They can be classed as (i) readings picked up from one or other of the two ancient families, λ and ρ , or (ii) obvious emendations, derived, for example, from the *deteriores* or read by A in common with Thomas Magister or Triclinius, or (iii) purely accidental errors made by A or A's ancestor π . We have not yet, therefore, found any reason to posit a third ancient family as the ultimate source of A.

Let us now consider Professor Kamerbeek's fourth group of readings. Here he lists instances of A's agreements with G and R against L and Λ (when legible), but does not make it clear where Moschopulus also follows GR. There can be no *prima-facie* significance in an agreement between A and GR if Moschopulus is also in agreement, because, as Turyn has pointed out, Moschopulus knew and used both ancient families.⁴ Nor is it easy to see what

¹ It was conjectured by Porson on Euripides, *Orestes* 614.

² So A. Dain, *Sophocle II. Ajax-Oedipe Roi-Electre*.

³ Turyn gives a few more examples of A's divergence from Moschopulus, but there, too, it is easy to trace the source of A's

reading, e.g. *O.T.* 786 dei LGR *Moschopulus Thomani nonnulli, aici A Thomani cett. Triclinius.*

⁴ 'Recension', p. 144. An obvious example is *Ajax* 1000: δύνατος L4, δέδαυσ *GR Moschopulus (et A).*

significance can be attached to A's agreements with GR *without* the concurrence of Moschopulus: significant proof of the existence of a third ancient family would surely be found in A's notable divergences from L and GR alike.

I list first the agreements between A and GR which also have the support of Moschopulus. Here the simplest explanation seems to be that AGR-Moschopulus against L represents an original split in the old tradition, with Moschopulus, and therefore A, preferring the version offered by the Roman family.

72 *τήνδε ῥυσαίμην* AR Xa Xr Xs G (*p.c.?*)
τήνδ' ἐρυσαίμην G (*a.c.?*)
τήνδ' ἐρυσάμην L *a.c. A*
139 *ἐκεῖνον* AGR₂ Xa Xr Xs
ἐκεῖνος L *a.c. Suda*

Suda's agreement with L here suggests that *ἐκεῖνος* was an ancient double reading.

145 *δράσοντος* AGR Xa Xr Xs
δράσαντος L *a.c.*
221 *ἰχνευον αὐτός* AGR Xa Xr Xs
ἰχνευον αὐτό L₂ G₂ *Gyp.*

Again both readings were probably known to the archetype, as G's *γρ* *αὐτό* suggests.

240 *χέρνιβας νέμειν* AGR Xa Xr Xs
χέρνιβος νέμειν L *a.c.*
290 *τά γ' ἀλλα A p.c. GR Xa Xr Xs*
τά τ' ἀλλα L Xs a.c. (?)
322 *εἶπας* AGR Xa Xr Xs
εἶπες L *a.c. A*
προσφιλέσ AGR L *s.l. A* Xa Xr Xs
προσφιλῆ L
337 *όργην* AGR Xa Xr Xs
όρμην L *a.c.*
349 *εἶναι habent* AGR Xa Xr Xs *omittunt L A*
528 *ἔξ ὀμμάτων ὄρθων δὲ κάξ A Xa Xr Xs*
ἔξ ὀμμάτων δ' ὄρθων δὲ κάξ GR Suda₂ codd. AS
ἔξ ὀμμάτων ὄρθων τε κάξ L a.c. Suda₂ codd. G
543 *ποιήσων* AGR Xa Xr Xs *Suda₂ codd. plerique*
πόνησον L *a.c. Σ*
713 *ῆξει* AGR Xa Xr Xs
ῆξοι L *a.c.*
789 *ἄλλα δ' ἄθλια AR Xa Xr Xs*
ἄλλ' ἄθλια G
ἄλλα θ' ἄθλια L a.c.
800 *versum habent* AGR Xa Xr Xs
omittunt L A

904 ὅρθ' AGR Xa Xr Xs
ὅρθὸν L

1031 ἐν κακοῖς με AGR Xa Xr Xs
ἐν καροῖς L
ἐν καροῖς με *Pal. 40* (Turyn's symbol P)¹

1138 χειμῶν A Gmg. R Xa Xr Xs
χειμῶνος G (*in textu*)
χειμῶνα L
κατὰ τὸν χειμῶνα Xa s.l. Xr s.l. Xs s.l.

It looks here as though χειμῶν and χειμῶνα were old variants with χειμῶνa corrupted into χειμῶνος, the normal prose usage, by G. The explanation κατὰ τὸν χειμῶνα in Xa Xr Xs possibly led 'minimum unus e Moschopuleanis' (Professor Kamerbeek does not say which) to read χειμῶνa.

1151 εἰδὼς οὐδὲν AGR Xa Xr Xs
οὐδὲν εἰδὼς L a.c. A

(Through a misprint in Professor Kamerbeek's list εἰδὼς οὐδὲν is attributed to L a.c. and οὐδὲν εἰδὼς to A.)

1201 ἀνέστας AGR Xa Xr Xs
ἀνέστα L a.c.

1329 ὡς φίλοι AGR Xa Xr Xs²
φίλοι L

1336 ταῦθ' AGR Xa Xr Xs
τάδ' L

1469 τ' ἀν AGR Xa Xr Xs
δ' ἀν L a.c.

The three remaining examples from Group 4 are slightly less clear-cut:

180 νηλέα δὲ γενέθλα AGR M *lem.* Xr Xs *Pap. Soc. It.* 1192 Σ
νηλέα δ' ἀ γενέθλα L Σ *lem.* Xa

Turyn³ quotes νηλέα δ' ἀ γενέθλα as the reading preferred by Moschopulus, but δὲ in Xr Xs suggests that this variant was preferred in the Planudean version of Moschopulus' text.

516 τ' AGR Xa Xs L p.c. *Pap. Ox.* 2180
γ' L a.c. (?) Xr *Suda*

There is really nothing here to suggest that A was in any way departing from the standard Moschopulean text. Moschopulus clearly preferred τ', interpreting it as an elided τι: Xa and Xs followed by A all have τι *supra lineam*, and even Xr, which reads γ', has the explanation τι παρ' ἐμοῦ.

¹ Heidelberg Palat. gr. 40, a manuscript of the λ family in O.T. This is an interesting case. The manuscript evidence makes it clear that ἐν κακοῖς με was in the source of λ and ρ, possibly with some variant which L adopted to give ἐν καροῖς, or else so confusedly written as to lead to corruption.

The Scholion certainly seems to refer to something like ἐν κακοῖς: διαπινθίσανται ὁ Οἰδίποος ὅτι ἐν ποιῷ δρᾳ κακῷ ὅντα κατὰ τὴν ἰκθεούν . . .

² On this reading see Turyn, 'Studies', p. 124.

³ 'Studies', p. 45.

A's reading at 660 ought not to be classed with these agreements between A and GR. Professor Kamerbeek agrees with Pearson in ascribing *οὐ μὰ τὸν πάντων* to A, but this is erroneous. A, like L, reads *οὐ τὸν πάντων*.

οὐ τὸν πάντων AL Xa Xr Xs (*μά* Xa *s.l.* Xr *s.l.* Xs *s.l.*)
οὐ μὰ τὸν πάντων GR

(This long list of agreements between Moschopulus and GR may suggest that Moschopulus was heavily biased in favour of the Roman family, but a closer scrutiny will show that some of these cases must be discounted. Several of them (e.g. 240, 337, 940) do not reflect a genuine divergence in the tradition caused, for example, by a double reading in the archetype (as 221 does), but are simply instances of L's or the Laurentian family's private errors, which one would not expect an editor to adopt.)

Professor Kamerbeek's fifth group of readings is an extension of the fourth: here he lists A's agreements with one or other manuscript of the Roman tradition, viz. AG *v.* LR and AR *v.* LG. Here, as in Group 4, I find it difficult to see what significance can be attached to these readings, especially if Moschopulus is in agreement with A.

AG *v.* LR

194 ἀπορον A Gyp Xa Xr Xs Σ(?)
 ἀπορον GΣ(?)
 ἐπορον L *a.c.* *novit* Σ
 ἐποῦρον R *novit* Σ

All three readings appear to be ancient variants, as the scholion¹ and Gyp suggest, so that even if A did not make the same choice as Moschopulus here we could easily explain A's reading as a choice made by π from the variants supplied by an ancient λ- or ρ-manuscript containing scholia.

AR *v.* LG

273 ὄμιν AR Xa Xr Xs
 ὄμιν LG

Moschopulus' ὄμιν makes A's agreement with R unimportant.²

843 κατακτείναεν AR Xa Xr Xs
 κατακτείνεεν L *a.c.* (?) G
 κατακτάναεν G *s.l.*

G's preservation of a variant here shows that two readings were known to the Roman family. In cases like this it is much more common for R to agree with Gyp or G *s.l.* than with G's text reading.

So far we have found almost no instances of A's being alone in preserving a correct reading, but there are still three more groups to consider. Professor Kamerbeek's sixth group is a list of A's agreements 'with the "authentic"

¹ Here is the text of the scholion in LGRM: πάντας ἐπορον (om. GM, ἐποῦρον R)· ἄγοι ἐποῦρον (ἐπορον GRM) δέ ἔστιν (om. G) εἰς ἀνέμον· καὶ (om. L) "Ομῆρος" εἰς ἄρος δέ εἰς κίρια· δέ πορον (G *a.c.* M, *et sic* L, *ut miki videtur*. G *a.c.* et R *contractionem obscuram post ἀπορ πρaebent, fortasse των, ε τερισ sequentibus ἀπό των*) ἀπό των δρον της πόλεως.

² More interesting is R's divergence from L and G. R does very occasionally depart from the ancient tradition and embrace a Byzantine reading. It is not, however, impossible that ὄμιν was an ancient variant, in spite of there being no trace of it in L and G.

(i.e. ancient) readings for which the old scholia are evidence, against L or LGR'. Here again Moschopulus must be the decisive factor, for if A and Moschopulus agree we do not need to look further for an explanation of A's reading; but, even if they are at variance, need we see proof here of A's antiquity? It would surely not be surprising if the putative Byzantine editor responsible for π and through π for A occasionally used the ancient scholia as a basis for emendations, just as Moschopulus or a modern editor might do.

11 δείσαντες ἡ στέξαντες A Xa Xr Xs a.c. (?)
 δείσαντες ἡ στέρξαντες GR L a.c. Xs p.c.
 (οἷον ἡδη πεπονθότες Σ)

It seems to me unlikely that *στέξαντες* is in fact an 'authentic' reading. The problem has been very fully discussed by editors¹ and need not detain us here. The variant *στέρξαντες* no doubt arose, as Jebb suggests, from an attempt to make the text fit the gloss *πεπονθότες*, which was itself a misinterpretation of *στέρξαντες*.

375 βλάψαι AG s.l. Xr Xa Xs
 βλέψαι Pap. Ox. 22 L a.c. G (in textu) R
 (διαθεῖναι κακόν Σ)

The corruption *βλέψαι* must have been well established in the archetype, but the right reading does not seem to have been lost sight of altogether, as G *s.l.* testifies. Thus Moschopulus may have adopted *βλάψαι* directly from a ρ manuscript which, like G, offered it as a variant, or perhaps from a *deterior* whose text had been corrected on the basis of *διαθεῖναι κακόν*. In any case we can see no significance in A's reading if it is also that of Moschopulus.

1225 ἀρεῖσθε A Xa Xr Xs
 αἴρεῖσθε LAGR
 (λήγεισθε Σ Xa s.l. Xr s.l.)

Turyn² regards this as a Moschopulean emendation: it would hardly be a difficult conjecture for an editor to make, using *λήγεισθε* as a guide.

The second group contains one reading only: an instance of A, Λ , and Moschopulus agreeing against L, G, and R:

322 ἔννομ³ ΑΛ (testē Scheltema⁴) Xa Xr Xs Lc
 ἔννομον L a.c. GR Xr s.l. Xs s.l. (εὔνομον Xa s.l.)
 . . . προσφιλές ΑΛ Xa Xr Xs GR L s.l.
 . . . προσφιλῆ LP

This alinement of manuscripts needs some discussion, but for us the first and most important point must be, as always, the relation between A and Moschopulus. Here there is no problem: A offers exactly the same reading as Moschopulus and we are not, therefore, entitled to see any significance in its behaviour.

What is puzzling here is A's *ἔννομ*' against the corruption *ἔννομον* in the rest of the ancient tradition. Turyn⁵ originally accepted Scheltema's report of Λ and suggested that Λ itself may have emended the corrupt *ἔννομον*, but he has

¹ e.g. Jebb, ad loc.

Lugdunensi', *Mnemosyne*, S. IV, ii (1949).

² 'Recension', p. 137.

132-7.

³ H. J. Scheltema, 'De Codice Sophocleo

⁴ 'Recension', p. 134.

since¹ doubted whether *A* does in fact read *énνομ'*, which he now lists as a Moschopulean emendation.

The original reading was without doubt *énνομ'* . . . *προσφιλῆ*, but from the testimony of *L*, *G*, and *R* we must assume that the corruptions *énνομον* and *προσφιλές* had established themselves in the text at an early stage.² *L*'s *προσφιλῆ* and *P*'s *προσφιλῆ* suggest to me that in the Laurentian side of the tradition the corruption was not so firmly established as in the Roman branch: a clear divergence between the two families is often caused by their scribes' different reactions to the same set of variants. It is therefore quite possible that the original *énνομ'*, although it vanished completely from the Roman family, still survived in the Laurentian side of the tradition and was known to, and indeed preferred by, *A*. But it is still odd that *L*'s scribe, who was in general careful to note variants, recorded *προσφιλῆ* but ignored *énνομ'*.

As for Moschopulus, we may agree with Turyn that he conjectured *énνομ'* himself, or we may leave the credit for *énνομ'* with *A* and suppose that Moschopulus found the reading in a Laurentian manuscript. We may safely leave the whole question open, as its answer could not affect our view of *A*.

The first group of readings which Professor Kamerbeek offers is perhaps the most difficult to explain, not, as it turns out, so far as *A* is concerned, but with regard to Moschopulus. (In each case *A*'s agreement with Moschopulus deprives *A*'s reading of significance.) This group consists of agreements between *A*, Moschopulus, and a papyrus on the one hand and *L*, *G*, and *R* on the other.

824 stands apart from the rest, because here it is clear that *A*, Moschopulus, and the papyrus are in the wrong.

824 *μῆτε* *A* *Xa* *Xr* *Xs* *Pap. Ox. 1369* *L p.c.*
μῆστι *L a.c.* (*ut videtur*) *GR*

(825) *μῆτ'* *έμβατεύειν* *A* *Xa* *Xr* *Xs* *L p.c.*
μῆ μ' *έμβατεύειν* *L a.c.* (?) (*sic censuit Dindorf*) *R*
μῆ με βατεύειν *G*
. . . έμβατεύσαι *Pap. Ox. 1369*)

Here again I must stress that for our present purpose the problem is really a secondary one, because it concerns Moschopulus and not *A*. If *A* diverged from Moschopulus in agreeing with the papyrus we might well see this as evidence of a genuine ancient tradition in *A*; but nothing so remarkable occurs here.

But the secondary problem remains. What connexion, we must ask, if any, exists between the papyrus and Moschopulus? The ancient tradition of *λ* and *ρ* is a little confused but it is clear that their common source must have offered *μῆστι* . . . *μῆ μ'* *έμβατεύειν*. Even though *μῆ μ'* *έμβατεύειν* seems corrupt, there is little doubt that *μῆστι* is the right reading in 824: it is inconceivable that *μῆστι* . . . *μῆ μ'* could arise out of an original *μῆτε* . . . *μῆτ'*. On the other hand, *μῆτε* . . . *μῆτ'* might well be a corruption of *μῆστι* . . . *μῆ μ'* (or *μῆδ'*, or

¹ 'Studies', p. 22.

² *énνομον* may have got into the text as the result of a ditto-ography: *ομον'*, changed to *ομον* which is very similar in minuscule. Or possibly the apostrophe in *énνομ'* was mis-

read as the contraction for *ον*. Then *προσφιλές* would have been added above *προσφιλῆ* as an apparently more correct alternative in view of the singular *énνομον*.

$\mu\eta\tau'$, one or the other of which must originally have stood in the text¹) or even an intended emendation: $\mu\eta\tau\ldots\mu\eta\tau'$ does make sense and possible, though very unlikely, syntax, if one takes $\chi\rho\eta$ to govern $\delta\epsilon\epsilon\eta$ and $\epsilon\mu\beta\alpha\tau\epsilon\eta\epsilon\eta$.

The answer to our question could therefore be: (1) the original text became partly corrupt at an early stage (as $\mu\eta\mu'$ in L a.c. GR shows) and the papyrus and Moschopulus (or the source from which he took the reading, e.g. early *deteriores*) independently made the same error or conjecture, $\mu\eta\tau\ldots\mu\eta\tau'$, or (2) the $\mu\eta\tau\ldots\mu\eta\tau'$ version of the text was an ancient variant, read by the papyrus but neglected by the writer of the source of λ and ρ in favour of $\mu\eta\sigma\tau\ldots\mu\eta\mu'$ (or whatever stood in place of $\mu\eta\mu'$). The easier variant $\mu\eta\tau\ldots\mu\eta\tau'$ did not, however, disappear altogether, but was preserved in, for example, some lexicographical work and reinstated by Byzantine editors as the more intelligible reading.

This second explanation may not be so unlikely as it seems at first sight. No one, I think, would claim that all our known evidence for the text of Sophocles is derived from the source of λ and ρ : a certain number of readings neglected by that manuscript are known to us: there is, for example, the famous line 1167 of the *Antigone*, omitted by L and R (the only Roman manuscript which contains this play) but preserved by Eustathius. We ought also to remember that many variant readings were current at an earlier period when the ancient scholia were composed² and I do not think it unreasonable to suppose that a number of these variants continued to be known for several centuries. But merely to acknowledge the existence of ancient variants other than those recorded by L, G, and R is a very different thing from supposing a whole distinct ancient family to have existed alongside the Laurentian and Roman ones.

In the three other readings in Group 1 the papyrus, Moschopulus, and A appear to be right against L, G, and R. Turyn quotes the readings at 297 and 1306 as conjectures of Moschopulus' own and in both cases remarks: 'This agreement of Moschopulus with the papyrus is purely accidental.'³ He quotes the third reading, at 1355, as peculiar to the Moschopuleo-Planudean recension.⁴

297 $\alpha\bar{\eta}\epsilon\delta\epsilon\gamma\eta\omega\eta$ Pap. Ox. 2180 A Xa Xr Xs L p.c.
 $\alpha\bar{\eta}\epsilon\delta\epsilon\gamma\chi\omega\eta$ L a.c. GR

As in the previous example we can learn nothing here about A, because A agrees with Moschopulus. As for Moschopulus it seems likely that Turyn is right to see no connexion here between his text and that of the papyrus: it looks as though the text established by the Alexandrine scholars read $\alpha\bar{\eta}\epsilon\delta\epsilon\gamma\eta\omega\eta$ (hence the papyrus reading) and the corruption $\alpha\bar{\eta}\epsilon\delta\epsilon\gamma\chi\omega\eta$ occurred sometime between the date of the papyrus and the ninth or tenth century when it found its way into the source of λ and ρ . It is quite easy to imagine Moschopulus, faced with manuscripts all reading $\alpha\bar{\eta}\epsilon\delta\epsilon\gamma\chi\omega\eta$, restoring the future form simply by his skill as a textual critic.

¹ Editors since the time of Dindorf have usually favoured $\mu\eta\theta'$ as the original reading, but $\mu\eta\tau'$ (read by Brunck and Dain) is very attractive, as it so easily accounts for the change to $\mu\eta\tau\ldots\mu\eta\tau'$. Denniston (*The Greek Particles*, 2nd ed., p. 509) recognizes the usage $\mu\eta\ldots\mu\eta\tau$ in tragedy.

² For examples of variants known to scholia see, for example, O.T. 194 quoted above. On the date and composition of the ancient scholia see Vittorio de Marco, *Scholia in Sophoclis Oedipum Coloneum* (1952).

³ 'Studies', pp. 22-23.

⁴ 'Studies', p. 24.

(L's [οὐξελέγ]ξων *supra lineam* is by a late hand, not, as Jebb says, 'either by the first hand itself . . . or by the first corrector'. It is not by A, either, but looks late enough to be post-Moschopulean and must therefore be left out of account here.)

1306 *τοίαν Pap. Ox. 1369 A (in textu) U (in textu) Xa Xr Xs*
ποίαν L A s.l. U s.l.
οῖαν GR
(όποίαν τοιαύτην Xr s.l., τοιαύτην Xa s.l. Xs s.l.)

Again, as A follows Moschopulus, we have no major problem to solve.

It looks as though an original *τοίαν* (clearly the right reading) was supplanted in the source of *λ* and *ρ* by *όποίαν*, which had originally come in as an interlinear explanation. This could account for both *ποίαν* in L and *οῖαν* in GR through independent errors.¹ It is interesting to note that Xr reads *όποίαν s.l.*, which may illustrate the process I have been trying to describe. I would suggest that the editor of *π* (U's testimony shows that the double reading was known to the source of A's family) took *τοίαν* from Moschopulus but noted *ποίαν* also from some Laurentian manuscript.²

As for the connexion between the papyrus and Moschopulus, I incline to agree with Turyn that it is purely accidental. It would certainly be unwise to argue that this emendation is beyond Moschopulus' powers. I have already quoted examples of his editorial acumen and one need only look through Turyn's exhaustive lists³ to be convinced of it. Conjectures like *ὅσος* for *ὅς* (Euripides, *Phoenissae* 1235) or *ἀλλὰ γάρ* for *ἀτάρ* (*Phoenissae* 1762), both the work of Moschopulus, make *τοίαν* for *ποίαν* seem a mere trifle.

1355 *ἄχος Pap. Ox. 1369(?) A Xr Xs*
ἄχθος LGR Xa

Here the Planudean version of Moschopulus' text prefers the metrically correct reading *ἄχος*. Although this occurs in a kommos it is an iambic line and thus it would not be surprising if Planudes, seeing that *ἄχθος* did not scan, made the simple change to *ἄχος*. There is no need to suppose that his reading has any connexion with that of the papyrus.

But even if these agreements between Moschopulus and the papyri were not accidental they would prove nothing about A. In all six of the groups of readings discussed we have found no completely original reading in A and cannot, therefore, give A credit for independent activity in *Oedipus Tyrannus*.⁴ All that has been proved is that A's text is overwhelmingly Moschopulean, with occasional departures, none of which is unaccountably original. I do not think, therefore, that one would have any justification in supposing from the present evidence that there existed a third branch of the old tradition from which A is ultimately descended. If this is true it is surely scarcely proper even to suggest that Moschopulus derived some of the better readings attributed to

¹ *όποίαν* being at the beginning of a line, the first letter might be obscured by scholia and omitted. It would not be difficult, either, to write *οῖαν* for *όποίαν* by a sort of haplography.

² Or there may be some connexion between *ποίαν s.l.* in AU and *όποίαν τοιαύτην s.l.* in Xr.

³ e.g. 'Recension', pp. 131 ff. Cf. A. Turyn, 'The Byzantine Manuscript Tradition of the Tragedies of Euripides', *Illinois Studies in Language and Literature*, xliii (1957), 117 ff.

⁴ The situation is very probably identical in *Ajax* and *Electra*, as Turyn's evidence suggests.

him from an ancestor of A; for, if A in the Triad is not distinguished by anything but its Moschopulean readings, one might equally well suggest that any other 'Moschopulean' manuscript is ultimately based on ancient tradition, and that its ancestors influenced Moschopulus when he was making his recension.

To conclude, I ought to stress that I have purposely limited the scope of this article to *Oedipus Tyrannus* and that I have not by any means been trying to dispose of the whole problem of A. Until its text of the remaining six plays has been more thoroughly investigated there is no means of judging Turyn's hypothesis, which seems to me *prima facie* a sound one, that A is an edited text throughout.

Again, whatever conclusion one may reach about A, the problem of Moschopulus will doubtless continue to be debated. I am myself convinced by what I have seen of Byzantine emendation (from Turyn's lists, for example) that editors like Moschopulus and Triclinius are not to be underrated, but, if one believes with Professor Kamerbeek that there are things in the edition of Moschopulus which are patently beyond Moschopulus' power, then one must look for an ancient source other than λ and ρ for these correct readings.¹ But from this point of view the nature of the Moschopulean recension and the nature of A are two different problems, and I think it dangerous to see any connexion between them until we have precise knowledge of A's behaviour in each play and until more work has been done on the Byzantine editors.²

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¹ The true answer may be a compromise between the two extremes, namely that Moschopulus was indeed an able editor, but that he also had access to a fuller tradition of Sophocles than that available to us. This would not necessitate belief in a third ancient family, which would bring many attendant difficulties, and it would account for the more curious agreements with the

papyri by supposing Moschopulus to have known a greater range of variants and scholia and also of lexicographical works than is now extant.

² I am very grateful to Professor D. L. Page for much illuminating criticism and advice, and to Mr. R. D. Dawe for kindly reading this article in its final draft.

CLAUSULAE IN THE RHETORICA AD HERENNIVM AS EVIDENCE OF ITS DATE

BELIEVING that there is still something to be said about the early history of *clausulae* in Latin prose, I set myself to trace the practice of the early orators, then that of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, accepting its conventional dating to 86-82 B.C., and lastly that of Cicero in *D. Inventione*, assuming it to be roughly contemporary with the *ad Herennium*, and in his early speeches. But *clausula*-study itself, besides shedding light on the methods of composition used by the still unidentifiable Auctor *ad Herennium*, cast doubts on the conventional dating of his work. I gave a brief outline of my conclusions in *C.R.*, n.s. vi (1956), 134-6. I propose to attempt here a detailed justification of those relating to the date of the work, with a few modifications of some points.

My argument may be summarized as follows. (i) The *ad Herennium* may be so subdivided as to show that the certainly original passages have very marked rhythmical characteristics; (ii) the *exempla* (illustrative passages) scattered through the work do not as a whole show these peculiarities to the same extent, despite the Auctor's claim (in the prologue to Book 4) to have invented them himself; (iii) it has in any case long been realized that, whatever the Auctor says, many of the *exempla* are borrowed from Greek; study of these borrowed *exempla* shows them generally to lack the Auctor's two highly favoured rhythms (- u - u and - u - - u). Further, *exempla* paralleled in Latin sources (mainly Quintilian) either do not show the Auctor's rhythms or, by changes of word-order etc., show clearly that they have been altered by him to give his favourite rhythms; (iv) two main conclusions follow: (a) that the Auctor borrowed, with or without adaptation, Latin *exempla* which were sometimes derived from Greek, and incidentally that when Quintilian cites the same *exempla*, sometimes in such a way as to suggest that he got them from a certain Cornificius, he is not borrowing directly from the Auctor, i.e. the Auctor was not Cornificius, as has often been claimed; and (b) that, the discrepancy between the Auctor's rhythms and those of the *exempla* being clearly due to the mixture in them of the invented and borrowed, we may, with reservations to be mentioned at their place, classify other *exempla* as 'rhythmical' and original, or 'non-rhythmical' and so borrowed; (v) it turns out that many of the *exempla* with historical content may well be borrowed, while others are probably original, yet the two groups of borrowed and original cover the same historical period, that down to 87 B.C. It is obviously probable that the borrowed *exempla* are earlier than the Auctor's own rhythmical exercises, i.e. the *subject-matter* even of those the Auctor composed himself he borrowed, presumably from material familiar to him in his schooldays. Since there is no proof whatever that even the earlier 'stratum' of *exempla* was composed soon after the latest date to which it refers, the arguments for dating the Auctor's collection and composition of *exempla* and the compilation of the whole work to soon after 87 B.C. are seen to be tenuous. Finally I approach the question of a true *terminus ante quem* for the work.

Before giving the statistics on which my conclusions are based, it is perhaps desirable to say something of the methods adopted in obtaining them and on *clausula*-study in general. In this country in particular, Zieliński's work on

Cicero has had a dominating and far from healthy influence. Zieliński tried to establish the facts of Cicero's practice, to find the system on which the practice was based, and the 'laws' according to which the system was applied. Whether or not he was successful in the first of these undertakings, his conclusions on the other two matters are now generally rejected by those who have made their own study of the subject. There are other methods which are more informative. But Zieliński's exposition was imposing, and the vogue of his work has had other unfortunate effects for which its author is not to blame. Zieliński concentrated on Cicero's speeches—naturally enough, for they are consciously and avowedly rhythmical. But it does not follow, as seems sometimes to be thought, that Cicero alone used *clausulae*, or, more broadly, that only consciously rhythmical writers merit study, or again that we can impose Cicero's rhythmical preferences on other writers, as sometimes happens in textual criticism.¹ On the contrary, many other writers merit, and have received, consideration in their own right.² Provided that we are not asking the question 'What is the author trying to do?' we do not have to establish *conscious* seeking after rhythmical effects in order to achieve valid results any more than we do with other stylistic features when they are used solely as tests of date or authorship. Thus I am not concerned with the degree of conscious intention in the Auctor's rhythms; indeed my arguments will be strengthened if he was not guided by more than a half-conscious liking for particular rhythms. For the conscious master of rhythm or any other trick of style may indulge in deliberate variations; the unconscious mannerism betrays the man even more effectively.

Because I am here using *clausula*-analysis as an empirical and objective stylistic test, I need devote little space to two vexed questions: how is a *clausula* to be defined? and how should it be scanned? These questions are important for those who try to formulate some total theory of *clausulae*.³ But for my

¹ As, for example, when Kroll chooses *emungēt̄ solēbd̄* against *emunḡ solēbd̄* of other manuscripts of *ad Her.* 4, 67 on rhythmical grounds (*Philologus*, lxxix [1934], 74–75), obviously basing himself on Ciceronian practice since he admits (p. 80) that no adequate study of *clausulae* in the *ad Her.* was available to him. We shall in fact see that the Auctor did not favour —◦◦◦—◦, though it occurs quite frequently in the *exempla* as a whole, so that the choice of reading is an open question. Even if Cicero were the writer, we should have to remember that though he notoriously liked —◦◦◦—◦ he uses —◦—◦ far more frequently (and this not only because it *naturally* occurs more frequently in Latin prose, but because he was partial to it, to an extent which can be determined by methods discussed below). In any case he did not greatly care for the typology of —◦◦◦—◦ with the word-break after the dactyl.

Similar objections may be made against H. J. Rose's proposal (*Handb. Lat. Lit.* [London], 2nd ed., p. 106, n. 84) to emend L. Crassus' *possimus & débēmis* to *debēmis & pōssimis*. This imposes Ciceronian rhythm (I think a peculiarly Ciceronian rhythm

originally) on an earlier author, and again, although it is true that Cicero normally avoided the double spondee except for special effect, he might well have used it in such a passage as this.

² For some results see W. H. Shewring's article 'Prose-Rhythm' in *O.C.D.*

³ It is perhaps the fact that scholars of an earlier generation offered conflicting and sometimes extravagant solutions to possibly unanswerable questions about the general nature of prose-rhythm that has led some to regard the whole subject with suspicion. But I hope by the conclusions of this paper to show that there is a mean between the pointless amassing of statistics and wild theorizing. Only one of the main theories of prose-rhythm is totally incompatible with my approach, that which held that repetition of *clausulae* was the essential element (Blass, May, Zander: see Shewring's bibliography, loc. cit.). The 'French' school which stresses the word as unit (v.i.) and even those who see in accent the determinant of prose-rhythm (e.g. Broadhead) would probably reach the same results, though they would express them differently.

purpose it has been necessary to do no more than (i) to scan (exactly as verse) groups of syllables preceding strong stops in modern texts, and (ii) to give figures for the most important *clausulae*, selecting from and as appropriate combining, figures for a much wider range of metrical endings. I have naturally adopted what seem to me the most plausible methods, but in any case minor errors are likely to cancel out in an adequate sample.

In his theorizing Zieliński took a wrong turning, though it will be clear from what has been said that the figures he gives, so far as they are accurate, can safely be used in such matters as testing the authenticity of a Ciceronian speech. In another direction, however, an advance has been made. De Groot¹ and Shewring² have made convincing use of the 'relative' method, by which an author's preferences are determined by setting his *clausula*-statistics against counts for a standard non-rhythymical Latin prose, derived from Latin written in those parts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when the knowledge of ancient *clausulae* virtually disappeared and with it any attempt by writers of Latin to seek particular rhythms. The fact that no two counts of such prose are identical, though of course they are sufficiently similar to show that the idea of a 'non-rhythymical' prose is not nonsensical, enables conclusions to be drawn about the degree of variation which can reasonably be ascribed to mere chance. For this reason I made my own count of some passages of nineteenth-century Latin, and submitted it together with the De Groot-Shewring count and my figures for the *ad Herennium* to two of my colleagues who understand modern statistical methods. They confirmed that the discrepancies which seemed to me significant could be so regarded, while the discrepancies in the two counts for non-rhythymical prose were not so great as to destroy faith in its use as a criterion. It is worth noting, however, that my own count showed even more clearly than the other that Tacitus in the *Annals* was a quite unmetsrical author, except that he avoided $\sim\sim\sim\sim\sim$. Shewring thinks that Tacitus favours $\sim\sim\sim\sim\sim$, but his figure of 2.9 per cent. for non-rhythymical prose seems to be unduly low. My own 4.2 per cent. corresponds closely to the 4.3 per cent. which I get for the first hundred endings each of *Annals* xi, xiii, xiv. My figure for the *clausula heroica* (6.9 per cent.) is lower than De Groot's 8.3 per cent.; for Tacitus I get 6.3 per cent.³ The mutual support of such results seems to justify dissent from Broadhead's dictum that 'non-rhythymical prose regarded as a basis of comparison' is 'a fiction'.⁴

After these preliminary observations we pass to the *clausulae* in the *ad Herennium*. Marx gave them passing notice (Prolegomena to his 1894 edition, pp. 99-101, 137), and Norden (*Die antike Kunstprosa*, i. 175, ii. 930) touched on them. But the chief contribution is that of Borneque.⁵ He employed the so-called 'French' method of *clausula*-analysis, and despite the criticisms which can justly be made of this method⁶ and a tendency to think too much in terms

¹ *De numero oratorio Latino* (Groningen, 1919) and *Der antike Prosarhythmus* (Groningen, 1921) are the most relevant of his works for my present purpose.

² *C.Q.* xxiv (1930), 164-74, xxv (1931), 12-22, and an answer to criticisms by H. D. Broadhead (*C.Q.* xxvi [1932], 35-44) in *C.Q.* xxvii (1933), 46-50.

³ One of my own results seems to be abnormal, 7.0 per cent. for $\sim\sim\sim\sim\sim$, and

I have borrowed De Groot's 5.4 per cent.

⁴ *C.R.* lii (1938), 148.

⁵ *La Rhétorique à Herennius, etc.*, in *Mélanges Boissier* (Paris, 1903). The substance reappears in his *Les Clauses mètriques latines* (Lille, 1907), pp. 542-6.

⁶ (i) Its emphasis on the *word* as the unit of investigation conflicts with ancient authority; (ii) by treating the last word of the sentence as 'given' and asking 'What

of 'rules' independent of an author's practice, he reached the sound and important conclusion that rhythmical peculiarities in the Auctor's *exempla* show that he did not, despite his claims, compose them all himself. Borneque did not, however, perceive the implications of this fact. Since he wrote, Kroll (loc. cit.) and Golla¹ have recognized the need for a more thorough study. De Groot paid no special attention to the work. He gives figures based on 455 *clausulae* (*Prosarhythmus*, p. 107), but does not seem to have detected the rhythmical differences in the different parts of the work. But these differences should be the starting-point of any investigation into the Auctor's practice.

The work falls into the following sections. First, each Book has a more or less elaborate prologue and epilogue; these sections are important as providing indubitable evidence of the Auctor's own mannerisms, and as the figures given below prove, he departs very strikingly from non-rhythmical prose. In the remainder of the work the rhetorical system is expounded. Apart from general discourse on the topics as they occur—the bulk of the work—there are two special types of passage. There are first those which of their nature resist elaboration of style, including rhythm, that is, passages consisting of mere lists of technical terms, with concise definitions, and with these should be included themes for debate presented as brief statements of real or imaginary legal cases, for these also seek conciseness first, and are to be distinguished from the *exempla*, though Borneque thought otherwise. The *exempla*, mentioned already above, are extracts from speeches real or feigned used to illustrate particular precepts. The following table gives percentages relating to nine selected *clausulae*, first for natural frequency, then for the *ad Herennium* divided into (i) *exempla*, (ii) the bulk of the work, (iii) lists, definitions, and themes, and (iv) prologues and epilogues,² and finally the figures given by Shewring for Cicero's works as a whole. Each column (except the last) is headed by the number of *clausulae* taken into account.³

We notice first that that part of the treatise which is entirely the author's own work is marked by an astonishing prevalence of $- \cup - \cup$ and $- \cup - \cup - \cup$, totalling 64.5 per cent of all *clausulae* in these sections. In the main exposition the same preferences recur, but less strikingly—a total of 52.1 per cent. for the two *clausulae*, cf. 41.5 per cent. for Cicero. This we should expect, since these sections offer less scope for fine writing, and indeed much of the language in which the teaching was formulated was fixed by tradition.⁴ Neither here nor

metrical group precedes final words of various metrical forms?⁵ it obscures the part played in Latin *clausulae* by the flexibility of Latin word-order; (iii) for a fault affecting the *ad Herennium* in particular cf. p. 69, n. 1. Some modern French scholars, e.g. Cousin, reject the methods of their predecessors.

¹ *Sprachliche Beobachtungen zum Auctor ad Herennium* (Breslau, 1935), p. 16.

² Because the Auctor claims originality in his *exempla*, Borneque half apologizes for dividing the book up in this way with a view to settling questions of authorship. But even if the *exempla* were original, they might show interesting rhythmical peculiarities, and in fact the Auctor's claim is demonstrably false, and the dissection of his

work justified by results.

³ No trace will be found in my list of Zieliński's procrustean 'cretic-base'. It has been justly dealt with by earlier writers, who have also called attention to what is possibly its most flagrant defect of detail, its exclusion of the double trochee, which, if ancient testimony is worth anything at all, was certainly a *clausula* in its own right, whether preceded by a cretic or not.

⁴ Detailed comparison of such passages as *ad Her.* 1. 11, *Inv.* 1. 26, *Quintil.* 4. 1. 71 reveals a clear probability that the common ground is due to indebtedness to a common tradition recorded in non-rhythmical Latin rather than to direct borrowing.

⁵ The elaboration of the prologues is not in

elsewhere do we find in the work a liking for a cretic in the last place; in Cicero the two main forms $\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$ and $\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$ total 18.0 per cent. against 9.6 per cent. for non-rhythymical prose. Apart from the *exempla*, only a slight leaning towards $\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$ can be found in the Auctor. In fact he sometimes avoids the *clausula* deliberately. Golla (op. cit., p. 12) has shown the Auctor's fondness for hyperbata which bring a main verb *sentiendi vel declarandi* within the clause it governs or where a verb precedes the infinitive it governs (e.g. *potest esse, debet esse*). But this does not fully explain several occurrences of *videatur esse* or similar, metrically equivalent, phrases (1. 3 and 11, 3. 26, 4. 25).

	Natural frequency 2000	Ad Herennium				Cicero
		Exempla 419	Bulk 957	Lists, etc. 286	Prologues, etc. 186	
$\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$	16.8	31.7	37.8	44.1	41.9	25.3
$\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$	7.3	13.4	14.6	10.9	22.6	16.2
$\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$	4.2	2.4	3.1	2.4	1.6	8.3
$\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$	5.4	4.1	2.6	4.5	2.7	9.7
$\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$	2.0	5.7	3.7	2.1	2.1	4.7
$\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$	22.8	17.0	13.2	9.7	9.1	6.2
$\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$	6.9	3.3	2.9	3.9	1.6	1.9
$\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$	1.9	4.5	1.9	.7	1.6	2.8
$\text{---} \text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$	2.3	1.9	2.1	1.7	2.7	1.4

This word-order also produces the favourite double-trochée, and at four places where *videatur*, etc., occur as final word (3. 24, 37, 40, 4. 2), hyperbaton would not produce the favoured close, while at 4. 49 and 68 final *videamur* and *videatur* seem to be so placed because they carry emphasis and are by no means the almost otiose fillers of later Ciceronian practice.

The column headed 'Lists, etc.' provides more evidence of the Auctor's addiction to the double trochée, though the very high figure of 44.1 per cent. falls to 33 per cent. if forms of nouns ending in *-io* are ignored. The Auctor clearly liked such words in the final position as producing the ditrochaic close. About one sentence in eighteen ends with such a word, or, if we exclude Lists, etc., as offering less freedom of word-order, one in twenty-five. I cannot help feeling that the Auctor liked this sonorous ending,¹ and yet that the prevalence of those abstract nouns in technical language at the same time gives an artificial or fortuitous boost to the figure under Lists. As a whole the figures under this head resemble the Auctor's practice elsewhere more than might have been expected.

The most notable features are in the figures for the *exempla*. If the Auctor's claims in the lengthy prologue to Book 4 to have composed all his *exempla* were

itself remarkable. Ancient legal and mathematical treatises show the same phenomenon (cf. Wilamowitz in *Herms*, xxxv [1900], 33 and Schulz, *Roman Legal Science* [Oxford, 1946], p. 187, n. 3).

¹ I am sure that the French method is wrong which by its rules of procedure excludes all words of five or more syllables from consideration. This distorts the Auctor's

practice, and even in Cicero, according to Shewring (C.Q. xxiv. 167), the type *archipiratae* is commoner relatively (i.e. in comparison with non-rhythymical prose) than *esse constabat*. Quintilian (9. 4. 66) warns against polysyllabic endings as *etiam in carminibus . . . permolle*, but in censuring the ending *archipiratae* clearly recognizes it as a *clausula*.

justified, we should expect them to show the high degree of rhythmical elaboration of which the Auctor was evidently capable, except where there were special reasons to the contrary, e.g. illustration of the Plain Style (*genus tenuer* or *attenuatum*) (4. 14) or of faults, where the Auctor explicitly justifies the use of *aliena exempla* (4. 18). But as a whole the figures show the *exempla* to lack that high elaboration. Although they show pronounced departures from natural frequency, they do not go as far as the Auctor ($- \circ \circ - \circ \swarrow$ and $- \circ - \circ \circ \swarrow$ go in the opposite direction). The two *clausulae* $- \circ - \circ \swarrow$ and $- \circ - - \circ \swarrow$ total only 45·1 per cent., while $- - - \circ \swarrow$ and $- \circ \circ - \circ \swarrow$ are much commoner. The final cretic is somewhat commoner but still not sought.

On rhythmical grounds, then, we can say either that the Auctor composed his own *exempla* in a less rhythmical style not only than that of his prologues but even than that of his main discourse or that he borrowed some or all of them. The former view, *a priori* highly improbable, is ruled out by the fact known independently of any *clausula*-analysis that some at least of his *exempla* the Auctor did assuredly borrow. Did he borrow all of them? It is quite certain that several of the *exempla* come from Greek sources. For others possible origins in Greek have been detected. Secondly, several reappear in other Latin writers, and on occasions the Auctor appears to have adapted a traditional *exemplum* to suit his own rhythmical preferences. Thirdly, others suggest extracts from declamations on stock themes (cf. Marx's *Prolegomena*, pp. 102 ff.). It will be found that all these categories tend to lack the Auctor's characteristic rhythms, unless adapted. We may deduce that such lack is prima facie evidence of borrowing, but we should conversely allow as a general principle that the *exempla* showing the Auctor's rhythms in high proportions are his own work, particularly where the evidence from *clausulae* is supported by the occurrence of the types of hyperbaton already mentioned as a mannerism of the Auctor;¹ in other words, the *exempla* are a mixed bag of borrowed and invented. The only alternative would be to suppose that it is by sheer coincidence that so many of the demonstrably borrowed *exempla* are non-rhythmical.² To postulate such a coincidence would be perverse. It must, however, be borne in mind that the description of an *exemplum* as rhythmical does not in itself amount to its attribution to the Auctor, nor its description as non-rhythmical to a denial of the Auctor's authorship, though the balance of probabilities is not equal, for it is more likely that rhythmical features will occur by accident in borrowed *exempla* than that, except in special circumstances, the Auctor will have invented an *exemplum* lacking his usual preferences.

Inevitably there are *exempla* about which we can reach no certain conclusion, sometimes because they are too short, though this proves much less of an obstacle than might be expected; more often difficulty arises with a long *exemplum* in

¹ The Auctor achieved favoured rhythms by this means in 29 of Golla's 65 instances, but he liked it on its own account, for 27 instances are not rhythmically affected, 16 of the 27 giving favoured rhythms with either word-order. In 4 only does the hyperbaton produce a less-favoured rhythm. In 5 it improves the *clausula* from 'disliked' to 'indifferent'. On the 9 further instances in the *exempla* see below.

² Henceforward 'rhythmical' means

'showing the Auctor's liking for $- \circ - \circ \swarrow$ and $- \circ \circ - \circ \swarrow$ '. It does not include $- \circ \circ \circ - \circ \swarrow$ or a cretic in the last place. 'Non-rhythmical' implies the absence of the favoured *clausulae*, and the presence of $- - - \circ \swarrow$ or $- \circ \circ - \circ \swarrow$, or of *clausulae* so rare that even if there is some evidence that the Auctor liked or did not object to a particular ending of this kind, e.g. $- \circ \circ - - \circ \swarrow$, it seems better to treat them as non-rhythmical.

which the rhythms are mixed, a feature which should imply that the occurrence of favoured rhythms is coincidental, but one cannot always be sure. One guide with the doubtful *exempla* is the general character of the groups in which they occur. A study of the evidence strongly suggests that the Auctor tended to make efforts at originality at the beginning of various groups of *exempla*, but—so it seems—had wearied rather quickly and begun to look to other sources. The most striking example of this is to be found in the illustrations of the ten Figures grouped as instances of *κατάχρησις*. Of twenty-six *exempla* there are eight which the Auctor probably borrowed; of these eight only two occur in the first eighteen. It also seems likely that for certain particular types of stylistic device, especially purely verbal tricks, the Auctor was unable or unwilling to invent his own illustrations. By their position in patterned passages of these kinds doubtful *exempla* may give warrant for conjecture as to their origins.

I now list and where appropriate comment on all the *exempla* in the above categories. I next try to determine the authorship of those *exempla* which refer to specific historical events and to assess the evidence they provide for the date of the work.¹

A. Exempla from Greek

(i) Exempla on subjects from Greek mythology or history

Rhythymical: 48. 17-49. 24: a long exercise on the stock theme in which Ulysses, found near the body of Ajax, was accused of his murder. 144. 6: the succession of Greek hegemonies of the fifth to fourth centuries. The surrounding context with its predominance of borrowed *exempla* suggests that the Auctor has slightly adapted a borrowed passage. 154. 13.

Non-rhythymical: 139. 27, 159. 20.

Doubtful: 152. 14.

(ii) Exempla closely imitated from Greek oratory or rhetoric

Rhythymical: 145. 11, 150. 18: two short passages from Dem. *De Cor.*, the latter cited less fully by Quintilian 9. 3. 88 (cf. p. 74, n. 1).

Non-rhythymical: 58. 22, 58. 23, 126. 16: from Aeschines with imported allusion to *populus Romanus*. 130. 5: Dem. *De Cor.* 71 likewise adapted to refer to the *socii*, presumably the Social War (91-89 B.C.). 134. 1: a reminiscence of Isocrates ending *amicum fore spes*. The short vowel before *s*-impure occurs elsewhere in the Auctor's *clausulae* only at 6. 5. 111. 8 (*lect. dub.*), and 179. 20. Its rarity suggests that in his *clausulae*, though not elsewhere (cf. 108. 9, 109. 24, 111. 3 and 24), the Auctor generally avoided the problem it presented. 144. 1, 147. 13, 150. 21, 152. 6, 158. 9: a mistranslation of Dem. *De Cor.* 129 with dispondaic ending, intended to illustrate *translatio obscenitatis vitandae causa*. The context contains very many *exempla* of the Auctor's composition; his reluctance to offer his own illustration of this particular point shows delicacy. 165. 13, 179. 24: these two passages, the former long, the latter short, perhaps contain reminiscences of Aristotle's *ώς δὲ λέων ἐπόρονεν* cited (*Rhet.* 3. 3. 1406^b27) as from Homer, though not in our texts. Such indebtedness does not amount to much, cf. on 156. 16 below (A iii), 180. 1. 188. 18: this instance of

¹ References are by page and line of and Roman authors for the borrowed Marx's smaller (1923) edition, in which also *exempla*. will be found the parallel passages in Greek

brevitas referring to a campaign in the Aegean and Hellespont perhaps goes back stylistically to Dem. *Phil.* 3. 27 with its rapid survey of events and string of place-names. But the content is quite different. Münzer¹ suspected a Rhodian source referring to the campaigns of Philip V in c. 200 B.C. Warde Fowler² sought to associate it with the movements of Lucullus in 84 B.C., so providing a new *terminus post quem* for the work, but the matter remains very doubtful.

Doubtful: 142. 7: one of several indeterminate passages of some length which begin non-rhythmically, but end with a strong display of the Auctor's rhythms (cf. 118. 3, 162. 8). Here the ditrochaic rhythm of the last two *clausulae* is accompanied by hyperbaton (*conveniat commoveri, putet . . . nominari*). It is noteworthy that the penultimate period is still close to the Greek (Dem. *Aristog.* 1. 76), but the last sentence has no parallel there, and may well have been added by the Auctor. 152. 3: Dem. *De Cor.* 3 with imported allusion to *populus Romanus* (cf. 152. 6).

(iii) Exempla from Greek poets

Rhythymical: 156, 16, 19, 20: in a group which as a whole strongly savours of the Auctor there occur these three sentences all of which can be paralleled in Homer. But this is only to say that they were part of the common stock of Greco-Roman ideas. The expression *sermo melle dulcior* goes back to *Il.* 1. 249 (*μέλιτος γλυκιών ρέει αὐδήν*), but this and similar characterizations in Homer had long been turned into rhetorical commonplaces, while the other two comparisons 'white as snow', 'flashing like the sun', could hardly help being as old as European literature itself.

Doubtful: 121. 14: an illustration of the *genus dissolutum* or *fluctuans*, the perversion or exaggeration of the *genus mediocre*. It refers to the Social War, and ends with a *sententia* which goes back to Sophocles' *Electra* (320). The close is unrhythymical but this is what one would expect, even if, as I believe, the Auctor wrote it. 166. 9: a description of the horrors of the sack of a city, which again not surprisingly contains touches traceable as far back as Homer.

(iv) Exempla traceable in other Greek sources

Rhythymical: 149. 12: an adaptation by the Auctor of the well-known *poema loquens pictura, pictura tacitum poema*, here ending *debet esse*. 176. 11: begins with a reminiscence of Xenophon, and ends *potest pervenire*. Of the nine *exempla* cited by Golla as containing hyperbaton only these two show evidence of indebtedness.³

Non-rhythymical: 132. 13. 139. 5: reminiscence of Theophrastus in which the paronomasia exemplified (*dilegere/diligere*) occurs only in the Latin version.

Doubtful: 177. 10, closely paralleled in Lucian.

Conclusion. The evidence shows that the Auctor may have written his own exercises on such traditional themes as the Ulysses-trial, or produced his own versions of aphorisms from the rhetoricians' standard stock-in-trade of popular literature and philosophy. But the greater part of his *exempla* from Greek sources, especially those taken from Greek orators where ultimate indebtedness is often

¹ *Philologus*, lxxix (1934), 215.

² *Roman Essays and Interpretations* (Oxford, 1920), pp. 91-99.

³ The other occurrences are 52. 3, 63. 16, 133. 6, 135. 26, 160. 10, 169. 4, 171. 17 (the first, fourth, and fifth not before main

stops). The rhythmical effects are: in one no improvement of a 'bad' *clausula*, in five a less-favoured rhythm is replaced by the double trochee, in three a double trochee results either way.

beyond question, are non-rhythmical. There is a strong suggestion of a connexion between lack of the Auctor's favoured rhythms and indebtedness, and, since it is hardly likely that he wrote his own non-rhythmical translations from Greek, it is clear that he borrowed from Latin predecessors, whether he knew their Greek origins or not.¹ In a word, the Greek *exempla* prove that the Auctor borrowed, and that he borrowed from Latin writers. The last non-rhythmical *exemplum* above (139. 5) is good evidence for this. Abundant evidence suggests that the Auctor borrowed *exempla* involving word-play of this kind, so that between him and the Greek original, *which does not contain the verbal point*, an intermediate non-rhythmical Latin source must have existed. I believe further that such a source must have been written some time before the Auctor composed his work, for there is no reason to suppose that he had a rhythmical gift unique in his day.

B. Exempla paralleled in Latin

Rhythmical: 51. 9, 60. 25, 125. 16, 139. 18: all these *exempla*, closely paralleled elsewhere in Latin, show signs of adjustment to the Auctor's rhythmical preferences. The last has a minor abnormality. This pun on *patres conscripti/ circumscripsi* is quoted and deplored by Quintilian 9. 3. 72, who writes *videantur circumscripsi*, keeping the point to the end and avoiding a hexameter ending or alternatively a long-winded *esse videantur*. The Auctor, on the other hand, has *circumscripsi putentur*, departing from his otherwise invariable practice of reserving the pun-word to the end, whatever the rhythmical effect. 144. 4: verbatim in Quintil. 9. 3. 72; for reasons of context and the mechanical nature of the Figure illustrated (*gradatio, κλίμαξ*), I do not think the Auctor composed it.

Non-rhythmical: 51. 18. 57. 3, 57. 13: these two *exempla* are aphorisms on avarice and friendship, paralleled, the first closely, in Cic. *De Inv.* 1. 95. Between them the Auctor inserts an aphorism on wisdom not paralleled in Cicero, ending *consurunt*. Both are doubtless echoing classroom maxims. Had the Auctor written his own version of 57. 13, he must surely have put *possis iocari*, not *iocari possis*. The Ciceronian version on avarice ends *pecuniae cupiditas*, the Auctor's with *pecuniae cupiditatem*. The latter *clausula* occurs little in *De Inv.* 1, but it is common in the *exempla* of the *ad Herennium*, with a strikingly high proportion of the typology — | u u u — x here represented (11 out of 25 instances).² In the *exempla* it generally occurs where on other grounds the Auctor's authorship is to be questioned: exceptions are 134. 13, 166. 21 (perhaps echoing 166. 5, a passage which shows little of the Auctor's manner), 172. 26. Was it perhaps a mannerism of *noster doctor* (14, 15)? 125. 5, 128. 7, 138. 10, 149. 7: all these are various forms of word-play. For the last two Quintilian has versions more markedly rhythmical; thus in 138. 10 (a play on *āvium/āvium*) the effect is the converse from that noted above for 139. 18—Quintilian has *āvium dūcit*, the Auctor, true to his usual practice, *dūcit ad āvium*.

Doubtful: 126. 13: this passage contains three — — — x against one — u — x

¹ Thus we cannot plead as Caplan does (Loeb ed., p. xxxi) that his boasts of originality refer to producing his own translations from Greek.

² In the Auctor's main work this *clausula* is but little sought, though this typology still occurs in a high, though smaller, proportion

(16 out of 50). Its proportion to other typologies diminishes as the work proceeds: Book 1, 5 in 9; Book 2, 5 in 14; Book 3, 5 in 18; Book 4, 1 in 9. By nature the typology is extremely rare, since words of the form u u u — x are few.

and one $\text{---} \text{---} \text{---}$, but one double spondee avoids the final cretic *ignosci postulant*, which is in Quintilian's version, and achieves hyperbaton, while the final phrase is *conveniat eos impetrare*. This last sentence is not in Quintilian, and may have been added by the Auctor. This *exemplum* may thus be *statistically* doubtful, but I do not question that it provides another illustration of the Auctor's adaptation of a traditional *exemplum*.

Conclusion. We thus gain further insight into the Auctor's methods. We see him not only borrowing but also adapting, a process which we may presume sometimes to have taken place untraceably in the 'Greek' *exempla*¹ and in many others where evidence is lacking. The rhythmical *exempla* paralleled in Latin were adapted by the Auctor. It is a natural deduction that Cicero and Quintilian ultimately drew on a common source older than the Auctor, and the Cornificius from whom Quintilian perhaps borrowed some *exempla* was not the Auctor, nor directly indebted to him, but to the common 'pre-rhythmical' stock of deplorable puns, etc.

C. Exempla giving detail from Roman history and their bearing on the date of the *ad Herennium*

Rhythmical: 126. 8 (Rome and Carthage): from context and character (verbal point), this is unlikely to be the Auctor's. 129. 12 (the Gracchi, 133–121 B.C.); 129. 16 (Fregellae, 125 B.C.);² 157. 10 (Second Punic war); 161. 10 (L. Cassius and the trial of the Vestal Virgin, 113 B.C.); 173. 19 (Decius' *devotio*, 343 B.C.); 186. 24 (L. Brutus [510 B.C.]) returns from the dead in illustration of the Figure *προσωποποία*; 188. 11 (Saturninus, 100 B.C.); 188. 21 (? Marius, ? Sulla: see below).

Non-rhythmical: 39. 6 (Caepio, 100 B.C.); 125. 13 (Scipio Aemilianus, 146–133 B.C.); 126. 13 (Laelius, Scipio Aemilianus' contemporary); 148. 8 (C. Gracchus 122 B.C.). 155. 15 (fall of Carthage, 146 B.C.): this *exemplum* interrupts a long series of rhythmical *exempla*. 186. 16 is probably from a speech, real or fictitious, against the Gracchi referring to the events of 146–133. If the following *exemplum*, which has similar spondaic quality, but contains the characteristic *hac utatur oratione*, is to be accepted as the Auctor's, 186. 16 also may be by him. 188. 18: see A (ii) above.

Doubtful: 118. 3: example of the *genus mediocre* referring to the Social War. This is probably by the Auctor. In rhythmical elaboration it falls half-way, as it should, between his examples of the *genus grave* and the *genus attenuatum*. 140. 10 (ill-fated tribunes from Ti. Gracchus to P. Sulpicius, killed 87 B.C.): I discuss this at length below. 143. 5 (the plea of a general who surrendered, known from 20. 21 and elsewhere to be C. Popillius in 107 B.C.); 147. 7 (Numantia 133 B.C. and Fregellae); 189. 12 (death of C. Gracchus).

Conclusions concerning the date of the *ad Herennium*

Though from a more detailed survey of the evidence it does not emerge, as I suggested in *C.R.*, loc. cit., that few of the *exempla* referring to datable events

¹ The only *exemplum* from Greek which is also paralleled in Latin is 150. 18, where the Auctor is more rhythmical than Quintilian—but also nearer the Greek.

² The resemblance to Aeschines in *Ctes.*

133 observed by Marx is slight, as Hubbell comments in reviewing Caplan's Loeb edition of the *ad Herennium* (*A.J.P.* lxxvii [1956], 214).

bear the marks of the Auctor's composition—it would be begging the question to urge that the rhythmical *exempla* listed above were adapted by the Auctor from older sources, though this may often be the truth—the conclusion which I drew as to the composition and date of the treatise is but little affected. There is not simply a group of non-rhythmical historical *exempla*, but two groups with historical content, one rhythmical and one not. Now it is unlikely that both groups were composed by one man at one and the same time, or at the same date in the same school. The non-rhythmical should be earlier than the rhythmical. Yet the two groups have a *common* historical background. In both, the latest certainly datable event is the Social War, while I assign to the doubtful group the *exemplum* which alludes explicitly to the death of Sulpicius in 87. We must leave out of account the two *exempla* of *brevitas* (188. 18 and 21). One is rhythmical, one not. They are both so obscure, and the second so corrupt, that no safe conclusion can be drawn from them, although it is generally agreed that the second refers either to Marius or Sulla.¹

One of the allusions to the Social War is a non-rhythmical adaptation of Demosthenes (130. 5), the other occurs in the specimen of the *genus mediocre*, which is probably the Auctor's own. But the Social War appears as a theme for declamation at 73. 2, a fact which suggests that the Auctor returned to a stock theme familiar in his youth in order to illustrate the *genus mediocre*, but there is no *proof* that even the earlier *exemplum* was composed soon after the Social War.

The *exemplum*, rhythmically doubtful, which mentions the death of Sulpicius, was, I believe, borrowed, with at most some adaptation by the Auctor. It lists the murdered tribunes of the period from 133 to 87 B.C.; the point is that each tribune's name appears in a different grammatical case! The evidence suggests that to his credit the Auctor did not take kindly to the composition of *exempla* depending on such mechanical verbal points. Furthermore, Marx, seeing in many of these 'historical' *exempla* indebtedness to collections of declamations or school-exercises, not only assigned to them passages referring specifically to historical events (e.g. 39. 6 and 12, 161. 1, and 189. 13) but attributed to a 'Sulpicius-declamation' several passages (127. 14, 142. 18, 148. 10, 158. 11) containing no specific reference. I believe that it is more than coincidence that these passages are non-rhythmical or doubtful, and that the Auctor did in fact draw on a Sulpicius-declamation older than his own work. The common assumption that the *terminus post quem* of 87 B.C. is also a *terminus haud multo post quem* is plainly invalid in the absence of supporting evidence. It is merely to reinforce this general argument that I point out that it is highly doubtful if the Auctor himself composed this *exemplum* and more likely that he borrowed from an earlier source itself of quite uncertain date.

It is clear too that if the Auctor did compose this *exemplum*, he was returning to a theme of his student-days as he returned to the theme of the Social War. The death of Sulpicius, like the Social War, appears as a stock theme in passages (21. 11, 73. 2) which there is no reason to divorce from their general context, and that context, even if the Auctor himself was not as puerile as Marx maintained, was undoubtedly the teaching the Auctor received in youth.

Thus the Sulpicius-*exemplum* in no way proves—indeed it could not prove—

¹ It is usually assumed that both *exempla* are more or less accurate accounts of real events, though Münzer (op. cit., p. 217) reports that Kroll had communicated doubts to him.

that the Auctor wrote soon after 87. More probably he wrote later, copying an *exemplum* composed earlier but equally at an uncertain interval after 87. We now turn to other considerations affecting the dating.

(i) When we observe the resemblances of *ad Herennium* and *De Inventione*, we must always remember how little conventional rhetorical teaching changed over long periods. The *De Oratore* avoids and belittles the text-book traditions, but nowhere suggests that they had changed since Cicero's youth. Quintilian's work shows at many points the same conservatism, even in details of wording, over a century later.

What of the Auctor's two claims to specific innovations? On the difficult question of the relation of *ad Her.* 1. 16 and *Inv.* 1. 23 I agree with Caplan (pp. xxix-xxx) that the Auctor here claims a minor variation of terminology as a major innovation. As to the implication of 4. 10 that the Auctor offers his own translations of the Greek names of Figures, my analysis suggests that he is guilty of a half-truth here as in the matter of composing *exempla*. When the Auctor's names are found nowhere else, or only where Quintilian (9. 3. 98) rejects their claims to be Figures, we find the Auctor mixing invented and borrowed *exempla*, and it is difficult to test his claim to originality in nomenclature. But where he uses the same name as Cicero and Quintilian, he has borrowed the *exempla*, sometimes with adaptation; so that where we know that a name is not peculiar to the Auctor, the name, like the *exempla*, is very possibly not his own invention, and his claim to priority doubtful.

(ii) The *exemplum* (160. 7) which has been held to imply juries of senators and knights, and so to yield a date not later than 82 B.C., does not prove so much. Cicero after the restoration of mixed juries in 70 often ignores the *tribuni aerarii* and alludes to senators and knights alone (*Font.* 36, *Clu.* 121, 130, *Flacc.* 4, 96, *Rab. Post.* 37). Thus the years after 70 are not ruled out, and the years 81-70 are excluded only if the speaker of the extract is demonstrably reproducing conditions contemporary with the Auctor. I believe the Auctor composed this *exemplum*, but though he may be referring to contemporary events, he is within a few lines composing (as I believe) an *exemplum* referring to events of 113 B.C.

(iii) The Auctor's list of models for imitation in the prologue to Book 4 ends with Antonius and Crassus. But he thrice refers to the orators he has in mind as *antiqui* (106. 26, 108. 16, 109. 4), and in the first passage Crassus is coupled with Gracchus as enjoying the *auctoritas antiquorum*. The question is, by what date must the Auctor have mentioned Cicero as an author whom he was not going to quote? We do not know; but text-books in general and ancient rhetorical treatises in particular are so conservative that we need not put the date very early. Text-book writers, like public speakers, are much more likely to quote from the established classics familiar to their audiences or readers than from contemporaries.

(iv) The elder Seneca declares that the first known references to *declamatio* occurred in Cicero and Calvus (*Contr.* 1 *praef.* 12). Now the word occurs in the *ad Herennium* (3. 20), but in the sense of 'voice-training', not with reference to the speeches on set themes which Seneca presumably had in mind. The problem is to determine at what date it would have become unlikely for the Auctor so to limit the connotation of the word without any hint of its use in connexion

with practice-speech and school-debate. The evidence¹ suggests that the transition falls in the early 40's B.C. The Auctor claims to be offering something new on voice-production and delivery in general (3. 19, 27). If he is telling the truth, these sections represent doctrines contemporary with the date of writing, which may accordingly be as late as c. 50 B.C. If he is in fact recalling what he learned at school, the date may be later still.²

Kroll (op. cit., p. 64) was prepared to bring the date down as far as 70; I believe we must be prepared to go much farther, and that it is time for somebody to re-examine the *ad Herennium* with an open mind as to its date for more positive indications to supplement my own mainly negative arguments. I would myself add two points. (i) If my arguments are sound, the chief support disappears for the not uncommon view that the rhetoric schools of the early first century B.C. encouraged their pupils to discuss the most inflammatory issues of contemporary politics,³ and consequently there is no mystery about the notorious ambiguity of the Auctor's political attitude. Like all other practitioners of the *suasoria*, the exercise on a set historical theme, he may have drawn his themes from a comparatively remote past.⁴ I was earlier mainly anxious to argue that rhythmical considerations show that some of the Auctor's work *must* be considerably later than the latest datable event to which it refers. That it *might* be should always have been obvious, and perhaps would have been but for the conviction that similarity of content to the *De Inventione* implied proximity of date. (ii) The Auctor remains, I think, *incertus*. The common ground, such as it is, with the Cornificius cited by Quintilian is best explained by indebtedness to a common unchanging tradition.⁵ But two points should be noted. First, the tradition contains a feature peculiar to the Auctor and Cornificius, namely in a treatment of certain Figures censured by Quintilian (9. 3. 98). In *ad Her.* (pp. 130-52 Mx.) these figures appear as Figures of Speech and Cornificius treated them in the same way. Quintilian denies that half of them are Figures at all, the other half he classifies as Figures of Thought.

¹ Well set out in Bonner's account in *Roman Declamation* (Liverpool, 1949), though the early dating of the *ad Herennium* is of course assumed. The root sense of the group of words derived from *declaimare* is 'loud utterance'. The first technical sense is to 'rehearse' a speech (for a real case) (*Rosc. Am.* 82). The association with voice-training survives at least till 55-54 (*De Orat.* 1. 251). *Declimator* and *declaimator* are related to practice-speeches from 55-54 (*Planc.* 83, *De Orat.* 1. 73, *Q.F.* 3. 3. 4), but *declaimatio* still means 'shouting' (*Mur.* 44, *Planc.* 47) until 44 B.C. (*Fam.* 16. 21. 6), and *declaimare* first appears in the full technical sense in 45-44 (*Fin.* 5. 5, *Att.* 14. 12. 2).

² On these sections Marx observes (86. 24 with app. crit.): *hinc usque ad finem libri III stilus peculiaris*, a statement for which support can be found in the *clausulae*, with a figure of 49 per cent. for - - - . So this may genuinely be a 'late' passage.

³ e.g. in A. Gwynn, *Roman Education* (Oxford, 1926), pp. 68 and 162. His view about the political significance of the closing

of the schools of the *rhetores Latini* by the censors of 92 has been questioned by Tenney Frank, *Life and Literature in the Roman Republic* (Cambridge, 1930), p. 150, n. 28, M. L. Clarke, *Rhetoric at Rome* (London, 1952), pp. 12-13.

⁴ The sceptical are invited to apply the criterion of the latest datable event to Cicero's *Topica* and *Part. Orat.* and to the two sets of declamations once attributed to Quintilian, and to consider, among much else, Quintilian's list of *turbulenti* in *Inst. Or.* 2. 16. 5. Suetonius (*Rhet.* 1) refers to declamatory themes drawn *ex veritate ac re si qua forte recens accidisset*, but he is dealing with *controversiae*, which were on legal themes. So in Cicero's *De Inventione* of c. 86 B.C. a legal case of the late 90's is cited, but the latest important political event referred to belongs to 106 B.C.

⁵ For good arguments against Cornificius' authorship cf. Kohler, *De Rhetorica ad C. Herennium* (Berlin, 1909) and the admirable summary by Caplan, op. cit., pp. ix-xiv.

Some of the Auctor's *exempla* of these are borrowed, and again we may have traces of a common tradition. But it is of course possible that, though the Auctor borrowed the *exempla*, the faulty classification is his own. Secondly, it has been argued convincingly that Cornificius was a writer of Augustan date, since he appears in what seem to be chronological accounts in Quintilian in an Augustan context. But if my view about the date of *ad Herennium* is correct, this is no longer conclusive against the identification of the Auctor with Cornificius.

But if the Auctor's date and identity remain obscure, of his personality one can learn much by separating off his own contributions among the *exempla*. Not only does he belie the energetic protestations of originality contained in the prologue to Book 4 because, as I have suggested, his inventiveness was short-winded. There is significance, too, in the types of *exempla* which do or do not stimulate his powers of composition.¹ We thus discern that he was impatient of merely mechanical verbal tricks and not very much at home with close argumentation. His strength lies in a real sense of style which is by no means contemptible, shown best perhaps in the field of vivid description, whether of the horrors of assassination or the lighter side of everyday life. When we consider too his orderly but laboured presentation of rhetorical doctrine in the work as a whole, we can on all these grounds say that the Auctor, whoever he was, reveals himself as he clearly wished to be revealed—as a true Roman.²

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¹ The best defence of the Auctor's failure to keep his promise is that the poem of Book 4 deals with borrowings from creative writers, i.e. orators, poets, and historians. Borrowings from such sources can nowhere be proved of him in Book 4 apart from Greek oratory, and the *exempla* from these reached him through intermediate sources. But he makes unacknowledged borrowings from Latin rhetoricians, and in implying that the choice lies between taking *exempla* from orators and poets and inventing them he is clearly guilty at the least of *falsa enumeratio*.

² This article was completed before the appearance of W. Schmid's *Über die klassische Theorie und Praxis des antiken Prosarhythmus* (*Hermete Einzelschriften* Heft 12 [1959]), in which the author, adhering closely to ancient sources, argues *inter alia* (i) that the word *clausula* strictly means only 'end of a sentence', not a rhythmical form of sentence-ending, (ii) that prose-rhythm runs throughout a

sentence, and (iii) that the end-rhythms are in no way so distinctive as to merit the customary concentration of investigation on the (so-called) '*clausulae*'. While accepting that (i) and (ii) are undoubtedly true of ancient theory, I do not feel it necessary to abandon the established modern usage of *clausula*; and though I agree with Schmid that '*clausulae*' are not the *only* element in prose-rhythm, I remain convinced that, as indeed much ancient evidence suggests, the rhythms of the sentence-endings were and are the most striking in effect, and the most susceptible of analysis; and that as ancient authors show undoubted idiosyncrasies in their end-rhythms, it is not improper to make special studies of these, at least for such purposes as the present one, as an 'empirical and objective test' (cf. p. 66, n. 3 above). For further comment on Schmid's novel and interesting ideas cf. my forthcoming notice in *C.R.*

AESCHYLEA

τριταιον ἡμαρ τόνδ' ἐφημένη τάφον
τέκνοις ἐπωξε [ζῶσα] τοῖς τεθηκόσιν. *Niobe.*

ἐπωξε Hesych. ; ἐποιμάζωνα II.

ARE we to restore ἐπώξει 'sit on eggs' after Hesychius or ἐπώξει 'cry ὥ', 'lament' after Nauck? In his recent supplement to the Loeb *Aeschylus*, Mr. Lloyd-Jones says that the latter 'is far better suited to the context', by which I am given to understand that he means that Aeschylus would have been very unlikely to employ the brooding metaphor in this passage. Admonished by Wilamowitz (*Interpretationen*, p. 57 n.) that 'es unverzeihlich ist, das Bild der brütenden Henne zu vertreiben', I fall back in some bewilderment on the fact that I personally like it very much and that the tomb-nest symbolism, though not absolutely presupposed by *Cho.* 247 ff. and 501 (*ἰδὼν νεοσσοὺς τούσδ' ἐφημένους τάφῳ*), would certainly have encouraged the poet to write these later passages. But there is a dearth of objective argument on this matter which I want, if possible, to supply.

We know from Epicharmus, fr. 172, and Cratinus, fr. 108 (the correction is certain), that ἐπώξει was current in the time of Aeschylus in the sense 'sit on eggs'. We do not know that ἐπώξει was current at that or any other time in the sense 'cry ὥ', 'lament'. I wish I could satisfactorily elucidate Ar. *Av.* 265 f.:

ἄλλως ἄρ' οὐποψι, ὡς ἔοικ, ἐς τὴν λόχημην
ἐμβὰς ἐπώξει [ορ ἐπώξει]¹ χαραδριὸν μιμούμενος.

χαραδριὸν μιμούμενος was referred by Euphronius to the tradition according to which a look from a charadrius cured jaundice, and the bird had to be hidden away until sold or the prospective buyer would be cured free. To imitate a charadrius, then, is to hide, and as this is the point in Hippoanax (fr. 58 Bergk), it is wiser to accept it here² than to resort to modern observation of the plover's habits. So the hoopoe behaves like a charadrius in hiding in the thicket and we are no forwarder in interpreting ἐπώξει. In this context it could of course mean 'cry ὥ' (though without the idea of lamentation); but the point could also be that the hoopoe brooded in vain and therefore produced no birds, or that it cackled like a laying hen (or clucked like a broody hen) and no birds came. I must say, if I were trying to disprove the bird-reference of ἐπώξει, I should be vexed at finding it once again in a bird-context. The evidence of usage seems to me to favour 'brood' as the sense of ἐπώξει in our *Niobe* passage.

καὶ τῶνδε πύστις οὐκ ὅκνω χρονίζεται
κληρούμενος δ' ἐλεύπον, ὡς πάλιν λαχῶν
ἔκαστος αὐτῶν πρὸς πύλας ἄγοι λόχον. *Theb.* 54-56.

54 τῶνδε πύστις οὐ μόνω χαρίζεται Stobaeus; μετ' οὐ πολὺ δὲ ταῦτα γνώσῃ τῇ πείρᾳ. η περὶ τούτων ἀκοὴ οὐ βραδέως γέγονεν. τάχιν γάρ ἥγειλα Σ Med.

¹ Here again I suspect that we should restore the present tense.

D'Arcy Thompson, *Glossary of Greek Birds*, p. 311.

² So Wellmann, *Real. Enc.* iii. 2115;

Interpretation of v. 54 has wavered between the alternatives implied by the scholion :

1. 'Your learning of these matters has not been delayed by any hesitation of mine.'
2. 'The proof of these matters is not being delayed by any hesitation of theirs.'

1, although the more popular interpretation, seems to me to be clearly wrong. As Verrall says, it does not account at all well for the tense of *χρονίζεται*. Nor can *όκνος* refer merely to hesitation by the messenger as to whether he ought to stay longer and see more, for it always conveys a suggestion of fear or flinching. (Tucker's attempt to meet this requirement by claiming that the messenger might have flinched from incurring odium as the bringer of ill tidings will not do, for what he brings is not so much bad news as vital operational intelligence which Eteocles is anxious to receive.) Nor again do vv. 55 f. do much to substantiate a claim by the messenger to have come without delay; Eteocles might just as well have thought that he had cut it a bit fine as that he had hurried away to give plenty of warning.

To 2, on the other hand, I can think of no substantial objection; it would be captious to argue that any suspicion of *όκνος* which survived the preceding verses, in particular vv. 52 f., would not be removed by drawing lots. But, like most of those who have preferred this interpretation, I think it necessitates the adoption of *πύστις* from Stobaeus; *τώνδε πύστις* is what Eteocles has just had from the messenger—it is *πύστις* which the imminent attack will supply. Clearly, an interpretation which involves preferring a common word of inferior authority to a rarer word of superior authority has no strong claim to acceptance, though it may in fact be right. I should like to suggest as a possibility that Aeschylus wrote *καὶ τώνδε πύστις οὐκ ὄκνω* (or *?μονῆ* from *μόνω* Stobaeus) *χαρίζεται* 'and your learning of these matters affords no indulgence to hesitation (or delay)', i.e. 'you have not had enough advance notice to allow for any hesitation'—άγων γάρ ἀνδρας οὐ μένει λελευμένος (T.G.F. 37). This use of *χαρίζεσθαι* differs from E. *Tro.* 1129 *χάρων μονῆς ἔχων* (with which we may perhaps compare A. *Ag.* 1356 *τῆς μελλούσις χάρων πέδου πατοῦντες*. See Page, ad loc.), for it means 'show favour to' rather than 'find gratification in', but both would arise quite naturally.¹

τρόπον αἰγυπτιῶν,
οἵτ' ἐκπατίοις ἀλγεστοιδίων,
51 ὑπατοι λεχέων στροφοδιοῦνται . . .
55 ὑπατοι δ' ἀλών η τις Ἀπόλλων
η Πάν η Ζεὺς οἰωνόθροον
γύον δέξυθάν τώνδε μετοίκων . . . Ag. 49-57.
51 ὑπατηλεχέων Headlam.

In recent years Headlam's conjecture has won acceptance by Fletcher, Winnington-Ingram (*C.R.*, n.s. i. 148), and Rose and a compliment (without acceptance) from Denniston-Page. Fraenkel, however, dismissed it contemp-

¹ It would be a welcome consequence of eliminating *χρονίζειν* from this passage if Professor Fraenkel would now allow us to restore *χρονίζεσθαι* middle at *Ag.* 304. After all Aeschylus wrote *something* and the possibilities are circumscribed.

tuously; and if I regard it as palmary, it will certainly not be thought superfluous for me to say why.

Housman's objection to *ὑπατος* with the genitive in the sense 'high above' has never been satisfactorily answered. It is surely not enough for Denniston-Page to refer to *ὑπατος χώρας* in 509 below, when they themselves admit that it *could* mean 'highest of the land'. A mere preference—and one by no means universally shared (compare, for example, Beattie in *C.R.*, n.s. v. 6)—can hardly avail in a matter of grave linguistic difficulty.

In *C.P.* xlvi. 150 I raised a further objection to *ὑπατοι λεχέων*, viz. that Greek is not in the habit of combining a strong plural (referring to more than one bird) with a weak plural (referring to one nest). No one seems to have considered my point, but seven years of reading have not acquainted me with so close a combination of disparate plurals. *τευχέων πάλον* (*Eum.* 742) would be nearly comparable if we were under any obligation to believe that there was only one urn.

These, however, are purely negative arguments against *ὑπατοι λεχέων*, and the justification for this note lies in what I have now to say in commendation of Headlam's conjecture. In *C.R.* xvi. 436 Headlam wrote: 'the eagles in their lofty haunts are conceived as denizens (*μέτοικοι*) in the region of the loftiest-dwelling Gods'; and Fraenkel says 'those lofty regions belong really to the gods; they alone have full rights of citizenship therein. The birds that are permitted to live there too are *μέτοικοι* in the heavenly *πόλις*.' So it is because they *live* on high that the birds are *μέτοικοι* of the gods on high. But this is precisely what the manuscript reading does not say; according to it, the comparison, if any (it is spoilt by making *ὑπατοι* relative to *λεχέων*), is between where the gods live and where the birds fly. But Aeschylus called the swallow *πέδουκος* (*T.G.F.* 53) because it nests with man under the eaves, not because it flies about the house or streets. If the vultures are 'very high above the nest', then the nest is very far below them and there is no *μετοικία*; *μετοίκων* presupposes that the *οίκος* is *ὑπατος* and thereby establishes Headlam's conjecture.¹

It is on a correct appreciation of the metaphor that the defence of *τῶνδε* must turn. The deictic pronoun points to the *ὑπατηλεχέων* . . . *ὑπατοι* association which has already justified *μετοίκων* before it is actually used.

I have heard it asserted (though never argued in print) that *ὑπατηλεχής* is an improbable form. I cannot think it would have offended a poet who used *μεγιστότητας* (*Supp.* 709). Thomson has pointed out that the corruption would be facilitated by the scribe's familiarity with *ὑπατος* 'consul'; I might add that the construction of *ὑπατοι λεχέων* would not surprise a scribe familiar with, for example, *πράτοις μου* (John i. 30).

Ka. Άγαμέμνονός σέ φημ' ἐπόψεσθαι μόρον.

Xo. εἴφημον, ὡ τάλανα, κοίμησον στόμα.

Ka. ἀλλ' οὐτὶ παιῶν τῷδ' ἐπιστατεῖ λόγω.

Xo. οὐκ, εἴπερ ἔσται γ'. ἀλλὰ μὴ γένοιτο πως. *Ag.* 1246-9.

No interpretation of v. 1248 can be considered which is not directed against what the coryphaeus has just said; and, so far as I know, the only such inter-

¹ A further argument in its favour is the fact that, as Stanford remarked (*C.P.* xxxiii. 307), there is no other instance of *παῖς tout court*, 'young of animals', and what we need

is a corrective epithet. Young vultures are 'children that nest on high', just as fish are 'children without voice'.

pretation as yet proposed is 'this is no occasion for a Paean', i.e. for a propitious utterance to which *εὐφῆμος* could be applied. But the difficulties mentioned by Denniston-Page, that the sentence is confused rather than enriched by the obvious play on Paean (song) and Paeon (healer) and that *κοίμησος* shows that it is silence the Chorus enjoin, strike me as absolutely crippling. I will add that, on this interpretation, I am not entirely happy about v. 1249—'If we really are going to see Agamemnon dead, then your saying so is no occasion for a Paean'—though I suppose the point, if any, would be that a Paean would be appropriate if the admitted danger failed to materialize.

Now a comparison, for example, of 543 with *Eum.* 836 shows that *τῷδε λόγῳ* is capable of meaning not 'my assertion' but 'your request'; it may even be that a Greek would more naturally refer it to the nearer of the two. Is it possible that I am the first to suggest that, enjoined by the Chorus to be silent, Cassandra retorts with 'Talking like that will not help'? The Chorus have already admitted (1198 f. with Fraenkel's commentary) that perjury would not avail (*παιάνιον γενέσθαι*) to obliterate the past; now Cassandra chides them for trying to nullify the future by wrapping it in silence. Their rejoinder betrays the confusion between free will and determinism which is characteristic of the Greek attitude in such circumstances.

ἀνχεῖς εἶναι τόδε τοῦργον ἐμόν·
μηδέ ἐπιλεχθῆσ
Ἀγαμεμνονίαν εἶναι μ' ἀλοχον. *Ag.* 1497-9.

There are three problems here:

1. Fraenkel has established that *μηδέ* without a preceding negative cannot mean 'but not'.
2. The normal meaning of *ἐπιλέγεσθαι* is 'take into account', which does not appear to suit the context here.
3. Whereas *ἐμόν* in 1497 refers to that mortal woman, Agamemnon's wife, who the Chorus are so sure did the deed, *με* in 1499 refers to that other something whom they are warned not to confuse with her. It is not often in Aeschylus that poetry quite parts company with logic, and we need not apologize for seeking an explanation.

The thought seems to me to run like this: 'you confidently assert that I (Clytemnestra) did this deed'; perhaps she was going on to develop the argument of 1475 ff., viz. that the real murderer was the Atreid *ἀλλοτρό*. But a more striking thought intervenes, and she continues with 'do not even assume that *I* (the real murderer) am Agamemnon's wife'. The point of *μηδέ* 'not even' is that the Chorus were already perplexed on the score of responsibility; now they are told that not even identity can be taken for granted. But can we admit 'assume' as a possible rendering of *ἐπιλέγεσθαι*? It seems to me that *πᾶν ἐπιλεγόμενος πείσεσθαι χρῆμα* (*Hdt.* 7. 49. 5) comes within a hair's breadth of meaning 'assuming that everything will befall him', and that the difference between 'taking into account' and 'assuming' is only that the latter conveys a suggestion that the factors taken into account are open to dispute.

Κλ. οὐδὲν σεβίζη γενεθλίους ἀράς, τέκνον;
Ορ. τεκοῦσα γάρ μ' ἔρριψας ἐς τὸ δυστυχές. *Cho.* 912-13.

'Hast thou no awe of a parent's curse?' (Weir Smyth) is the all but universally accepted rendering of 912, but it is vulnerable on four counts:

1. *γενέθλιος ἄρας*, as Sidgwick comments, is an unusual expression for 'a mother's curse'. *αἷμα γενέθλιον* (*E. Or.* 89), which has been cited in defence, may well be rendered 'blood from which he took his birth'; and I know of no other instance of *γενέθλιος* where a literal rendering would be so absurd.¹

2. *σέβειν* and *σεβίζειν* usually betoken positive rather than negative reverence. In particular *τὰς ἡμάς ἄρας σέβων* (*E. Hipp.* 896) means 'respect my curse and bring it to fruition' not 'avoid incurring it'. Even together these two considerations would not avail to throw grave suspicion on the accepted interpretation, but:

3. if Clytemnestra really threatened Orestes with a visitation of the Furies, his retort—'you were a bad mother'—strikes me as singularly ineffective. That the Furies would abate their onslaught one whit on that account was out of the question, nor is it easy to believe that it would render Orestes indifferent to his fate. Such diffidence as I feel in urging this view is tempered by consideration of vv. 924-5, where Clytemnestra (surely a little surprisingly) repeats the threat, and Orestes' retort—that he cannot escape the Furies by sparing her—is effective enough.

4. If we set aside 912 as *sub iudice*, it appears that Clytemnestra essays persuasion until 922 and only then resorts to a threat.

It will be conceded that the rendering 'hast thou no reverence for the prayers offered at thy birth?', viz. that he would be a comfort and succour to his mother (cf. for example, *S. Aj.* 559 and 570, *E. Med.* 1033) meets all these objections. There remains the difficult question whether Aeschylus can possibly have used *ἀραι* in the sense of 'prayers for good'. At 145-6:

*ταῦτ' ἐν μέσῳ τίθημ τῆς κακῆς ἄρας,
κείνοις λέγοντα τήνδε τὴν κακὴν ἄραν*

the most natural course—in spite of Wilamowitz's irascible assault (*Interpretationen*, p. 204) and Groeneboom's unenthusiastic defence—is surely to read *κεδῆς* (or *καλῆς*) for *κακῆς*. Not only is it true that Electra interrupts her prayer with a curse, not only does *τὴν κακὴν* point to *τῆς κεδῆς*, but, as has been well observed, the apologetic note suits both the general reluctance of the Greeks to mix good and ill (*Ag.* 648) and the particular reluctance of Electra to wish her mother harm (122). Of course if Aeschylus used *κεδῆ* *ἀρά* for 'prayer for good', it would be a further step to use *ἀραι* by itself in the same sense; but one could hardly assert with confidence that he would not take it, and he may not have realized that *γενέθλιοι ἄραι* could possibly be mistaken for curses. I know of no other evidence for *ἀρά* in the sense of 'prayer for good' in tragedy. Mythologically speaking the *ἀραι* of Theseus were 'wishes' rather than curses (*Σ Hipp.* 46), but Euripides is wholly concerned with the one which was used as a curse. But considering that *ἀραιοι* appears five times in tragedy in the sense of 'pray for good', and *ἀρά* itself is similarly employed on its only occurrence in Pindar (*Isth.* 6. 43), I think that, in assigning the good sense here too, we are not paying too high a price for our escape from trouble.

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¹ I do not find Untersteiner's attempt to meet this point convincing.

ELEATIC QUESTIONS

THE following suggestions for the interpretation of Parmenides and Melissus can be grouped for convenience about one problem. This is the problem whether, as Aristotle thought and as most commentators still assume, Parmenides wrote his poem in the broad tradition of Ionian and Italian cosmology. The details of Aristotle's interpretation have been challenged over and again, but those who agree with his general assumptions take comfort from some or all of the following major arguments. First, the cosmogony which formed the last part of Parmenides' poem is expressly claimed by the goddess who expounds it to have some measure of truth or reliability in its own right, and indeed the very greatest measure possible for such an attempt. Second, the earlier arguments of the goddess prepare the ground for such a cosmogony in two ways. For in the first place these arguments themselves start from assumptions derived from earlier cosmologists, and are concerned merely to work out the implications of this traditional material. And, in the second place, they end by establishing the existence of a spherical universe: the framework of the physical world can be secured by logic even if the subsequent introduction of sensible qualities or 'powers' into this world marks some decline in logical rigour.

These views seem to me demonstrably false. As long as they are allowed to stand they obscure the structure and the originality of Parmenides' argument.

What measure of truth or reliability is claimed for the cosmogony?

Here our chief problem is the reinterpretation of a couplet which was already for Diels in 1897 the most controversial text in Parmenides. It occurs, according to Simplicius' quotation, at the end of the goddess's opening remarks.

χρεὰ δέ σε πάντα πνθέσθαι
ημὲν ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμές ήτορ
ἡδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐν πίστις ἀληθής.
ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθῆσοαι, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα
χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα.

(B 1. 28-32. In the first instance I shall quote fragments from the text of Diels-Kranz.)

Thus the final couplet follows a sharp denunciation of *βροτῶν δόξαι*, and subsequently this denunciation is driven home. When the goddess comes to the promised account of mortal ideas she calls it by the phrase which Empedocles took as a challenge—*κόσμον ἔμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλόν* (B 8. 52, cf. Emped. B 17. 26). And it is certainly this same way of inquiry that she bars to her hearer in B 6. 4-9, and B 7. 1-5:¹ the way of mortals who know nothing, who

¹ *Contra* those who follow Bernays in identifying this, the second of the false paths denounced by the goddess, with the theories of Heraclitus, and so have to distinguish it from the unheraclitean cosmology expounded in the last part of the poem. This thesis led Burnet to identify the cosmology with the first false path (*Early Greek Philosophy*,⁴ pp.

183-4), though this path is the 'wholly unintelligible' line of sheer negation (B 2. 5): a preposterous equation that he did not try to make plausible. The second false path is the error not of Heraclitus but of all men: see the second section of this paper and Verdenius, *Parmenides*, app. J; Jaeger, *Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers*, p. 101; Kirk,

wander deaf blind and bemused, compelled by habit¹ to trust their aimless eye and sounding ear and tongue. Despite all this, Parmenides' readers have nursed the conviction that he meant to claim an independent validity for his cosmology, a reality of some kind or degree for the phenomena described in it. So there must be a saving clause in the denunciation. But where?

Wilamowitz found one in the goddess's promise to expound a διάκοσμον ἔοικότα πάντα (B 8. 60).² ἔοικότα he interpreted in a sense similar to that which it carries in the *Timaeus* 29 b-d. Verdenius replied that without some such supplement as τοῖς ἔτιμοις (cf. Xenophanes B 35) the word can hardly have had this meaning for Parmenides;³ and the same rejoinder rules out Reinhardt's 'Folgerichtigkeit und Augenscheinlichkeit' and Kranz's 'wahrscheinlich-einleuchtend'. Verdenius himself cited Homer in support of the translation 'fitting' or 'proper',⁴ and this sense is the more convincing in that the purpose for which the cosmology is fitting is announced in the next line of the poem: it is given simply ὡς οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσῃ (B 8. 61), though these are still the same witless mortals, men at the mercy of the words they use (B 6. 4-7; B 8. 38-41, 53; B 9). So, on this construing of the lines, no ontological claims have been made and the cosmology need be no more than a dialectical device.

Nor, again, can any reality be conjured into the world of appearance from the ambiguous couplet B 8. 53-54. 'Mortals decided to name two forms, of which it is not right to name one—and there they went astray': whether or not these words are meant to show that, as Aristotle supposed, one of the forms which dominate the cosmogony is logically respectable, what is certain and agreed is that the question cannot be settled from the obscure text. The interpretation of that text itself depends on the answer we give to our general problem.⁵ So the saving qualification is still to seek.

Hence the importance of the couplet which ends the passage quoted above (B 1. 31-32); for since Wilamowitz many interpreters have thought that on its most natural interpretation it expressly promises some sort or degree of reality to the contents of the cosmology.

The sole authority for the couplet is Simplicius, and he quotes it together

Heraclitus: the Cosmic Fragments, p. 211. To take this path is to suppose that to be and not to be are the same and not the same (B 6. 8-9: for the negative in τὸ οὐκείναι cf. B 8. 40, where it cannot be explained as *oratio obliqua*). Gregory Vlastos, to whom I am indebted for making me reinforce and reconsider my argument at some salient points, argues: 'Those who deny any allusion to Heraclitus in Parmenides . . . have yet to explain why in these lines Parmenides should (a) impute to anyone the belief in the identity of being and not-being (rather than merely the belief in not-being, which is bad enough . . .) and (b) after saying οὐς τὸ πέλεων τε καὶ οὐκείναι ταῦτὸν νενόμων here, which would be quite sufficient to make his point, should add maliciously κού ταῦτόν, producing the expression ταῦτὸν κού ταῦτόν, which so strikingly parallels δλα καὶ οὐχ δλα in Heraclitus' (A.J.P. lxvi [1955], 341 n. 11). The

explanation is given below, pp. 90-92 and p. 91, n. 3. Both the points queried by V. are essential to Parmenides' criticism: ordinary men not only want to keep both *είναι* and *οὐκείναι*; in trying to distinguish them they confuse them. That is why both expressions in their ordinary use are empty names (B 8. 38-41).

¹ έθος πολύπειρον, B 7. 3, for which Calogero suggests 'l'esperienza della molteplicità delle cose' (*Studi sull'Eletismo*, p. 32 n. 1); but if the adjective is *πολύπειρος* it is better taken with the accompanying *σε*. Perhaps from *πολυπέιρον*, 'widespread'.

² *Hermes*, xxxiv (1899), 204-5.

³ Verdenius, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

⁴ Ibid., citing *Odyssey* 3. 124-5 and 4. 239 (cf. 266).

⁵ Cf. Kirk and Raven, *Presocratic Philosophers*, p. 281 n. 1, and by contrast Vlastos, *Trans. Am. Philol. Assn.* lxxvii (1946), 74.

with the three preceding lines (*De Caelo* 557. 25–558. 2 Heiberg). Of the four manuscripts used in Heiberg's text two, which share one archetype (A, F), give explicable and worthless variants for *μαθήσεα*. Of these two manuscripts one, which is particularly given to literal and accentual errors and improvements,¹ reads *περῶντα* in the last line as against *περ ὄντα* in the other three manuscripts. Despite these poor credentials *περῶντα* has been generally received.² Diels, as we shall see, had a special motive for adopting it, and those who did not follow Diels's interpretation seem to have accepted the reading on the ground that its better-attested rival would make the goddess claim, by a flat self-contradiction, that nothing existed but the *δοκοῦντα*. Whether she would be much happier to claim that all things are permeated by those *δοκοῦντα* is an open question; but this is one dilemma that can be left to yield in due course to a general solvent.

All the manuscripts have *δοκίμως* (and I have no doubt they are right). Wilamowitz explained the word in accordance with his Platonic reading of the *διάκοσμον δοκότα*. He credited Parmenides with the theory that 'neben die Wahrheit die in sich geschlossene konsequente Hypothese tritt. In dieser Falle τὰ δοκοῦντα δοκίμως ἔστι τοιάντα, oder besser in der Rede des Eleaten δοκίμως ἔστι, die Hypothesen haben in einer probehaltigen Weise Realität'.³ That is to say: provided our account of the phenomenal world can be got to conform to certain canons of internal consistency—even if as a whole it is vitiated by its premisses—then the phenomena can be allowed a modest but 'warranted' reality of their own. Kranz translated accordingly: 'Doch wirst du trotzdem auch dieses kennen lernen und zwar so, wie das (*ihnen*) Scheinende auf eine probhafte, wahrscheinliche Weise *sein* müßte, indem es alles ganz und gar durchdringt.' Grant the translation, and the saving clause has been found.

Diels replied that this interpretation will not square with Parmenides' ontology, and he was right.⁴ There can be no degrees of reality: what exists must *πάμπαν πελέσαι*, on pain of being nothing at all.⁵ But all such general issues apart, Wilamowitz's sense cannot be got from the Greek. Where *δοκίμως* is attested elsewhere (Aeschylus, *Persae* 547, Xenophon, *Cyr.* 1. 6. 7) the lexica and the editors rightly translate it 'really, genuinely', and the earlier editors of Parmenides had no doubt that this was its sense in the present context.⁶ The *δοκύως* is the reliable man, not one who measures up to some standards but fails the main test.⁷ So *δοκίμως εἶναι* is *assuredly to exist*; and this is what the

¹ Heiberg's A, which makes two other such slips in the five lines quoted.

² The sole recent exception is Zafiropoulo, *L'École éléate*, p. 297.

³ Wilamowitz, l.c.; cf. Reinhardt, *Parmenides*, p. 9, Calogero, *Studi*, p. 31 n. 1.

⁴ *Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta* (1901), p. 60.

⁵ B 8. 11, 15–18, 32–33. In line 33 most editors excise *μή* with Bergk and, with qualms, understand *ἔον* as copulative = *ἔον ἐνδεεῖς*. But see Hermann Fraenkel, 'Parmenidesstudien' in *Wege und Formen fruhgriechischen Denkens*, pp. 192–3. The same sense can be got from Gomperz's *Ἴτι γάρ οὐκ ἐπιδέεις μή ἔον δ'* ἀν παντὸς δέειτο: any admixture of *μή* *ἔν* (any statement of the form *οὐκ ἔστι*) is as ruinous as taking the

first wrong path at once. See below, pp. 90–92, 97–98.

⁶ 'Plane' Brandis (1813), 'clare' Karsten (1835): both accordingly felt compelled to discard *εἶναι* for Peyron's *ἴέναι*.

⁷ Arbenz, *Die Adjektiv auf -ιμος*, Zürich-Tübingen (1933), pp. 38–41; Hermann Fraenkel, *Hermes*, ix (1925), 190. See, e.g., Aesch. *Persae* 87 (*δοκύως* with inf. = 'able'), Democritus B 67, B 68. In Herodotus the sense 'renowned' becomes common, but never with the implication that the renown is not wholly deserved. The exception that may seem to tell for Wilamowitz is Heraclitus B 28, *δοκέοντα γάρ ο δοκυμότατος γυνάκει, φυλάσσει*. But if we give *δοκυμότατος* here the weak sense of 'having the greatest (but finally undeserved) reputation'

phenomenal world can never do for Parmenides' goddess. The same fact defeats any attempt to read *δοκίμως* as 'in a manner appropriate to *δοκοῦντα*'.¹ Avoiding these pitfalls, Verdenius followed Hermann Fraenkel in translating the word 'acceptably';² but he recognized that the reality of the appearances could not be acceptable to the goddess and therefore took this to mean 'acceptably to mortals'. He glossed the lines: 'How mortals starting from a certain principle were able to explain reality in detail in a manner satisfactory to them'.³ The saving dative is far to seek (it is scarcely enough to argue that since it must be supplied with *δοκοῦντα* it can be imported elsewhere in the clause). But the weightier objection comes from an independent survey of the use of *δόκιμος*. Writing after Fraenkel, Arbenz showed by his discussion of the evidence that 'acceptable', however plausible at first sight, is still too weak a translation for this strong adjective. He was induced by that evidence to claim an original sense for the word that is not passive but active, 'receiving the enemy in battle' and hence 'steadfast, sure'.⁴

Such difficulties with *δοκίμως* seem to recommend Diels's emendation: *ώς τὰ δοκοῦντα χρήν δοκιμῶσι* (ai) *είναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα*. Here, as in the older edition of Karsten, *περῶντα* takes on an excellent sense, describing not the appearances but the inquirer. But old snags give way to new. The elision is harsh, and harder to parallel than Diels supposed.⁵ *δοκιμῶσι* he took for the equivalent of *δοκιμάσαι*, and on this assumption two interpretations of the clause *ώς . . . είναι* seem to be possible, depending on whether *είναι* is taken with *δοκοῦντα* or with *δοκιμῶσι*. The first is 'how one should examine the things that seem to exist' (the alternative taken most recently by Messrs. Kirk and Raven); the second is 'how one should test the appearances with regard to their reality' (Diels's original rendering⁶). The first requires a close coupling of *δοκοῦντα* and *είναι* that the order of the text makes very improbable. The second ignores the fact that *δοκιμάσαι* with the infinitive would naturally mean 'approve or admit their reality',⁷ and this is certainly too hospitable for Parmenides' goddess. In his later editions Diels saw an escape-route: he reduced *είναι* to a copulative role and took it closely with *ώς* ('wie man . . . annehmen müsste, dass sich jenes Scheinwesen verhalte').⁸ Such a reading is if anything strengthened by Reinhardt's objection that *δοκίμωμι* must be equated not with *δοκιμάσω* but with *δοκέω* (= *οίομαι*).⁹ But the proverbial opposition

verschaffend.

¹ *Parmenides*, pp. 49-51.

² Op. cit. (p. 86, n. 7 above), comparing *δόκιμος* = *ἐς δοκήν διαθέσις* with *ἀλκιμός* = *ἐς ἀλκήν διαθέσις*: cf. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus*, p. 184 (ad loc. A 6).

³ The elision in Xenophanes B 3. 5 was exorcized by Wilamowitz. Kirk and Raven (*Presocratic Philosophers*, p. 268) say 'the elision is otherwise unknown in hexameters', but editors have cited *Iliad* 11. 272, 13. 777, 17. 89.

⁴ 'Wie man alles durchforschend das Scheinsein auf seine Echtheit prüfen muß', *Parmenides Lehrgedicht* (1897), p. 59.

⁵ LSJ. s.v. II: e.g. *δεδοκιμασμένος ιππεύειν*.

⁶ *Poet. Phil. Frag.* (1901), p. 60.

⁷ Reinhardt, *Parmenides*, p. 6. The sense required by Diels is found only in the letter

¹ Prompted perhaps by B 19, *οὐτα τοι κατὰ δόξαν ἔφυ τισε*. This sense again might seem warranted by Heraclitus B 28 (see last note); but of course Heraclitus' characteristic word-play depends on there *not* being any such overt connexion in sense between the words.

⁸ Fraenkel (see p. 86, n. 7 above) had suggested 'annehmbar, sich Anerkennung

of δοκεῖν and εἶναι is enough to make any such weakening of εἶναι implausible in this context, where the antithesis is inescapable. And Reinhardt found other objections, arguing for instance that at this date χρῆν cannot be read as χρῆ: unless it is genuinely historic in tense it can express only what is contrary to fact, and as such it cannot introduce the general rule of procedure which Diels found in it.¹

So much for a notorious deadlock. Between these lines of interpretation the choice is disheartening; but fortunately it seems also to be unnecessary. The competing answers are answers to a mistaken question.

The assumption on which the debate depends is put clearly by Verdenius. To settle the status of the cosmology, he observes, 'we should first examine the general character which the goddess attributes to her statements regarding human opinions. This is contained in the following lines'—namely, in the couplet we are discussing.² Thus the problem becomes: just what comment on human opinions does the goddess volunteer in these lines? And this is the mistaken question.

The first step is to see, as Kranz and others have seen, that when the goddess promises ἀλλ' ἔμπτης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι her *ταῦτα* is naturally taken to refer to the previous line. It means just 'the contents of mortal opinions'.³ There is no true belief found among such opinions, nevertheless Parmenides shall be told these things too. And then without a connective the sentence continues: ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα. Now according to the received view this is the goddess's own comment: her promise to say how the appearances can have a sort of reality, or how they can be tested, or whatever. But this gives the sentence an intolerable twist. It must now be supposed to mean: Still, you shall learn the contents of men's opinions *from me at second-hand*—and at the same time learn from me at first-hand how the appearances are to be allowed a sort of existence (or how to test them, etc.). But the connexion that I have italicized is not in the text. Kranz writes 'und zwar', and it corresponds to nothing at all. The relative clause from *ὡς* to *περ ὄντα* (or *περῶντα*) can only be epexegetic, elaborating the *ταῦτα*: and *ταῦτα*, on the natural reading, are the contents of human opinions. So the sense is: Still, you shall learn (at second-hand from me) these things too (sc. the content of mortal opinions), namely (still at second-hand and giving the general content of those opinions) how the things-that-seem had to have genuine existence (*δοκίμως εἶναι* in the only possible sense), being indeed the whole of things⁴—or, if we read *περῶντα*, '... and to pervade everything without exception'.

To be sure, the twist of sense on which I have laid stress—the twist that forced Kranz to supply 'und zwar'—might also have been avoided by denying that *ταῦτα* looks back to the preceding line. We might have held, as Diels and others have done, that the whole couplet is concerned with the goddess's own comment on mortal opinions. But if we say this all the old puzzles are restored. The only people who can say of the δοκοῦντα that and how they δοκίμως exist are the mortals who believe in them (B, 8, 38), not the goddess.

If this is correct, the choice between *περ ὄντα* and *περῶντα* depends on a last

of 'Pherecydes', Diog. Laert. 1. 122. Hesychius gives δοκίμωμα: δοκέω, οἴομαι. Cf. Gow on Theocritus 30. 25 (apparently misread by LSJ. s.v.).

¹ Reinhardt, op. cit., pp. 7-9.

² Verdenius, *Parmenides*, p. 49.

³ *ταῦτα* after δοξας is of course no obstacle: cf. e.g. Od. 3. 124-5.

⁴ *περ* as *vel*, cf. Denniston, *Greek Particles*,² pp. 482, 484.

minor point of interpretation. Suppose we take the couplet as anticipating some such general description of *δοκοῦτα* as that given in B 8. 38-40. In those lines mortals posit certain illusions, believing them real; in our couplet they claim that they assuredly exist. The illusions in question include coming to exist and coming to an end, being and not being, shifting place and changing colour: in fact they are presumably all the ordinary manifestations of change and plurality. Then if these are the *δοκοῦτα* of our couplet we had better read *περ ὄντα*, for if the list comprises all the phenomena these must exhaust and not merely pervade the totality of things for those who believe in them. And in that case the tense of *χρῆν* must be taken to show that this is how things inevitably were from the start. But the past tense comes more firmly into its own on a slightly different interpretation. For suppose that by *δοκοῦντα* here the goddess means primarily just those two forms from which the cosmogony begins (B 8. 53-54). The tense of the verb is wholly apt to the first stage of the cosmogony; and now *περῶντα* is just as attractive, for the forms are expressly said to permeate the universe (B 9. 3). However, it is not clear that this pervasion of things by Light and Night could form part of the ordinary man's description of his world: it seems to be the goddess's independent commentary on the disastrous results of naming the two forms (B 8. 53, B 9). So on balance I am inclined to keep *πάντα περ ὄντα* both as more appropriate to the content of mortals' beliefs and as the better-attested reading. But no major point of interpretation now hangs on it.

If this general solution of an old puzzle is acceptable, it is worth seeing how much or how little it establishes. The goddess, we can now say, is not inconsistent in her denunciation of the mortal opinions she surveys; there is, after all, no saving clause. Her account of those opinions is not introduced as a contribution to early science. But to say this is not of course to deny that it was the most complete and plausible system its author knew how to produce. If the building of such a system was never his end, it could certainly be a means to his end; and for my part I take its purpose to be wholly dialectical. Parmenides set himself to give the correct or the most plausible analysis of those presuppositions on which ordinary men, and not just theorists, seem to build their picture of the physical world. (These are in fact presuppositions reached by analysis, but Parmenides presents them as conscious past decisions.¹⁾ Whittled down to their simplest and most economical they can be seen still to require the existence of at least two irreducibly different things in a constant process of interaction; and both the plurality and the process have now, on Parmenides' view, been proven absurd.

But needless to say the points for which I have so far argued do not depend on the truth of these larger claims.

Do the arguments of the Άληθεια depend on assumptions derived from earlier cosmology?

Here I can best begin by illustrating the type of interpretation that I want to reject. Cornford maintained that Parmenides' whole argument depends on a premiss which 'states in a more abstract form the first assumption common to

¹ On this see Verdenius, *Parmenides*, p. 53 and app. E. With Parmenides, if not before, appears the ambiguity in *νόμος* and *νομίζεσθαι* which runs through fifth-century thought: 'unchallenged custom' (B 7. 3),

'arbitrary decision' (B 8. 53); the second an historical mirage thrown by the first, as the Social Contract was by current forms of society.

all his predecessors, Milesian or Pythagorean: ultimately there exists a One Being. . . . He considers what further attributes can, or cannot, logically belong to a being that is one.¹ Following the same line of interpretation Raven held that Parmenides is really talking about the Pythagorean One: 'Unity', he wrote, is 'postulated as an ultimate principle'.² Such theories are in fact answers to a familiar problem for which we must try a different solution. The problem is this: when the goddess begins her argument by distinguishing the right way of inquiry—*ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι*—from a wrong way—*ἡ δ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς χρεών ἔστι μὴ εἶναι* (B 2. 3–6)—what is the unexpressed subject of the verbs *ἔστιν* and *οὐκ ἔστιν*? Cornford and others import a subject from earlier cosmology, and by looking too far afield they overlook a remarkable argument.

(a) *The subject is not 'What is'.* Diels understood *τὸ ἔόν* as the subject. Cornford even proposed to introduce this into the text at B 2. 3 (*ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἔόν ἔστιν καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι*).³ But there is a conclusive reason why this subject will not do. The reason is that it turns the *ἔστιν* into a mere tautology and the *οὐκ ἔστιν* correspondingly into a flat contradiction, whereas Parmenides thinks it necessary to *argue* for *ἔστιν* and against *οὐκ ἔστιν*. We shall come to the detail of his argument directly, but first this general point must be guarded against misunderstanding. No one will deny that, as the argument goes, *τὸ ἔόν* is a correct description of the subject. The point is that Parmenides purports to *prove* that it is a correct description, and that (as we shall see) his proof is not a disingenuous *petitio principii*, and therefore he cannot be assuming it from the start. Cornford indeed seems to suppose that *τὸ ἔόν ἔστιν* would not be a tautology for Parmenides, for he holds that it has to be incorporated in a group of special premisses on which, in his view, the whole argument depends.⁴ But even if this paradox could be made out—if, that is to say, *ἔόν* could be divorced from *εἶναι* in such a way as to make the proposition non-tautologous (and of course Cornford does not profess to do this)—it would not affect the point. For, quite apart from the consideration that no such premiss is either recognized or required by the argument, the very fact that Parmenides argues for the existence of his subject proves that for him the assertion of its existence was no more a bare assumption than it was a bare tautology.

Yet a theory such as Cornford's does imply, wittingly or unwittingly, that Parmenides did not try to prove his *ἔστιν*, and in face of this we need only remind ourselves of Parmenides' arguments on this head. The purpose of those arguments is well known: it is to rule out two wrong roads which,

¹ Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides*, p. 29. How far Cornford's picture of Parmenides' predecessors as sharing this assumption is acceptable is another question and one which lies outside this paper.

² Raven, *Pythagoreans and Eleatics*, p. 176 and ch. iii *passim*. It is to be noticed that Mr. Raven takes a different and, I believe, more plausible view in the later *Presocratic Philosophers* (see p. 93 n. 4 below).

³ *Plato and Parmenides*, p. 30 n. 2. As a parallel he cites B 6. 1, *ἔόν ἐμείνα*, yet within a few lines he destroys this parallel by taking the *ἔόν* with the immediately preceding

infinitives (so Simplicius and Burnet, rightly; Cornford, op. cit., p. 31 n. 2; see below, p. 94). In B 8. 3, as other editors have seen, *ἔόν* is part of the predicate (cf. *Laus* 904 a).

⁴ *Plato and Parmenides*, p. 33. Of the other 'premisses' detected by Cornford one ('that which is is one and cannot be many') will be considered in part (b) of this section of the paper and the other ('that which is can be thought or known, and uttered or truly named; that which is not, cannot'), or an emended version of this, in part (c). None is in fact a 'premiss'.

together with the remaining right road, make up an exhaustive set of possible answers to the question *ἔστιν ή οὐκ ἔστιν*; 'Does it exist or not?' The right path is an unqualified yes. The first wrong path is an equally unqualified no;¹ and this is rebutted at the start by the argument that what does not exist could not be thought or spoken of, *οὐτε γὰρ ἀν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἔστιν (οὐ γὰρ ἀνιστόν) οὐτε φράσας* (B 2. 7-8). (Later I shall suggest that this reply is itself reinforced by a further argument at the beginning of B 6.) There is no suggestion that anyone takes the first wrong road, which simply comes to saying that there is nothing whatever in existence. It is the second, the blind alley described in the latter part of B 6, that is followed by 'mortals'—i.e. by everyone in his daily business.² To take this well-trodden path (*πάτος ἀνθρώπων*, B 1. 27) is to say, very naturally, that the question *ἔστιν ή οὐκ ἔστιν*; can be answered either yes or no, depending on what one is talking about, and when, and where. Ordinary men want to keep *both élva* and *οὐκ élva* in use: horses exist, mermaids do not; there is sandy soil here but not there; there are dodos at one time, not at another. It is this qualified answer that Parmenides denounces as looking both ways (*δίκρανοι*, B 6. 5), moving in opposite directions (*παλίντροπος κέλευθος*, B 6. 9); and his first and fundamental argument against it is that it treats existence and non-existence as different and yet identical: *οἰς τὸ πέδεν τε καὶ οὐκ élva ταῦτα νενόμισται κοντά ταῦτάν* (B 6. 8-9). This clause, which has been construed out of context by those who read it as a reference to Heraclitus,³ has an exact sense in Parmenides' argument. Ordinary men and cosmologists alike try to distinguish existence from non-existence by saying, for instance, that lions do exist and mermaids do not; yet in distinguishing them they identify them, for (by the argument already brought against the first wrong road in B 2) if non-existent mermaids could be talked about they would be existent. Subsequently Parmenides essayes to refute those who say that *ἔστιν* is true at one time but not another (the elimination of *γένεσις* and *διλέθησ* in B 8. 6-21), or true for one thing but not another (the proof that the subject is unitary and indivisible first introduced at B 8. 22-25), or true at one place but not another (the proof of spatial uniformity in B 8. 42-49: we shall return to these latter arguments). He is anxious to show that the second wrong road has no advantage over the

¹ The two paths are 'It exists and *must* exist', 'It does not exist and *cannot*' (B 2. 3 and 5). The force of the 'must' and 'cannot' is shown by the remaining path, which says accordingly that the subject *can* but *need not* exist (*ἴστι γὰρ élva*, cf. p. 94 below), and means by this that the question 'Does it exist?' has to be answered sometimes yes and sometimes no (see the text). In ruling out 'can' in favour of either 'must' or 'cannot' the other paths are ruling out this qualified answer. This warns us against saying that the third path is a conflation of the other two.

² *Pace* A. H. Coxon, who holds that Parmenides consistently distinguishes between *ἀνθρώποις* = *mankind as a whole* and *φύτοι* = *philosophers* (C.Q. xxviii [1934], 134). I am obliged to him for a copy of his paper vigorously annotated with its author's second thoughts.

³ Because they have to break it into two supposedly Heraclitean conjunctions: being and not-being, and same and not same (cf. Vlastos, p. 84, n. 1 above). Quite apart from the implausibility of the attempt to read these as actual echoes of Heraclitus (see the 'parallels' adduced by Kranz in his apparatus, *Vors.* 7 i. 233), this fragmentation destroys the sense and the grammar. The point is not that men simply identify being with not-being, or the same with the different, but that they cannot distinguish *élva* and *οὐκ élva* on their own terms without identifying them. Cornford, who does not claim a reference to Heraclitus here, commits the same fault of fragmentation (*Plato and Parmenides*, p. 33): in a changing world, he says, men hold that things (a) are (at one time) and are not (at another), and (b) pass from being one thing (the same) to being another (not the same).

first, and so to reduce the choice of answers to *πάμπαν πελέναι η οὐχί* (B 8. 11 and 15-18); to qualify the positive answer at all is to go wholly astray (B 8. 32-33¹). And thus by elimination he tries to establish the conclusion he wants: *ἔστιν*.

I confess that in face of this I do not see how it is possible to interpret Parmenides either as preoccupied merely with the truism that what exists exists, or as smuggling in the existence of his subject as a premiss in the argument.

(b) *Nor is the subject 'The One' or 'The One Being'.* Another premiss that Cornford detects behind Parmenides' argument is the proposition that what exists is single: 'That which is, is one and cannot be many.' This, he claims, must be a premiss, for Parmenides gives no proof of it.² Thus he is able from the start to pack unity as well as existence into the unexpressed subject of the argument; and then it is a short step to the claim that what Parmenides is discussing, albeit in this uncandid way, is just the One Being of Pythagorean cosmology. But this move to fill out the subject is one degree less plausible than the last. For not only does Parmenides prove the unity of his subject instead of (as Cornford believes) assuming it; he proves it at the second remove, from a theorem that he has previously proved about its existence. However, it is not hard to detect a reason why this was overlooked and indeed why Parmenides might seem to be offering no proof of unity at all. The reason seems to lie in a misreading of the first line of his proof.

The proof that the subject of the argument is single is of course just the proof that it is 'indivisible' and 'continuous', which is given in B 8. 22-25 and promised in the *ἔν*, *συνεχές* of B 8. 6. The first line of the argument is always given in the form: *οὐδὲ διαιρετόν ἔστιν, ἔτει πᾶν ἔστιν ὁμοίον*, where *πᾶν ἔστιν* *ὁμοίον* is predicative and the premiss of the proof is that its subject is 'all alike'. But at once we run into difficulties. The passage is embedded in a long self-contained train of argument quoted as a whole by Simplicius;³ and there is no previous point in the argument in which it has been concluded that the subject is homogeneous. Indeed it seems that the sense in which this is meant can only be gathered from the following lines: presumably the subject is *ὁμοίον* just in the sense that it is *συνεχές*, and then the supposed argument collapses into a mere *petitio principii* or, as Cornford might say, into the enunciation of an unsupported premiss. In any case it is unconnected with the arguments that precede it, and the deductive form in which it is cast is misleading.

But the picture is quite changed once it is seen that *ὁμοίον* here must have not predicative but adverbial force and that the *ἔστιν* before it must accordingly be written *ἔστω*.⁴ For several reasons this seems certain. First, *ὁμοίον* is parallel

¹ See p. 86, n. 5 above.

² *Plato and Parmenides*, p. 35.

³ Simplicius, *Phys.* 145. 1-146. 25 Diels. Some have suggested that the passage is not continuous and that some lines have dropped out after B 8. 25 (cf. Zeller-Nestle i², 692). But it is not the case that Proclus quotes B 5 as though it directly followed B 8. 25: he turns to it with the words *καὶ τάλιν* (*in Parm.* 708 Cousin).

⁴ *ὅμοιον* and *ὅμοια* are used as standard adverbs with the dative: for the absolute use as here cf. Aeschylus, *Eum.* 240, *ὅμοια*

χέρσον καὶ θάλασσαν ἐκπερῶν (Homer's *γαῖαν ὁμοῖον πόντον*), where as all editors have seen *ὅμοια* has adverbial force whether or not it is read as technically qualifying the nouns: so Parmenides in B 8. 23 (and perhaps the formula *σε γῆρας τείρει ὁμοίον*, *Il.* 4. 315, which scholl rightly uses *ὅμοιος* to explain). The form *ὅμοιος* which appears in the fifth century is not found in Homer, Hesiod, or Parmenides, though *ὅμως* occurs in them all: notice that *τοῖος* kept its adverb *τοῖον*, as *οἷος* did *οἷον* and *τοιοῦτος τοιαῦτα*.

to the *τῇ μᾶλλον / χειρότερον* of the next two lines (B 8. 23–24), where the verb to be supplied from the first line can only be *ἔστω*: the subject exists uniformly, not somewhat the more in one part or somewhat the less. Next, it is this premiss that was proved in the preceding lines (B 8. 6–21). For in those lines it is argued that, since there cannot be any change from non-existence to existence or vice versa, *οὕτως ἡ πάμπαν πελέναι χρεών ἔστιν ἡ οὐχί* (B 8. 11); and then the second alternative is ruled out as unintelligible (B 8. 15–18). So the proof has allegedly been given that the subject exists *πάμπαν* or *όμοιον*, unqualifiedly, without intermission; and this is exactly the premiss required to prove that it is indivisible and single. Moreover, the form and placing of the *ἐπει*-clause in B 8. 22 show that it takes up a conclusion previously established. For Parmenides' train of argument in B 8 breaks into four main stages which are clearly distinguished and correctly ordered in the programme given at the start,¹ and each succeeding movement is introduced by an *ἐπει*-clause which, in the other cases at least, shows how the new argument depends on a proposition already proved. (Thus in the third movement B 8. 27 looks back to B 8. 6–21 and especially to line 21; and in the fourth B 8. 42 looks back to B 8. 26–33 and especially to lines 26 and 30–31.²) As we might expect, then, the second stage of the argument—the proof of unity and continuity in lines 22–25—is no more an isolated and unargued pronouncement than the other stages. The unity of the subject is proved, not assumed *ab initio*.

It is worth noticing that all but the first of these reasons for reading *ἔστω* *όμοιον* could be satisfied by an alternative explanation of the lines which would leave *όμοιον* predicative. (But the first seems to me inescapable.) Up to this point the argument has been concerned only with variation in time: the sense in which it has been shown that the subject *πάμπαν πέλεται* is just that it has no temporal boundaries, no *γένεσις* or *ὅλεθρος*. Now this is just the sense that Melissus later gave to *πᾶν ὄμοιον*,³ and the words can be construed in the same way in B 8. 22 without at all affecting the proposed interpretation. The fact that, on either version, the argument for continuity in lines 22–25 depends on the prior elimination of *temporal* starts and stops in lines 6–21 is of the first importance for understanding that argument, and we shall come back to it in another context. For the present we have sufficient grounds for dismissing these attempts to saddle Parmenides' argument with a subject from earlier cosmology.

(c) *But there is a subject.* Some interpreters gave up the quest for a subject. Hermann Fraenkel suggested that 'the *ἔστω* is primarily used by Parmenides as a so-called impersonal, somewhat like "it rains" = "raining takes place"'.⁴ But this move, soundly antiseptic as it is, is unconvincing because Parmenides goes on to prove various characteristics of the subject of his *ἔστω*. To supply that subject we have to repeat our question: What must it be *from the start* if it is to satisfy the demands of the argument? If it is not assumed to be existent and indivisible, what is it assumed to be? And the answer is clear and, I think, of great interest. The goddess maintains that to the question 'Does it exist?

¹ See the Additional Note, p. 101 below.

² On this see the third section of the paper.

³ Melissus B 7 = Simplicius, *Phys.* 111. 22–23 Diels (cf. 112. 3–4): *εἰ γάρ ἐπεροῦνται ἀνάκη τὸ ἐὸν μὴ ὄμοιον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἀπόλυτον τὸ πρόσθεν ἐὸν, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἐὸν γίνεσθαι.*

⁴ *Class. Philol.* xli (1946), 169, criticizing

Verdenius's suggestion that the subject is 'All that exists, the total of things'. Cf. Calogero, *Studi*, p. 18; Kirk and Raven, *Presocratic Philosophers*, p. 269.

only a positive answer can be given; the negative is ruled out by the plea that what does not exist cannot be distinguished in thought or speech (B 2. 7-8), and this plea is basic to the following arguments and recalled more than once in them (B 8. 8-9, 17-18, probably 34-36). This alone would give us the answer to our problem; but before drawing the moral we may take one more step to clarify the argument. The goddess's premiss in this opening game is that what does not exist cannot be thought or spoken of or, what comes to the same, that what can be thought or spoken of exists. But this, after all, is far from self-evident. The plain men whose daily uses of language make up the second wrong path hold that plenty of things can be talked about which do not exist: they need not wait for Gorgias to tell them that they can think of Scylla and Chimaera.¹ So how are they to be convinced that what can be talked or thought about must exist? It is this prior point that Parmenides seems anxious to establish in the opening couplet of B 6; and he argues it from something that plain men can be expected to concede, namely that what can be thought or spoken of *could* exist (even if they want to add that in fact, in particular cases, it does not). The couplet in question is *χρή τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι, μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἔστω*. I adopt the familiar version of Burnet: 'What can be spoken and thought of must exist; for it *can* exist, whereas nothing cannot.' Hence, of course, it is *not* nothing; and hence it exists. That this celebrated fallacy² is the point of the lines seems certain on several scores. This seems to be the sole way of construing them that saves them from platitude.³ And the presence of an important argument in the couplet is shown by the goddess's injunction to 'think that out' (*τά σ' ἔγώ φράζεσθαι ἄνων*, B 6. 2), just as the fact that the argument is important to the reasoning in B 2 is proved by her immediate reference to the first wrong path (B 6. 3).⁴ Moreover, this reading provides a context for B 3, which on a similar interpretation

¹ Commentators are still seduced by Aristotle's loaded comment in *Met.* A 3. 98a²⁹-b¹ into diagnosing Parmenides' basic fallacy as a confusion between the existential and the predicative senses of *εἶναι*: as though he was (a) right to say that we cannot talk about a non-existent X but (b) wrong to suppose on this score that we cannot say 'X is not white'. Both (a) and (b) are groundless. Parmenides, though he certainly could not have drawn the necessary logical distinctions, might nevertheless fairly assume that, if one part of the world is white but not another, this can be formulated existentially as 'there is white, or a white thing, here but not there': the point may be confused but is not annulled by the use of *τὸ λευκόν* to mean both the colour and what has it. The move from *δύεντον* to *ἀρπεμέσ* is valid enough: what is mistaken is his claim that we cannot talk of the non-existent. We can, of course: mermaids, for instance. How we can is another matter, and Aristotle was not the first or last philosopher to fail to see his way through it; but it is his failure that underlies his treatment of the Eleatics and their predecessors in A 3.

² A, which can exist, is distinguished from B, which (poor thing) cannot: invalid, for to say 'nothing cannot exist' is not to ascribe compulsory non-existence to anything but to say that it is necessarily (trivially) true that what doesn't exist doesn't exist, and this unexciting reformulation disables the argument. The fallacy is the so-called *dere* interpretation of modal statements.

³ Kranz tries to save matters with an unwarranted 'nur': 'Nötig ist zu sagen und zu denken, daß *nur* das Seiende ist; denn Sein ist, ein Nichts dagegen ist nicht.' The translation 'One must say and think that *what is*, is,' is ruled out by pp. 90-92 above.

⁴ Notice that Parmenides is refuting the first wrong path for the benefit of the plain men who take the second; for he refutes it from their premiss that what can be thought of *can* exist. A convinced follower of the first wrong path would deny this by saying not only *οὐκ ἔστιν* but *χρεών ἔστι μη εἶναι* (B 2. 5), and with this Parmenides admits he could do nothing: it is *παντευθέσ* (B 2. 6). But since no one takes this line it is enough to rule out *οὐκ ἔστι* from the plain man's assumptions.

embodies the essential admission that Parmenides needs: what can be thought is identical with what *can* (not *must*) exist.

Either with or without this reinforcing argument, however, the subject of the reasoning is clear. What is declared to exist in B 2 is simply what can be talked or thought about; for the proof of its existence is that, if it did not exist, it could not be talked or thought about. (On our version of B 6. 1-2 the subject comes into the open there: *τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἔοντα*.) And it needs no proving that the subject of the argument can be talked and thought about, for we are talking and thinking about it. Hence indeed the temptation to say that the *ἔστιν* has no subject; for Parmenides' argument need assume nothing save that we are thinking and talking of something, and this seems to be guaranteed by our framing or following the argument at all. The subject is quite formal, until it is filled in with the attributes (beginning with existence) that are deduced for it; and because this seems to reduce to the vacuous discovery that the subject is just the subject, it is as tempting as it is certainly illogical and misleading to say that there is no subject at all.

Is this too small a mouse from the mountain? Philosophically it seems more like the giant that Parmenides' successors thought it. The comparison with Descartes' *cogito* is inescapable: both arguments cut free of inherited premisses, both start from an assumption whose denial is peculiarly self-refuting. This seems sufficient to establish that Parmenides does not, in the sense described, rest his argument on assumptions derived from earlier cosmologists.¹ To me it seems sufficient to establish him as the most radical and conscious pioneer known to us among the Presocratics.

But those who wish to set his poem inside an orthodox cosmological tradition have one prop left to rest on: the spherical universe, whose appearance is the outcome of the whole argument.

Does Parmenides argue for the existence of a spherical universe?

There is no novelty in denying, as I shall, that Parmenides' arguments set up a spherical world. But the reasons sometimes given for the denial seem to carry little weight.

One reason suggested is that Parmenides does not say that reality is a sphere, only that it is like one: *εὐκίκλου σφαῖρης ἐνάλγκιον οὐκω* (B 8. 43).² But no doubt *σφαῖρα* has its usual Homeric sense of 'ball', and a spherical world can certainly be compared to a ball.³ Another reason is that Parmenides does not deal in spatial concepts at all: for him, nothing exists but thought.⁴ But I do not for my part think that this is the necessary translation of B 3 (*τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸν νοεῖν ἔστιν τε καὶ εἶναι*) or that there is room in Parmenides' argument for such a thesis.⁵ Again, Hermann Fraenkel rejected a spherical world in his analysis

¹ 'In the sense described': I am not of course denying that some of the ideas employed in the course of the argument may have been inherited from earlier theorists. This must be true of some of the cosmogony, and probably of at least the idea of *πειρας* in the *Ἀλήθεια* (see the third section of the paper).

² e.g. by Coxon, *C.Q.* xxviii (1934), 140.

³ A point most recently taken by Jameson, *Phronesis*, iii (1958), 15; but it does not go home, as he thinks, against Fraenkel (*Wege*

und Formen

⁴ und Formen

⁴ Argued by Vlastos (*Trans. Am. Philol. Assn.* lxxvii [1946], 66-77; *Gnomon*, xxv [1953], 168) following von Fritz (*Class. Philol.* xl [1945], 236-42).

⁵ Vlastos argues that 'the thought which knows being could hardly be denied existence . . . and since being is "all alike" (B 8. 22) [but see pp. 92-93 above on this reading], if thought is any part of being, all being must be thought' (*Gnomon*, xxv [1953], 168). This takes for granted that Parmenides must have

of the *σφαιρα*-passage: he set the lines in a wider context (B 8. 26–33 and 44–49) which he construed as a critique of Anaximander.¹ But the plausibility of this interpretation need not concern us now, for his wider context unhappily stops just short of the lines which settle the problem. These lines are the proof of continuity that is given in B 8. 22–25, and the importance of the proof is that it is precisely the same pattern of argument that is later given to show that what exists is like the mass of a rounded ball (B 8. 44–48: 44–45 are introductory). Since the repetition is beyond question deliberate, and since the argument is used at its first occurrence to prove that there is no part of reality that borders on nothing, it cannot be used at its second occurrence to prove that reality does border on nothing in all directions at an equal distance from a centre.

This contention is correct, but to be conclusive it needs reinforcing at several points. The exact correspondence between the two occurrences of the argument scarcely needs proving. The proposition that the subject cannot be broken up by gaps of nothingness (*οὐδὲ διαιρέσθαι ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἔστιν ὄμοιον*, B 8. 22 = *οὐτε γὰρ οὐκ ἐὸν ἔστι τὸ κεν πάντοι μν ἴκνεῖσθαι εἰς ὄμοιον*, B 8. 46) is followed by the complementary proposition that it cannot exist to a different degree at different points (*οὐδέ τι τῇ μᾶλλον . . . οὐδέ τι χειρότερον*, B 8. 23–24 = *οὐτ’ ἐὸν ἔστιν ὅπως εἴη κεν ἔοντος τῇ μᾶλλον τῇ δ’ ἡσσον*, B 8. 47–48). The explanatory *ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἔστιν ἄστοις* of B 8. 48 answers to the *πᾶν δ’ ἐμπλέον ἔστιν ἔοντος* of B 8. 24 which is itself in effect a restatement of the premiss *ἐτεὶ πᾶν ἔστιν ὄμοιον*. The *τὸ κεν πάντοι μν ἴκνεῖσθαι εἰς ὄμοιον* of B 8. 46–47 matches the *τὸ κεν εἴργοι μν συνέχεοι* of B 8. 23 (the sole difference being that in the later version of the argument the phrase attaches to the first proposition, and in the earlier to the second). If it had been noticed that the *ἴκνεῖσθαι εἰς ὄμοιον* is no more than the earlier *συνέχεοι* we might have been spared such eccentric renderings as Burnet's 'reaching out equally'; as Empedocles well knew,² the phrase means 'reaching to its like', *ἐὸν ἔοντι πελάζειν*. For my part I can see no such difference between the two passages as Calogero detects.³ He takes the vocabulary of the first to be 'static' and that of the second to be 'dynamic'. But *τὸ κεν πάντοι μν ἴκνεῖσθαι εἰς ὄμοιον* is neither more nor less dynamic than the earlier *τὸ κεν εἴργοι μν συνέχεοι . . . ἐὸν γὰρ ἔοντι πελάζει*: the primary sense of *πελάζειν*, like that of *ἴκνεῖσθαι*, is one of movement, but the reason why either verb is preferred to a more static counterpart must, here as elsewhere in the argument, be one of style and not of content.⁴ The same holds good of the later conclusion, *ὄμοιος ἐν πείραις κύρει* (B 8. 49), even if we read this as though it were *ἔκπύρει πείραις* ('gleichmäßig begegnet es seinen Grenzen', Kranz); but probably *κύρει* has its weaker, copulative sense. Yet this very phrase engenders doubts about the parallel I have tried to draw between the arguments. How can

faced squarely the question 'Is thinking of being a part of being?' Plato implies that he had not; for Parmenides constantly couples thinking and naming (B 2. 7–8; B 8. 17; B 8. 35–36), and in *Soph.* 244 c–d Plato argues that Parmenides does not face a dilemma in the relation of *τὸ δῦ* to its name: are there after all two things in existence or is the name a name of nothing? This is in effect the same problem as whether the *νόημα* is distinct from or identical with *τὸ δῦ*, and (for what this is worth) Plato implies that it had not been faced. He implies

the same at *Soph.* 248 d–249 a in making the Eleatic Stranger say that if reality contains life and soul and understanding it cannot be *δικίνητος δύος*.

¹ *Wege und Formen*, pp. 186–97.

² Empedocles B 62, 6.

³ *Studi*, p. 27 and n. 1.

⁴ The *Ἀλήθεια* is full of metaphors of movement and arrested movement: motion on a path comes often (including the puzzling B 5), and arrested motion in B 6. 3; B 7. 3; B 8. 13–15 and 37. Cf. L. Woodbury, *Harvard Studies in Class. Philol.* lxiii (1958), 154.

the reasoning in B 8. 44–48 be the old argument for unbroken continuity, when it issues now in the assertion that its subject is contained equally within certain boundaries, *πείρατα*? Or when it is prefaced by the claim that the subject has a *πείρας πύματον* and is *τετελεσμένον πάντοθεν, εὐκύκλον σφαῖρης ἐναλίγκιον ὅγκῳ* (B 8. 42–43)? Moreover, if it is the same argument, what can be the point of repeating it in detail? These difficulties can be met by settling the course of the argument and the use that is made in it of one or two cardinal expressions.

Having argued that his subject has neither beginning nor end in time (B 8. 6–21), Parmenides goes on, in accordance with the programme he has laid down,¹ to prove its unity and continuity (B 8. 22–25). It is often assumed that at this point Parmenides is turning from existence in time to existence in space, from a refutation of *γένεσις* and *διεθρός* to a rejection of spatial division and variation. The impression is probably strengthened by the fact that when he repeats the argument for continuity it is in a context of spatial concepts (*σφαῖρα, μεσσόθεν*, etc.). But the impression is surely false. For in the first place, as I have argued, the premiss of the continuity-argument at its first occurrence is taken from the refutation of *γένεσις* and *διεθρός* that precedes it, and consequently must carry a temporal sense. Secondly, this application of the preceding conclusion is clearly called for. For when it has been argued that the subject has neither beginning nor end in time it still remains to draw the corollaries, that there can be neither a succession of separate entities nor internal change in any one entity; and these corollaries are drawn in B 8. 22 and 23–24 respectively. Thirdly, the temporal import of the argument at its first occurrence is proved, not only by its being embedded in a context of temporal argument that reaches to B 8. 33, but by the fact that when Parmenides comes to resume the conclusions reached at B 8. 34–41 he mentions only ideas of temporal change (lines 40–41, where the only exception is *εἶναι τε καὶ οὐχί*, and these are present because their misuse is taken to be basic to the other errors). Moreover, that *συνεχές* can have a temporal sense needs no arguing,² and that it must have it here is shown again by the couplet which introduces the refutation of *γένεσις*: *οὐδέ ποτ’ ἦν οὐδ’ ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν, ἐν, συνεχές τίνα γὰρ γένναν διζήσεις αὐτοῦ*; (B 8. 5–6). Thus one of our difficulties is resolved: Parmenides' reason for repeating the continuity-argument is that it is applied first in a temporal sense and then in a spatial.

The next section of the argument (B 8. 26–33) remains within this temporal framework. It begins *αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν ἔστιν ἄναρχον ἄπαντον*, and thereby shows that in its turn it is applying the conclusions

¹ See the Additional Note, p. 101 below.

² And if *συνεχές* then also in this context its opposite, *διαιρέτον*. (Thus Aristotle, maintaining against Parmenides that continuity does not preclude but always entails divisibility, can say that time and any process in time is *συνεχής* and therefore *διαιρέτος*, *Phys. Z. 2. 232^b23–26 et al.*) In this setting of temporal continuity it is natural to explain that *τῇ* in line 23, which is commonly read as implying an answering *τῇ* in 24, must have not its spatial sense but its wider meaning, 'in this respect' (Empedocles B 26. 10); but I doubt if Parmenides wants wholly to lose the spatial metaphor in *τῇ*, for not only

this passage but the whole treatment of temporal variation is couched in spatial metaphor (the impossibility of any different state of affairs is pictured as being chained to one place, B 8. 14–15, 26–27, 30–31, 37–38); and Parmenides wants to keep open the possibility of a spatial application of the same arguments. (Karsten, pointing to the singularity of *τῇ* here without an answering adverb and observing that the necessary contrast is carried by *τι . . . τι . . .*, emended so as to excise it; Stein proposed *τῇ*, plausibly in view of the source of contamination in B 8. 45 and 48.)

already reached. For just as the last two attributes have already been proved, and Parmenides at once refers to the proof (B 8. 27–28), so the possibility of any change whatever has been excluded by the argument for temporal continuity, and it is to this argument that Parmenides refers in order to establish that *ταῦτόν τ' ἐν ταῦτῷ τε μένον καθ' ἑαυτό τε κεῖται χοῦτως ἔμπεδον αὐθὶ μένει* (B 8. 29–30). For, he says, 'mastering necessity holds it in the bonds of a limit that wards it about, since it is not permitted that what exists should be incomplete (*ἀτελεύτητον*). For it is not lacking in anything; if it were, it would lack everything'¹ (B 8. 30–33). Here the premiss that the subject is *οὐκ ἀτελεύτητος* or *οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον*, on which the proof of general immutability is made to depend,² is just a restatement of the *πᾶν δ' ἔμπλεον ἔστιν ἔόντος* in the continuity-proof; and the argument now given for this premiss, that to lack anything is to lack everything, is a reminder of the way in which the same proposition in the continuity-proof had been reached: namely by the opening argument that *πάμπαν πελέναι χρέων ἔστιν* because a yes-and-no answer to the question 'Does it exist?' is no better than a flat negative.

Now what is the sense within this argument of the statement that the subject has a *πεῖρας* or *πεῖρατα* (B 8. 26 and 31)? Not, certainly, that it has *boundaries* in time, a beginning or an end: this is exactly what Parmenides denies from the start. The sense of 'consummation' or even 'perfection' that the word occasionally carries in Homer³ is nearer to what we need, but (supposing we shelve the problem of reconciling this interpretation with the use of *ἀπειρον* by other early thinkers and with Aristotle's generalization on the matter)⁴ the sense is inappropriate in line 26, where as yet we know only that the subject is invariant in time and this fixity is the sole point made and reiterated in the context (B 8. 26–31). *πεῖρας* in fact is the mark of *invariance*: this is certified by Parmenides' language (in both 26 and 31 the subject is chained and imprisoned by the *πεῖρας*), and the same sense seems to be found in Pythagorean theory, for Aristotle's report of that theory may be taken to show that square numbers from one onwards exhibit *νέρπας* because their sides are in *constant* ratio while oblong numbers exhibit *τὸ ἀπειρον* because with them the ratio varies.⁵

Similarly, to say that the subject of the argument is *οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον* (B 8. 32) is not to say that it has frontiers, as opposed to stretching *ad infinitum*. The sense of it is just that, since we cannot talk of what does not exist, we cannot say that there is still something lacking which could be supplied by any change. But this formulation, like Parmenides' own, is ambiguous, and the ambiguity gives him his transition to the final spatial conclusions in B 8. 42–49. If we consider the possibility of change *in general*, there is an obvious temporal sense to be given to Parmenides' formula: the subject lacks nothing, in the sense that there is no state of affairs left for it to realize in the future. But movement has just been distinguished from other forms of change (B 8. 29–30, cf. the résumé

¹ See p. 86, n. 5 above.

² *οὐνέκεν* in B 8. 32 means 'because' (as generally in Homer: so Fraenkel, *Wege und Formen*, pp. 191–2), not 'therefore' (as von Fritz argues in *Class. Philol.* xli [1946], 237–8). Von Fritz urges that to deduce immobility from finiteness would reverse the 'natural logical order' and depart from Parmenides' procedure of putting the 'more

essential qualities of *τὸ ἔόν* before the less, but he has not seen that the *οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον* is in fact the conclusion of the opening argument and the premiss of the next.

³ *Iliad* 18. 501; *Odyssey* 5. 289.

⁴ Aristotle, *Phys.* I 4. 203^{b4}–15.

⁵ See Ross's note on *Phys.* I 4. 203^{a10}–15; Raven, *Pythagoreans and Eleatics*, pp. 188–94.

at B 8. 41); and if we consider this form of change in particular there is an equally obvious *spatial* sense to be given to the formula: the subject is not *άτελεύτητος* or *ἐπιδενέσ* in the sense that there is no empty or relatively empty space for anything to move into. In its first sense the formula insists that there cannot be an existential statement that is false at one time and true later; in its second it says that there cannot be an existential statement that is true of one place but not another. But Parmenides has no right yet to take the words in this second sense, for, as we have seen, at this point they are merely a restatement of the *πάμπαν πελέναι* and *πᾶν ἐμπλέον ἔόντος* of the earlier arguments; and those expressions were to be understood in the temporal sense. Since Parmenides is a wholly honest and explicit reasoner he sums up his interim conclusions in lines 34-41 and then, finally, turns to prove that his formula is equally true in its spatial interpretation.

He begins this last stage of the argument with the words *αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πεῖρας πύματον, τετελεσμένον ἐστὶ πάντοθεν* (B 8. 42-43). The *ἐπεὶ* shows that this proof in its turn depends on the conclusions already established; but even without the connective it should have seemed absurd to interpret *πεῖρας* here as 'boundary', a sense flatly incompatible with the whole train of argument in which the word was first introduced. The epithet *πύματον*, so far from compelling that translation, itself recalls *πείρατος . . . τό μν ἀμφὶ ἔργει*, a phrase used in a context where any suggestion of literal boundaries was out of the question (B 8. 31). So the sense is not in doubt: the opening words mean, in effect, 'Moreover, since it is utterly unchanging'. And the conclusion is drawn that, since there cannot be movement, there cannot be room for movement. *τετελεσμένον πάντοθεν* is the exact spatial counterpart of the temporal *οὐκάντελεύτητον* in B 8. 32; and in case this correspondence should escape any reader Parmenides reinforces his conclusion and shows its sense by transferring to this spatial context the very argument for continuity which was earlier, in its temporal application, associated with the *οὐκάντελεύτητον* (B 8. 44-48). But before giving this argument Parmenides introduces his simile: the subject is *εὐκύκλον σφαιρῆς ἐναλίγκιον ὅγκων, μεσούθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάτη*, precisely because there is nothing true of it at one point or in one direction that is not true elsewhere. Its uniformity is like the perfect balance of a ball about its centre. (It is not of course a uniformity of *radius*: that is ruled out by *ἰσοπαλές*.) And the whole argument concludes: *οὐ γὰρ πάντοθεν ἵσον ὄμῶς ἐν πεῖρασ κύρει* (B 8. 49). Here again is the metaphorical notion of being contained in *πεῖρα*; here again is the equality which is *τὸ ἰσοπαλές*, spatial indifference. And *όμῶς* does not of course mean 'at an equal distance from the centre': its meaning is given by the *ἴκνεῖσθαι εἰς ὄμον* of lines 46-47. So the phrase has an exact sense: to the *πεῖρα* of temporal invariance Parmenides has added the *όμῶς* of invariance in space.

So Parmenides' treatment of space exactly matches his treatment of time; there is no place in it for boundaries or a spherical universe. And if that is so there is a rider that deserves to be added. It is sometimes said that Melissus differed from Parmenides 'in holding that reality was spatially as well as temporally infinite'.¹ Both, we are told, agreed that 'reality is eternal'; but it was Melissus who saw the inconsistency of saying in the same breath that it had spatial frontiers. Thus it becomes an engaging puzzle why Melissus directs the

¹ Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*⁴, p. 325.

brunt of his opening argument to proving that his subject is temporally infinite, whereas its spatial infinity—supposedly the major point of departure from Parmenides—is introduced by the almost perfunctory *ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἔστω* *ἀεὶ, οὐτω καὶ τὸ μέγεθος ἀπειρον ἀεὶ χρὴ εἶναι* (30 B 3).¹ To this puzzle we have a clear answer. When Melissus indicates in these words that his argument for temporal infinity can be carried over, *mutatis mutandis*, to prove the corresponding point about space, he is not correcting Parmenides but following him without reservation. On the other hand, the point on which his opening argument is brought to bear is precisely the issue on which he does seem to differ from Parmenides: namely, on the form of those general conclusions which can be given both a temporal and a spatial application. For Parmenides had argued that, since there is no change, there can be no way of distinguishing the past and the future from the present: *οὐδέ ποτ’ ἡν οὐδέ ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστω* *όμοῦ πᾶν* (B 8. 5).² In order to make the distinction there would have to be something true at one time that was not true at another. And, just as there is no purchase for temporal distinctions, so there is none for spatial: what exists exists *όμοῦ*, the mind makes no distinction between far and near (B 4).³ Yet this conclusion raises in an acute form the difficulty besetting Parmenides' argument. The very proof which rules out all variation in time and space has to use language which implies temporal and spatial distinctions. It has to say that what exists is continuous, *ἔν τοι γὰρ ἔστι πελάζει*; and that it remains the same; and that it is uniform in all directions. Just as Parmenides can only prove the unintelligibility of *οὐτε ἔστω* by himself denying the existence of certain states of affairs, so he can only show the vacuousness of temporal and spatial distinctions by a proof which employs them. His argument, to adopt an analogy from Sextus and Wittgenstein, is a ladder which must be thrown away when one has climbed it. Melissus saw this hazard, and tried to evade it by reimporting the distinctions discarded by Parmenides: *ἀεὶ ἡν ὁ τι ἡν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται* (30 B 1), *ἀεὶ τε ἡν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται* (30 B 2). To him it seems clearly significant to say that reality always was and will be exactly the same, even though no description can be given to pick out one time from another; and thus his position is comparable to that of later philosophers who deny the 'identity of indiscernibles'.⁴ But he is at pains to explain that the distinctions he reimports do not entail divisibility in the obnoxious sense in which it had been rejected by Parmenides. To this end he argues that, since what exists is single, it

¹ Vlastos (*Gnomon*, xxv [1953], 34–35) thinks this fragment (= Simplicius, *Phys.* 109, 31–32 Diels) to be concerned only with temporal infinity. His motive for trying to discount its natural meaning (and that of the following fragment, B 4) is that he does not see how to reconcile a spatial conclusion with B 9, which denies that *τὸ ἔον* can have *οὐμά* or *πέχος*. But Melissus was just denying that *τὸ ἔον* can be a *solid* (see this section of the paper).

² Fraenkel now challenges this reading of the lines (*Wege und Formen*, additional note on p. 191), arguing that otherwise Parmenides faces the dilemma I describe in the text; but the dilemma is genuine and Melissus' language shows that he

recognized it.

³ Clement, who quotes this fragment, interprets it in terms of temporal not spatial distance (*Strom.* v. 15), but shows that he found no warrant for this in the text by his words *Παρμενίδης περὶ τῆς ἀληθίας αἰνισσόμενος*. The verbs *σκίδνασθαι* and *συνιστασθαι* call for a spatial interpretation.

⁴ See for instance Max Black's description of a world containing a number of things having all their properties in common (*Mind*, lxi [1952], 153–64) and on Parmenides' side cf. Russell's objection that there could be no way of establishing the existence of a plurality of such objects (*Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*, p. 102).

cannot have a body; for otherwise it would have solidity (*πάχος*) and, consequently, distinguishable parts (*μόρια*), and then it would be no longer single (30 B 9). Here the word *μόριον* must evidently be understood in the light of the Eleatic attack on divisibility: the argument assumes that, on the ordinary view of the world, a physical solid is divisible in the sense that parts can be identified and distinguished in it, either by finding or making gaps between them or by characterizing them as having more or less of something (hardness, say, or heat) than their neighbour; and it is this divisibility into parts against which Parmenides' argument in B 8. 44-48 is directed. So Melissus is anxious to point out that his subject is not such a solid: mere extension in time and space does not involve divisibility or prevent the subject from being *εν*, *συνεχές*. That Plato at any rate took this to be Melissus' point appears from his defence of Parmenides in *Timaeus* 37 e-38 a: what is unchanging, he says, can only be described in the present tense, for *ἥν* and *ἔσται* are parts of time: they imply change and they break up the unity of the immutable. In reimporting such distinctions Melissus may of course have supposed himself to be not correcting but clarifying Parmenides' results. But one thing strongly suggests that he saw himself as a dissenter. For with those distinctions he couples an expression that Parmenides could never have used in any sense to describe his world: *ἀπειρον*.

In sum: Parmenides' goddess does not claim that her cosmogony has any measure of truth or reliability in its own right; her subject-matter and her assumptions are not inherited from earlier cosmology; and she does not argue for a world that is spherical and everlasting. Parmenides did not write as a cosmologist. He wrote as a philosophical pioneer of the first water, and any attempt to put him back into the tradition that he aimed to demolish is a surrender to the diadoche-writers, a failure to take him at his word and 'judge by reasoning that much-contested proof'.

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ADDITIONAL NOTE

B 8. 2-4, *The Programme of the Argument*

(see p. 93, n. 1, and p. 97, n. 1 above)

In B 8. 2-4 the goddess gives a list of the 'signs' which mark the right road. This list is in fact a programme of the succeeding argument.

Simplicius twice quotes the lines in a longer context, which ensures that he is not trusting to memory (*Phys.* 78. 12-13, 145. 3-4 Diels), and then writes them:

ώς ἀγένητον ἔον καὶ ἀνάλεθρόν ἔστι
οὐλον μουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ήδ' ἀτέλεστον.

But elsewhere, quoting the second line by itself and presumably from memory, he writes *ήδ' ἀγένητον* for *ήδ' ἀτέλεστον*, and so, in the same circumstances, do Plutarch and Proclus and the ps.-Plutarch *Stromateis*. Though Clement keeps this reading in quoting the whole couplet, it involves an impossible repetition when the line is coupled with its predecessor. This leaves small hope that Plutarch and Proclus are safe sources for the rest of the line, yet Kranz

abandons the *οὐδον μουνογενές* of Simplicius, Clement, and Philoponus for *ἐστι γάρ οὐλομελές*, which he takes from the isolated citations of the second line by Plutarch and Proclus. That reading must be rejected because (a) the *ἐστι γάρ* occurs only in Plutarch and may well not be intended as part of the quotation (cf. a similar doubt over Plutarch's quotation of Heraclitus B 92), (b) the *γάρ* is inappropriate since *ἀδιαιρέτον* is to be proved from *ἀγένητον ἀνάλεθρον* and not vice versa, (c) the unreliability of Plutarch and Proclus in short quotations is notorious (see for instance Plutarch's quotation of Empedocles B 27, and on Proclus Dodds, *Gnomon*, xxvii [1955], 167 and now Jameson, *Phronesis*, iii [1958], 21). In face of this the apparent incongruity between *μουνογενές* and *ἀγένητον* can be discounted (Plato writes *εἰς ὅδε μονογενής οὐρανὸς γεγονός*, *Tim.* 31 b, and this would be a pleonasm if the epithet had the force suggested). But there is another correction to be made.

The lines give the programme of the argument. *ἀγένητον καὶ ἀνάλεθρον* is proved in B 8. 6–21; *οὐδον μουνογενές* (the exact equivalent is *εν, συνεχές* in line 6) is proved next in lines 22–25; *ἀτρεμές* is proved next in lines 26–33. Then, after resuming his interim conclusions in lines 34–41, Parmenides goes on finally to prove in lines 42–49 that his subject is *τετελεσμένον πάντοθεν*; and here the programme inexplicably ends with *ἡδ' ἀτέλεστον*. Diels, following Simplicius' mistaken attempt to find Melissus' *ἀπειρον* in Parmenides (*Phys.* 29. 26–30. 5 Diels), explained *ἀτέλεστον* as 'endlos' or 'ohne Ziel in der Zeit', but this will not do. For one thing, the word would be a mere repetition of *ἀνάλεθρον* and the one redundancy in a very economical couplet; for another, the word is not to be found in Diels's sense. Homer couples it with *ἀλιον*, *αἴτως*, *μάψ*, and it connotes failure or unfulfilment (this is its sense in both the passages cited by Diels himself: *Iliad* 4. 26, *Odyssey* 16. 111). As such it is the equivalent of *ἀτελεύτητον* which Parmenides explains by *ἐπιθενές* and which he expressly denies to characterize his subject (B 8. 33–34). And it is his assertion that the subject is *not* *ἀτελεύτητον* that is carried over and given a spatial application in the final argument that it is *τετελεσμένον πάντοθεν* (see the final section of this paper). So *ἡδ' ἀτέλεστον* cannot be right: what we want is just its opposite.

Brandis in 1813 proposed *οὐδ' ἀτέλεστον* (*Comm. Eleat.* i. 109–10, 138–40). But the reading is ungraceful and the authority of Karsten and Diels killed the attempt at emendation. I prefer *ἡδὲ τελεῖον*: a copyist was seduced by the reiteration of negative prefixes (*ἀγένητον . . . ἀνάλεθρον . . . ἀτρεμές*) into writing *ἡδ' ἀτελεῖον* and this was corrected to the orthodox Homeric clausula *ἡδ' ἀτέλεστον* (*Iliad* 4. 26). With this emendation the programme is complete.

MENANDER'S *HYPOBOLIMAIOS*

(Fr. 416 and Pap. Didot. b)

A. Fr. 416.

τοῦτον εὐτυχέστατον λέγω,
ὅστις θεωρήσας ἀλύπως, Παρμένων,
τὰ σεμνὰ ταῦτ' ἀπῆλθεν ὅθεν ἢλθεν ταχύ
τὸν ἥλιον τὸν κοινόν, ἀστρ', ὑδωρ, νέφη,
πῦρ· ταῦτα, καὶ ἑκατὸν ἔτη βιώσ, ἔτι
ὅφει παρόντα, καὶ ἐνιαυτούν σφόδρ' ὅλιγον,
σεμνότεροι τούτων ἔτερα δ' οὐκ ὅφει ποτέ.
πανήγυριν νόμισόν των' εἶναι τὸν χρόνον
οὐ φῆμι τοῦτον, τὴν ἐπιδημίαν ἄνω
ὅχλος, ἀγορά, κλέπται, κυβεῖαι, διατριβαί.
ἄν πρώτος ἀπίτης, καταλύσεις βελτίων,
ἔφοδος ἔχω ἀπῆλθες ἔχθρος οὐδενί·
οὐ προσδιατριβῶν δ' ἐκοπίσαντες ἀπολέσας,
κακῶς δὲ γηρᾶν ἐνδείξης που γίνεται,
ρεμβόμενος ἔχθροντος εἰρ', ἐπεβουλεύθη ποθέν,
οὐκ εὐθανάτως ἀπῆλθεν ἐλθών εἰς χρόνον.

5

10

15

5 βιώς ἔτι Jacobs, Porson; βιώς, δεῖ Meineke (*βιών δεῖ* Heringa); βιώσεται (vel -ητας) Stobaei codd. 11 βελτίων Stob.; βελτίων Salmasius 14 που Haupt; του Stob., K.

DR. G. ZUNTZ's excellent paper on these verses in *Proc. Brit. Acad.* xlii (1956), 209–46, deserves all our thanks for the clarity and good sense of its exposition, and for clearing away much unnecessary comment that has been encumbering the fragment, especially Bignone's theory (*Atene e Roma*, i [1933], 30, and *L'Aristotele perduto*, i [1936], 94) that it derives its philosophy directly from Aristotle's *Protreptikos*, with Körte's supplement that (since all of it derives from this same source) it is indivisible—that there is no break at v. 7; see Körte's *Menandri quae supersunt* (1953), ii. 147–8.¹ There is, however, I think, room for further comment on Zuntz's interpretation of the lines, and on his view that the fragment known as *Papyrus Didotiana b* (Körte³, i. 145) may belong to the same play, *Hypobolimaios*.

Zuntz argues that (as many have thought) v. 8 cannot follow directly on 7—the change both in style and thought is too abrupt—and that in consequence there is *no* evidence that 8–16 came from the same play or were written by Menander (unless style strongly suggests it); for, if Stobaios or his manuscripts could omit, after v. 7, *καὶ πάλιν* or the heading *τοῦ αὐτοῦ*, he or they could with equal ease have omitted the name of another poet. This, it seems to me, is putting the problem too simply. There are four possibilities: (1) that all the 16 lines are continuous; (2) that there was a short break after 7, e.g. an observation by Parmenon, and at 8 a resumption by the speaker of 1–7; (3) and (4) that the two parts are quite separate, from different plays, both by Menander or the first by him, the rest by another. Certainly Stobaios, or his manuscripts, or both, are weak in this field of accuracy; but they have some weight—after all a number of his attributions are supported by other writers, and more, including vv. 1–7 of fr. 416, are accepted by all on his sole authority.

¹ [The edition of Körte-Thiersfelder (1959), *ibid.*, omits all reference to Bignone and prints two separate fragments.]

The evidence of sense and style is not, in my view, sufficient to outweigh this evidence; and while I think that the second of the four alternatives given above is more probable than the first, it is just easier to believe that Stobaios or an earlier anthologist, purposely or accidentally, omitted a verse or two interjected in what is in effect, as Zuntz says, a monologue, than that he omitted a new heading, *τοῦ ἀντοῦ*, or another's name.¹

'In effect a monologue.' Yes; but the presence of Parmenon is not as irrelevant as Zuntz supposes. He thinks the speaker (of vv. 1-7 only, of course) to be a young man, and that 'the melancholy which dominates them could hardly but be the result of the same breakdown of his former convictions [as seen in frs. 420 and 417] and it is hardly necessary to urge that, in comedy, this could only have been brought about by some real or imaginary disappointment in a love-affair' (p. 239). But this is not the only possibility nor the first to come to mind; death, the death of a young man or woman is the more plausible alternative. For the natural reaction to the former is 'Is there no faith, no loyalty, no constancy left in the world?' rather than 'a long life has nothing special to offer'; but whether disappointment in love ('I shall go off to Baktria or Karia, Parmenon, as a soldier and get myself killed?') or a report of a death, it must come fairly early in the play; for in comedy the disappointment will be remedied or the report of a death proved false. The easiest suggestion is that Parmenon had brought to his master news that the neighbour's son or daughter (who was to marry his master's child) has died and that the neighbour is beside himself with grief. The philosophical reflections of fr. 416 are (surely) those of an older man, of a character somewhat like Pataikos in *Perikeiromene*; and Parmenon's interjection between vv. 7 and 8, if my conjecture of a line or two lost is a reasonable one, could have been either 'but our neighbour does not at all take his loss that way', or 'yet it is sad to die without knowing the good things of this world': e.g.

ἀλλ' ἀποθανεῖν γ' οὐ γευσάμενον τανδὲ καλῶν
ἔλεεινόν ἔστι, δέσποτ·. B. ἡλιθίως λαλεῖς

might do (showing that Parmenon had not really understood the other's thought). This could have started his master musing in another vein: the good things are not so good. My respected uncle, Menander himself may have remembered, likened this life to a *πανήγυρις*, and said that he who laughed and drank and loved best in this short spell was the happiest (Alexis, fr. 219); but a *πανήγυρις* is not all fun and laughter. The echo of Alexis' words, as Zuntz says, is unmistakable:

ἀποδημίας δὲ τυγχάνειν ίμας ἀεί
τοὺς ζῶντας, ὥσπερ εἰς πανήγυριν τινὰ
ἀφειμένους ἐκ τοῦ θανάτου καὶ τοῦ σκότους
εἰς τὴν διατριβὴν εἰς τὸ φῶς τε τοῦθ' ὁ δῆ
δρόμεν. ὃς δ' ἂν πλεῖστα γελάσῃ καὶ πίῃ
καὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀντιλάβηται τὸν χρόνον
τοῦτον ὃν ἀφείται, καὶ τύχῃ γ' ἐράνου τινὸς
πανηγυρίσας, ηδιστ' ἀπῆλθεν οἴκαδε.

Therefore, with perhaps the break of a line or two, v. 8 of fr. 416 of Menander

¹ I note that Zuntz accepts Kock's fr. 483 as belonging to fr. 417 (Körte) in spite of a gap between the two in Stobaios, and complains (rightly) that it is omitted altogether in Körte.

may well follow v. 7; I cannot agree with Zuntz that the two parts *cannot* come from the same scene and are probably not from the same play.

So much for the possible dramatic place of the fragment. For interpretation it is important to note that the speaker does not say, in 1-7, that the happiest man is he who dies youngest; the emphatic word, by position, is *ἀλπως*, *ταχὺ* is put away at the end (and the idea is perhaps taken up in 8-16). It is as in Herodotus 1. 30-31, Solon to Croesus: 'the happiest man I ever knew was Tellos, who lived to see his sons prosper and his grandsons grow up [to his sixties, therefore] and then died a good death in battle for Athens. The second happiest were Kleobis and Biton who died in youth, painlessly, in an hour of modest glory. Always, Croesus, watch that a man dies well.' So Menander: 'if a man has seen, with understanding, these noble things, and suffered little pain, he may die content; both if he live a hundred years and if he live but few, he will have seen the sun, our common comforter, the stars, rain,² clouds, fire, and nothing nobler will he ever see'. It is not just melancholy, though the occasion was a melancholy one; the spirit of it is nearer to 'see Naples and die' than to 'life gives us little here below, and the sooner we leave it the better'.

In 8-16 *τὸν χρόνον ὃν φῆμι τοῦτον* is difficult but not impossible for 'this period of time which I mention, our sojourn here above' (cf. Alexis' ll. 6-7); certainly no probable correction has been made. ('*Ονήσιμε*, Nauck's, is deceptively attractive; it would of course establish 8-16 as separate from 1-7.) But if the text is corrupt, it is so whether it is to be separated from 1-7 or no. I see no difficulty in *τὴν ἐπιδημίαν ἀν* making clear (without any mystic feeling) the meaning of *τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον*. Then *κυβεῖαι* should be taken specifically 'gambling' rather than 'frauds', as Zuntz, and *διατριβαί* are diversions, distractions, anything to make pass the time at the fair. V. 11 I do not find so difficult as some have done: if we emend to *βελτίνας* and may take *ἔχων* with *καταλύεις* as well as with *ἔφόδια* (or *κάφοδι*?), meaning 'getting lodging', we have excellent sense: 'get away first (or "early", *πρῶτος*, as Preller suggested; but *πρῶτος*, the manuscript reading, satisfies) and you avoid the crowd going home, and find lodging and food before supplies are exhausted or you have spent all your money, and you have quarrelled with no man.' Zuntz objects that *κατάλυοις* should mean final lodging, in the next world, as it often does in contexts similar to this; and suggests to me (by letter) that we can keep *καταλύεις* as a verb, with its reference to the next world, if we read *ἀν πρώτος* *ἀπίης*, *καταλύεις βέλτιον* with the permissible metrical licence *βέλτιον*; and *ἔφόδι* 'ἔχων' fits well into such a context; but the combination of future and aorist, *καταλύεις* and *ἀπῆλθες*, is difficult, and much of the liveliness of the comparison is lost. 'Good lodgement on the way home from this *panegyris* which is life' may not be strictly relevant, but it helps to make the picture more vivid—the return journey for those who must stay to the very end and taste every drop of life that is offered them, being so much a part of a holiday. Menander (or another) is doing in this simile what Homer so often did, and

¹ Zuntz, p. 223, says that the insistence on grief in this world is characteristic of the age of Menander; 'when the Greeks had passed their heroic and tragic ages, this is what remained'. But the optimistic fifth century, and Homer, had felt much the same.

² I think *ὕδωρ* may here mean rain rather

than water. As Zuntz points out (p. 224), the speaker is not cataloguing the elements. (It is perhaps necessary to remind ourselves that rain is generally a blessing in Attica—*Clouds* 299, 1115.)

I prefer to adopt *ἔτι* rather than *δεῖ*, adopted by Körte, at the end of v. 5, but with the comma before it.

other poets,¹ as Jebb so well elucidated in his *Introduction to Homer*, p. 28, with *Iliad* 13. 62–65 for his example:

αὐτὸς δ' ὡς τ' ἵρηξ ἀκύπτερος ἀρτο πέτεσθαι,
οὐ πά τ' ἀπ' αἰγύλιπος πέτρης περιμήκεος ἀρθεῖς
ὅρμηση πεδίου διώκειν ὅρνεον ἄλλο,
ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν τῆς Ποσειδάνων ἐνοσίχθων.

'Poseidon is not pursuing anyone; the point of similitude is solely the speed through the air. . . . But . . . if *A* is to be made clearer by means of *B*, *B* itself must be clearly seen; and therefore Homer takes care that *B* shall never remain abstract or shadowy; he invests it with enough of detail to place a concrete image before the mind. The hawk is more vividly conceived when it is described as doing a particular act characteristic of a hawk—viz. pursuing another bird.' That is just what the writer has done here. Then at v. 14 he drops the simile; at 16, with the remarkable expression *οὐκ εὐθανάτως* he is very near to Herodotus again. *ρεμβόμενος* too is interesting: a new word in literature, it would seem (see LSJ.), for the action for which in *Epitr.* fr. 3 Menander uses *ἄλνειν*. I can see nothing foreign to Menander in *ἀπῆθεν ἐλθών* in the last verse—on the contrary there is point in the conjunction.

It is interesting to observe the two contrasts with Alexis in 1–7 and in 8–16, and the difference between them. In the second it is simple: Alexis says 'get as much joy as you can out of this brief time', while the other has 'there is not much joy and there is a good deal of bother in it, and you gain something by leaving first'. With 1–7 on the other hand Alexis has in common 'there is much to value in this life', but the contrast is much profounder, *τὰ σεμνὰ ταῦτα* with laughter, wine, and love.

B. THE STORY OF *HYPOBOLIMAIOS*

Dr. Zuntz in the last part of his paper has conjectured much about the plot of the play, building hypothesis on hypothesis (what else indeed can we do?). His final words are: 'The main purpose of the present essay was to retrieve a piece of great poetry from the clouds of scholarly fancy. I pray that the concluding excursion into the realm of scholarly fancy may not cloud over this purpose.' This is both wise and disarms criticism; nevertheless it is worth while examining afresh the little that we have of the play, in order (if we can) to understand that little, keeping in mind always what Zuntz in spite of his sound principles sometimes forgets, that each fragment had once a dramatic context.

First, then, of some twenty references in ancient authors to the play, in only one (fr. 428, from Photios) is the double title '*Υποβολιμαῖος* η *Ἄγρουκος*' given. We may be in error in taking this to be correct. We should perhaps remember that Clement of Alexandria has *Μένανδρος γοῦν . . . ἐν Ἡνόχω, ἐν Υποβολιμαῖῳ τῷ δράματι* (Protr. 7, Körte ii, fr. 178), which, however it is to be explained, should not mean a play with these alternative titles. The only other support for *Ἄγρουκος* is Varro's reference to the rustic garb of a farmer in Caecilius' *Hypobolimaeus* (R.R. 2. 11. 11, Körte ii, p. 147). Secondly, even if Caecilius' play was based on Menander's, as Ribbeck argued (but four other

¹ Including Sappho, e.g. 105 (*οἷον τὸ γλυκύμαλον*), as I should have said in my article in *J.H.S.* lxxvii (1937) rather than

'a simile carried beyond the immediate purpose of comparison, for its own sake'.

Greek writers of comedy used the title), we must still be cautious in reconstructing the plot; for though it is generally assumed that we have the familiar contrast of the two brothers, the one brought up in the country, the other in the town, in none of the references to Menander and in only one of those to Caecilius, Cicero's (*pro Roscio Amer.* 46), is there any mention of two such brothers and Cicero's reference is not certainly to *Hypobolimaeus*. Not much weight indeed should be allowed this negative evidence, for none of the fragments suggests ὑποβολή either; but we must not straightway *assume* the conventional contrast; the title of the play after all is in the singular, and though the fact that a character is a supposititious child (not just a foundling, by the way) may not have great importance for the plot and the title may be as little significant as *Epitrepones*, it does not suggest a couple of brothers; and if there were two, and they were, in law, brothers or half-brothers, that one of them was supposititious, not the place where they lived, may have been the point of contrast.

An examination of the more significant of these fragments gives the following possibilities: 417, *παύσασθε νοῦν ἔχοντες, κτλ.*—a fine outburst, rather like Demeas' in *Samia*—could easily, as generally supposed, be from the speech of a father disappointed in a son he had so carefully, with so much *πρόνοια*, brought up (cf. 430a below); or again, as easily, of someone, young or old, who had in spite of all *πρόνοια* lost a fortune; Menander's feeling for the comedy of life was comprehensive as well as profound. Fr. 419, the power of wealth to conceal rascality and other ills, *perhaps* supports the latter guess. 418 ('the man should rule the house') and 421 ('it is best to tell the truth') without their context are but calendar-Polonus; nor has 422 ('women the worst of evils') any meaning for us—it might have been spoken by a servant (cf. *Epitr.* 387-8) or anyone else. Dr. Zuntz sets some store by 420:

οὐ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τὴν πρόνοιαν αἰτίαν
κρίνων ἀν δρθῶν ὑπολαβεῖν τίς μοι δοκεῖ,
ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ ταῦτα ποτὸν ἔνα χρήσιμον.

τὴν πρόνοιαν he says, must here be divine Providence, with an echo of Stoic doctrine. 'Human prudence could not have been held to be the cause of "every good"; nor would it be adequately contrasted with *ταῦτα ποτὰ* nor, finally, would it be unambiguously indicated here by the mere article prefixed to the noun: contrast *ἡ πρόνοια* *ἡ θυητή* in fr. 417.' This is really to forget that the lines come from a play, to argue as if they were just written for a motto in a calendar; it is absurdly easy to suggest a context. *Γέρων A*: 'I told you all would go well, and you see it has; I had foreseen every possibility.' *Γέρων B*: 'Foresight, I think, is not the cause of every good; chance plays its part'—a nice variant on the usual role of *Τύχη*: cf. Thuc. 1. 140. 1; and Ion of Chios fr. 3 Diels (*F.Gr.Hist.* 392 F 17), *ἡ τύχη πολλὰ τῆς σοφίας διαφέροντα πλεύστα αὐτῇ ὅμοια ποιεῖ*. Later perhaps chance did play its part, but to bring misfortune, and hence the outburst (by *Γέρων A*) in fr. 417. Quintilian's reference to the father's care in educating his son, fr. 430a, might also be part of a dialogue between two such *gerontes*. Nor should we conclude that 427 ('the poor old fool has been cheated') indicates that the young man with the help of his servant had successfully diddled his father. It may be only the servant's comment on the misfortune, or supposed misfortune, that may have occurred between 420 and 417. Lastly 428, 'the young lady's mother saw you, Moschion, driving through the agora at the Little Panathenaia'. It is hard on Moschion

to say, on this evidence, that he 'is practically certain to have been the typical, light-living "young man about town", on whose education the father has wasted so much money in vain'. Did not good young men ever ride in processions in honour of Athena? These lines imply that the young man was vain and liked to be seen in his glory? Perhaps; but in *Samia* Moschion is well behaved, eminently *κόσμος*, but vain too. It is also (probably) to the point that the festival is the *Little Panathenaea*: not such a very imposing spectacle.

C. PAPYRUS DIDOTIANA B

Following Herzog (*Philol.* lxxxix [1934], 185–96), Dr. Zuntz thinks that this schoolboy's 'exercise' too may be from Menander's *Hypobolimaios*, and that the lines were spoken, in all seriousness both of *dramatis persona* and of author, by the good *ἄγρουκος* (which will mean not a surly or rustic-mannered man, but just one who lived in the country):

5

ἔρημια μὲν ἔστι, κοῦκ ἀκούσεται
οὐδεὶς παρών, οι τῶν λόγων ὃν ἀν λέγω.
ἔγώ τὸν ἄλλον, ἄνδρες, ἐτεθήκειν βίον
ἄπανθ' ὃν ἔζην, τοῦτο μοι πιστεύετε.
πάνυ ταῦτὸ τὸ καλόν, τάγαθόν, τὸ σεμνὸν ἦν
τὸ κακόν¹ τοιοῦτον ἦν τί μου πάλαι σκότος
περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὡς ἐσικε, κείμενον,
οἱ πάντ² ἔκρυπτε ταῦτα κῆφάνιζέ μοι.
νῦν δ' ἐνθάδ³ ἐλθών, ὥσπερ εἰς Ἀσκληπίουν
ἔγκατακλιθεὶς σωθεῖς τε, τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον
ἀναβεβίωκα: περιπατῶ, λαλῶ, φρονῶ.
τὸν τηλικοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον ἥλιον
νῦν πρῶτον εὑρόν, ἄνδρες, ἐν τῇ τήμερον
νῦμας ὄρῳ νῦν αἰθρίᾳ, τὸν ἀέρα,
τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, τὸ θέατρον.² 15

10

This is at least a novel kind of good young man from the country, who comes to town and at once perceives that life in the country is but a monotonous round, death in life, and that only in the city is there light and one can live: *περιπατῶ*, *λαλῶ*, *φρονῶ*. These clever philosophers! But it is unexpected that, besides the Acropolis, the theatre, and the packed audience, he should see for the first time the sun and the sky. Athens of the fourth century was not of course so large that its inhabitants were divorced from the country and knew nothing of it, nor so high built that men rarely saw the sun, nor so well lit at night that the full and the new moon were alike unobserved (*Clouds* 611–14; *Wasps* 245–62). Still it was a crowded and busy place, full of noise and distractions (*Acharnians* 33–36), not where you would choose to go in order to contemplate τὰ σεμνὰ ταῦτα. And are not τὸν τηλικοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον ἥλιον surprising words?—the sun which is so large ('larger than the Peloponnese')? and so constituted ('a mass of blazing metal')? To me it seems clear that either the speaker, the character in the play, is quite serious and the irony, indeed the fun, is the

¹ πάνυ ταῦτό is Herzog's emendation, and ² τὸν τηλικοῦτον in Bucheler's supplement. Both seem right, but the result is not entirely happy: three words on the one side, for the good, only one on the other; and the article with *κακόν*

is not altogether easy.

² I think the subscription *αριστῶν* / *φιλοσοφος* / *μαθηματα* is as likely as anything to be the schoolboy's comment on his master. 'Ariston's a philosopher: his lesson'.

author's, or the speaker is laughing at the city's pretensions; only the context could tell us which, though the former seems more probable. 'A wonderful place, Athens. Here we learn to talk and think; here I have discovered the sun, here I first see the sky, as well as you, gentlemen, and the Acropolis. What darkness shrouded us all in the country! Whoever it is who speaks this, it is surely not Caecilius' Eutychus to whom Cicero refers ironically as 'banished' to the country by his father; he surely never left his country life.'

There is one other *curiosity* in these lines: in this context one would expect *ἐρημία μέν ἐστι* to be part of the description of life in the country, 'there's nobody to talk to', not just 'there is no one about and I may speak freely'. (From whom must he conceal these thoughts? From his father who had hoped that he would turn in disgust from the noise and chatter of the town? Or from a friend who has too solemnly urged the advantages of town life at which *he* is now laughing?) This expectation may be due only to similar uses of *ἐρημία* to contrast the country with the town because it is especially favourable to philosophic thought, e.g. in Menander, *Georgos* 82, and frs. 34, 336, 401, and to our knowledge of later Stoic language, especially such a passage as that of Epiktetos, 3. 13. 16 (to which Zuntz draws our attention), the one in which he is arguing that the wise man is never *ἐρημός*, he always, besides other things, has the sun and moon to contemplate and enjoy. (Herzog gives fr. 34, together with *Acharnians* 20 and Platon, fr. 173. 1, as instances of *ἐρημία* meaning, as here, 'the stage is empty'; in each case, I think, wrongly. Fr. 34, especially, means the quiet of life by oneself, even if this is applied to an empty stage.) But that is not all. *ἐρημία μέν ἐστι*: what is the meaning of *μέν*? There is no *δέ*-clause in sight or to be imagined; and Menander was careful in his use of this formal sentence-structure.

It is impossible, I know, to demonstrate the dramatic meaning of this interesting fragment, but to me it is as different in tone from fr. 416 as could well be, and not particularly in keeping with any of the other fragments of *Hypobolimaios*. This would not prevent it being Menander's, and is not decisive against it belonging to this play; but this last seems to me very unlikely.

A. W. GOMME

The Editors are indebted to Mr. F. H. Sandbach for his assistance in seeing this posthumous paper through the press.

TWO NOTES

1. LYKOPHRON, *Alexandra* 600-11

THIS passage concerns the bird-colony on the Diomedean islands, now called Tremiti, off Gargano in Italy; it is said to have been formed by the companions of Diomedes, when they became birds. 'They shall hunt fish-spawn with their beaks, dwelling in an island bearing their leader's name they shall fashion the streets for their close-packed nests with firm blows¹ (of their beaks), on an earth-covered slope, tiered like a theatre, imitating Zethos' (i.e. building to music, the birds are noisy when breeding). 'They shall set out to hunt and return to the hollow, together and at night.² They shall flee all together from a crowd of barbarous men, but on the way home to their accustomed bivouacs they will take offscourings of bread and after-dinner fragments of barley-cake from the hand, provided they come from the pouches of Greek robes; they will murmur softly in friendly fashion, sadly remembering, poor birds, their former way of life.' In [Aristotle]'s³ account the birds dive-bomb the heads of barbarians. That passage does not describe shearwater but it may easily refer to other birds on the Tremiti. Evidently the observers did not drag the shearwater out of their burrows, which is the only way to be certain of their appearance. The Lockleys⁴ tell us of gulls marauding round the Skokholm colony. Black-headed gulls feed from the hand on the Embankment, and dive-bomb intruders near their eggs.

Lykophron does not mention the name of the species in the colony. He may not have known it, but if he did it is quite characteristic of him to leave his readers to guess at it. After all the name of Diomedes is not given here.

This habit of going out all together by night⁵ fixes the group as *Procellaria*, and they must have been shouting or who would have known of their going? The close-packed burrows in which they nested confirm the kind of bird. The fact that they are said to be like swans⁶ in some respect has led everyone astray. Being nocturnal on land, they are seldom seen there, and judging by their voices, one might well expect a bird as big as a swan. There is evidence that shearwater once lived on the Tremiti.⁷ Lykophron here says that Diomedes founded Argyrippa in memory of his lost companions and Strabo⁸ confirms this.

Lykophron likens the Greek fleet off Tenedos to a flock of shearwater waiting on the sea off shore, tossing like rigged ships in stormy weather, not daring to come ashore to their burrows before darkness. It is a simile showing close observation of nature; Lockley has photographed the flock doing just this. Mair's translation 'corded gulls'⁹ is obscure.

¹ *ἔμπεδοις τοποῖς*: Mair's translation (Loeb ed.), 'with firm bits of wood', suits most birds' nests but not shearwaters'; in them there are no 'twiggy bits' (*Glossary*), nor 'wattlework' (Warde Fowler, *C.R.* xxxii. 67) nor 'crates' (Pliny, *N.H.* 10. 61). The birds dig tunnels. Why attempt to whitewash Pliny?

² Mair has quite missed the point that these birds set out and return in the dark.

³ *It. θαυμ. dr.* 79 (836a).

⁴ *Shearwaters*. See opp. p. 9.

⁵ Cf. the Lockleys' account of shearwater sitting on the sea waiting for sunset, or the

Koch broadcast of shearwater, setting off at 1 a.m. ⁶ *Alex. 1. 599.*

⁷ *Alex. 594*. See Thompson's article in his second edition of the *Glossary*. Aldrovandi's drawing was taken from a dead shearwater sent to him from the Tremiti, and incorrectly represents the bird as standing: shearwater neither stand nor walk. The name Great Shearwater is kept now for an oceanic bird which flies from the Arctic to the Antarctic. ⁸ *Strabo 283 ad fin.*

⁹ *Alex. 230*. Surely a translator should aim at giving some meaning even to an obscure author.

It is pleasant to relate that the current scientific name of the species Cory's Shearwater is *Procellaria diomedea*.

The classical name for this shearwater was *aithna*. The word is connected with storm and quick movement: θύελλα, δίστω, αἰθύσσω. It lives on the deep sea except in the breeding season. It flies like an arrow and for great distances. It hunts in the trough of the wave and it was an attribute of Athena,¹ the storm-goddess. It dives from the surface and then swims deep² with its wings to avoid its enemies. Ornithological nonsense is often produced when the word *aithna* is translated 'gull' as is the custom. Douglas³ observes that 'Gull' is a bad name for a racing mare, but he should have seen the take-off of a frightened shearwater. Gulls flap slowly, low over the water, or soar in high, slow circles. The shearwater takes its English name from its low swift flight, shearing the waves. Its Homeric name is similar, ἄρπη,⁴ a cutting instrument. The legend says that the Harpies, creatures like the Harpe bird, fled from the Bosphorus to the Strophades islands; and shearwater were still breeding there when I saw them in 1932.

It is not to be expected that all Greeks knew the difference between offshore birds, like λάρος the gull or κύξ the tern, and the pelagic *aithna*, but sometimes they did, and a correct translation often gives an added point to a poem.⁵ Classical scholars, to whom all sea-birds are gulls, should read the excellent articles in the second edition of the *Glossary* on *aithna*⁶ and Διομήδειος **Oρνίθες*.

2. AESCH. AG. 115

ο κελαινὸς δ τ' ἔξόπιν ἀργᾶς

(See also Aristotle, *H.A.* 618^b ff. [9. 32].)

Near the start of the Trojan expedition two eagles were observed in a conspicuous place feeding on a pregnant hare; one was dark and the other had a white tail. The seer made a comparison between the kingly birds and the two kings, so different in spirit from one another. To all commentators white signifies cowardice, and analogy has been drawn between eagles with black tails, μελάμπυοι,⁷ and brave men like Herakles. The word μελάμπυος is not used here; τύγαρυος is never used of men, and it is carefully avoided here. It is hard to believe that in this solemn passage Aeschylus is making a comparison between the colour of birds' tails and ribald folk-beliefs about the significance of the presence or absence of pubic hair in men. The comparison is not close; can we find a better?

¹ Paus. 1. 5. 3; 41. 6; cf. Alex. 359. Of course this epithet can have nothing to do with ships: see Liddell and Scott.

² Cf. *Od.* 5. 337, 353. Cf. *Anth.* 7. 285.

³ *Beasts and Birds of the Greek Anthology*, p. 105: commentary on *Anth.* 7. 212. Agamemnon had a mare called 'Αἴθη' in a winning team: *Iliad* 23. 295.

⁴ *Iliad* 19. 350. 'Shrill-voiced, with long beating wings.' The description fits the shearwater exactly. Liddell and Scott say 'unknown bird of prey, prob. shearwater', which is no bird of prey.

⁵ e.g. *Anth.* 6. 23, 7. 285, 295, 374, 652, 654. Note on 6. 23 ἐνοτήτες αἰθύαις . . . λένας, rock well-trodden by the shearwater. Though the birds cannot walk, they do wear grooves in climbing up rocks for the take-off. I cannot, however, be confident that this was known to the poet (*Shearwaters*, p. 49). They sometimes nest in caves, especially in Greece.

⁶ The latest Liddell and Scott follows the *Glossary*.

⁷ μελανόροον as an emendation of μέλανος, τοῦ θηρητῆρος in *Il.* 21. 252 is not convincing.

Μελάμπυγος cannot properly be used of eagles,¹ because there is no eagle with a completely black tail² and a body of another colour. Contrast *μελάνουρος*, who is still the mackerel, with a black tail and a spotted body. Homer says that the *μέλας αἰετός*³ is the strongest, but we do not know with what it is being compared, very likely with some of the smaller eagles, such as the Short-toed Eagle, who has a good deal of white on his body.

Aristotle⁴ lists *πύγαρος* as a species of eagle, but does not attribute cowardice to him; he says the bird has *θάρρος*. He has not, however, noticed that his Sea-eagle, *ἀλλαέτος*, has a white tail and a dark body, or he would have added a whole list of other ruthless qualities to White-tail, who varies in size, but who can be slightly the largest, and is much the most active, of the eagle tribe. He still comes to kill ducks in Britain. White-tail was active in the Saronic Gulf, for Nisos,⁵ king of Megara, was turned into one and continued to prey on sea-birds. He was a son of Pandion, king of Athens. There were birds with white, wedge-shaped tails just like a Sea-eagle's on the Geison of the old Hekatompedon.⁶ It is likely that White-tail was held in particular regard in Athens. There are still large trees in well-watered Eleusis. The portent may have been seen by Aeschylus on a nest in his own back garden,⁷ for White-tail nests on trees, and the juveniles start life with dark tails. This solution also avoids the ornithological absurdity⁸ of eagles of different species amicably sharing small prey. The deference of Menelaos to his elder could be likened to the subservience of the eaglet to his elders; as described by Mountford.⁹ Sea-eaglets must be subservient or they will regret it, so Aristotle¹⁰ tells us.

We have to choose whether Aeschylus is making up a portent that could not have happened, or describing something that he could have seen in his own home town and something which yields a closer and a more respectable comparison. The kingly brothers Menelaos and Agamemnon saw a family of kingly birds with prey, the all-dark junior and the white-tailed senior, in that order.

Scientifically there can be no doubt that ὁ τ' ἐξόπιν ἄργας is the White-tailed or Sea Eagle, *Haliaetus albicilla*. It is the only adult dark eagle with a pure-white tail. It eats fish, small mammals, water-birds, and carrion. We have seen that it must have been prevalent in the Saronic Gulf. It breeds now¹¹ in the vicinity of the mountain lakes of Macedonia. It seems likely that Aristotle's second species of eagle, ὁ *Πλάγγος*, who kills ducks and frequents marshy lakes, and his third species *Μελανάέτος*, who kills hares, are the juveniles of White-tail. They could of course be other species, and the nations have made different guesses at the identity of *Πλάγγος*, but all eagles are noisy, *Albicilla* when young is the darkest, and kills the largest game, especially ducks.

S. BENTON

¹ Facts of this sort would not of course deter a punster, but this is tragedy.

² There is no proof that Archilochus fr. 93 Diehl (110) is talking about an eagle.

³ *Il.* 21. 252-3. ⁴ *H.A.* 618^b1 (9.32).

⁵ An Osprey will not do because the king went on chasing a bird: the Osprey hunts fish only.

⁶ Th. Weigand, *Poros-Architektur der Akropolis zu Athen* Abb. 45-47. One of them (Abb. 47) is carrying a bone, presumably

from a sacrifice.

⁷ Aristotle said that White-tail then frequented cities, *H.A.* 618^b (9. 32).

⁸ Aristotle tells us that each pair likes a wide territory to itself, *H.A.* 619^a29 (9. 32).

⁹ *Portrait of a Wilderness*, p. 158. Mountford describes an Imperial Eaglet.

¹⁰ *H.A.* 620^a1 (9. 34).

¹¹ Makatsch, *Vogelwelt Macedoniens*, mentions Lake Langada north of Salonika in this connexion.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF PARTS IN MENANDER'S *DYSKOLOS*¹

THE distribution of parts between the available actors in ancient comedy has frequently engaged critical attention,² but it has only recently become possible to test the principles believed to be at work against a play of Menander which is for practical purposes preserved complete. The present inquiry will suggest that either four principal actors are needed or, alternatively, that three actors can carry the major roles between them, provided that the part of Getas is split between two of them and that a supernumerary actor is available for two small parts, together with parachoregemata in a few places and a *kophon prosopon* twice. It is not easy to choose between these two possibilities, but there may be sufficient hints in the dramatic economy of the play to warrant preference for the three-actor alternative.

The play is divided into five sections by the four choral intermezzi at 232, 426, 619, and 783. In addition the stage is empty at five points (392, 486, 521, 665, and 873), so that there are nine breaks after the prologue in the course of the action of the play. Some of these may be relevant to the distribution of roles, and need to be kept in mind; discussion of their possible bearing on the vexed question of the so-called 'Five-Act Law' falls outside the scope of this inquiry.

It is difficult (and perhaps inadvisable) to compute the precise number of lines spoken by each of the twelve characters in the play. In the livelier passages of dialogue lines are commonly split between two or more speakers and attribution is not in all cases settled. No serious misconceptions will arise if round figures are adopted in most cases, and the part lengths may therefore be taken as follows:

Pan	.	.	.	49
Chaereas	.	.	.	30
Sosistratus	.	.	.	220
Pyrrhias	.	.	.	40
Cnemon	.	.	.	135
Daughter	.	.	.	10
Daos	.	.	.	35
Gorgias	.	.	.	150
Sicon	.	.	.	120
Getas	.	.	.	120
Simike	.	.	.	30
Callippides	.	.	.	30
				<hr/>
				969

Some obvious allocations of parts spring to the eye from inspection of the table given below at Appendix 'A'. Sosistratus converses with all the other characters except Pan and Sicon, and is on stage too frequently for it to be practicable

¹ This paper was written before the spate of literature on this play began to appear. I am very grateful to Mr. H. Lloyd-Jones for showing me the material of his text and to Professor E. G. Turner for an advance copy of an issue of the *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*.

² See, for example, the select list of refer-

ences given by A. W. Pickard-Cambridge in *Dramatic Festivals of Athens* (Oxford, 1953), p. 152 n. 1. His contention that four actors were certainly available (*ibid.*, p. 153) should be read in conjunction with the more cautious statements of Körte in his article on Menander in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encycl.* xv. 1, cols. 755-6.

for him to support another role entire. He cannot in fact do Sicon's part, if only because there is not time for him to change his costume at 392, or to change back at 521, although the stage happens to be empty at both these points. Menander has, however, contrived things so that Gorgias and Sicon can be done by the same actor, and we shall find later that, on the three-actor hypothesis, the actor playing Sostratus is needed for a share in another part later in the play.

To enable the same actor to do both Sicon and Gorgias, the playwright has made Gorgias leave the stage for the time taken for the twelve lines of Sostratus' monologue between 381 and 392 before he re-enters as Sicon at 393. For the reverse change of this actor back to Gorgias twenty-five lines are available (665-90), and here again, as it happens, Sostratus provides a convenient monologue. It will be necessary for a parachoregema to represent Gorgias for a fleeting moment at 635-8 and also at 617-18 (see later). Similar considerations show that the actor taking Cnemon can also do Callippides, the *senex* and father of Sostratus. It is not clear when exactly Cnemon leaves the stage at or near line 760 (one of the few serious gaps in the papyrus occurs just before this line), but Callippides does not enter until 775, so that there is sufficient time for change of costume. After his exit as Callippides in 860 this actor is disengaged until his final re-entry as Cnemon at 911(912)¹. This actor can also manage the part of Daos.

It ought to be simple matter to assign the parts of Chaereas and Pyrrhias to their respective actors. It so happens that the Geneva papyrus is mutilated at its left-hand edge in 138 ff., and the editor allocated the lines on the assumption that Chaereas stayed on-stage until 146. This would leave insufficient time for the same actor to reappear as Cnemon at 153. Before Mr. C. H. Roberts's identification of the tiny scrap of papyrus published by Grenfell and Hunt in 1905 as a fragment of a text of the left-hand portions of lines 140-50 of this play, I had conjectured, on grounds of content and language, that Chaereas must have made his exit earlier at 134 and that Sostratus' interlocutor between 135 and 152 is the slave Pyrrhias.² This inference has now documentary support, so that the way is clear for Actor II to take both Chaereas and Cnemon, with nearly twenty lines for change of costume at 134 for his entry at 153. The third Actor will thus deliver Pan's prologue and double the parts of Pyrrhias, Gorgias (whose first entry is at 233), and Sicon (as mentioned above). It should be noted that lines 300-1 are not a difficulty; this interruption is spoken by Daos, congratulating Gorgias, and not by Pyrrhias.³ Thus far then the parts are distributed, on the three-actor hypothesis, as follows:

Actor I Sostratus

Actor II Chaereas, Cnemon, Daos, Callippides

Actor III Pan, Pyrrhias, Gorgias, Sicon

¹ Mr. W. S. Barrett has suggested that 911 is a clumsy dittography of 912 and has no place in the text.

² Thus (i) the third person singular of the verbs in 136, referring to Chaereas, indicates a character off-stage; (ii) only Pyrrhias can say *ἡδίκηκα, Σώστρατε*, and he is the only possible recipient of the imprecation in 138-9; (iii) the allusion to a whipping in 142 suits slave-talk; (iv) the respectful *βέλτιον*

in 144 suits a slave addressing his superior (cf. *Dysc.* 476, 503 and *Epitrep.* 48, 68, 132, 194; *Samia* 169). In *Dysc.* 319, 338, and 342 Gorgias uses it to Sostratus, whom he is at that point in the play treating with a certain stiff formality.

³ This has been suggested independently by Mr. Lloyd-Jones and the members of the London seminar.

It remains to fit the parts of the Daughter, Getas, and Simice into this scheme. The Daughter's eleven lines may legitimately be given to a supernumerary; her isolated utterance at 648-9 may perhaps have been made from behind the scenes. Getas and Simice, however, are not so easily disposed of. In the course of his 120 lines Getas converses with Sostratus (Actor I), Cnemon (Actor II), and Sicon (Actor III), so that either a fourth actor is needed for him, or his part must be shared between two of the major actors.¹ Some details suggest that it was indeed shared between Actors I and III. His first entry at 402 looks like a 'delayed' one: Sicon has preceded him at 393 after the empty-stage interval following on Sostratus' exit, and the stage-business with the refractory sheep occupies ten lines, which, with the pause, probably give enough time for the change of costume, so that Actor I can play Getas from 402 to 426 and on through the triangular scene between Sicon, Cnemon, and Getas from 427 to 441, and he can also reappear for the interchange with Cnemon in 456 to 480. This adds rather more than forty lines to the 220 of the part of Sostratus.

From 487 to 521 Getas is on stage, but mute; here he may be presumed to be represented by a *kophon prosopon*. In 546 to 573 and again from 603 to 619 Getas has speech with Sostratus, so that his lines here must be spoken by Actor III (Actor II is required on stage up till 602, and so is not in fact available). Actor III has, however, been disengaged since 521, when he made his exit as Sicon, and this actor must continue as Getas for the dialogue with Simice in 574 to 588 and also for the argument with Cnemon over her which follows in 588-602. Although Getas need not be physically on stage after 611, a consequence of Actor III's taking his part up to this point is that a *parachoregema* will be needed for Gorgias' isolated remark six lines later at 617-18. This *parachoregema* is going to be required again as Gorgias for another reason in 635-8, and may just as well make two appearances within twenty-one lines as make one, once he is dressed for the part.

Getas is also on stage continuously from 878 till the end of the play. As in this section he speaks with both Cnemon (Actor II) and Sicon (Actor III), Actor I must be responsible for these forty-five lines. Here there is certainly something of a minor difficulty, in that Sostratus (I) only left the stage at 873, and Simice has only five lines before Getas comes on at 879. This is a 'lightning change' indeed, but not, I think, an impossible one. For one thing there is an empty-stage pause at 873, and in this case the actor concerned has finished with the part of Sostratus and need not do more than throw aside the costume he has been wearing and put on the simple tunic and mask of the slave, which he may well have managed to do in the time. Whether the flute-intermezzo at 879 is significant in this connexion cannot be determined.

Those who think that the mechanics of dividing Getas' part in this way are too elaborate to be convincing will prefer to suppose a fourth principal actor, and have done with it. They are then at liberty to assign Chaereas and Daos to this fourth actor, if they wish. In this case it is perhaps worth pointing out that the part of Simice could be divided in such a way that Actor III would take her lines from 574 to 602 and Actor II (who has left the stage at 602, before the choral interlude) does her share of lines 620 to 638 and also of 874

¹ Something similar has been suggested for the part of Theseus in Sophocles' *Oedipus Coloneus*: see E. B. Ceadel in *Class.*

Quart. xxxv (1941), 139 ff., who himself offers a more economical compromise which affects the part of Antigone in that play.

to 884. By this means four major actors and nothing more than parachoregemata (and no *kophon prosopon*) are needed; the three-actor distribution involves, in addition to the three actors, one supernumerary (who speaks about forty lines in all), parachoregemata, and a *kophon prosopon*.

Choice between these alternatives seems a curiously open one. Unless I have overlooked some pointers in the text that definitely exclude one or the other, I incline to the more elaborate but perhaps more economical solution which employs three actors; the mechanics of the play seem to favour this. For convenience I append the two possible allocations of parts.

A. Three major actors

Actor I	.	.	Sostratus; parts of Getas (220+90 lines)	.	.	.	310
Actor II	.	.	Chaereas; Cnemon; Daos; Callippides	.	.	.	230
Actor III	.	.	Pan; Pyrrhias; Gorgias; Sicon; Getas (part)	.	.	.	389
Supernumerary	.	.	Daughter and Simice	.	.	.	40
						Total	969

B. Four major actors

Actor I	.	.	Sostratus	220
Actor II	.	.	Pan; Cnemon; Callippides; Simice (part)	229
Actor III	.	.	Pyrrhias; Gorgias; Sicon; Simice (remainder)	325
Actor IV	.	.	Chaereas; Daos; Getas	185
Supernumerary	.	.	Daughter	10
								969

APPENDIX A

Distribution of roles in Menander, Dyscolos

Lines	Actor I	Actor II	Actor III	Remarks
1-49	Pan		Pan	
50-80	Sostratus	Chaereas		
81-135	Sostratus	Chaereas	Pyrrhias	
136-152	Sostratus		Pyrrhias	
153-178	Sostratus	Cnemon	(Pyrrhias)	Pyrrhias on stage, but silent.
179-188	¹ Sostratus		(Pyrrhias)	
189-206	Sostratus		(Pyrrhias)	Daughter, supernumerary.
206-213	Sostratus	Daos	(Pyrrhias)	Daughter.
214-217	Sostratus		Pyrrhias	
218-232		Daos		
			CHORUS	
233-258		Daos	Gorgias	
259-381	Sostratus	Daos	Gorgias	Daos, not Pyrrhias, speaks 300-1: see above.
381-392	Sostratus		Empty stage	
393-402			Sicon	
402-426	Getas		Sicon	
			CHORUS	
427-441	Getas	Cnemon	Sicon	Parachoregemata for members of family.
442-455		Cnemon		

¹ There is no change of speaker within 177, but Cnemon continues to 178, when he exits. Sostratus' speech is then continuous till 188, beginning with asyndeton at 179.

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456-480	Getas	Cnemon		
481-486		Cnemon		
			Empty stage	
487-499			Sicon	Getas as <i>kophon</i> .
500-514		Cnemon	Sicon	" "
515-521			Sicon	" "
			Empty stage	
522-545	Sostratus			
546-573	Sostratus			
574-588				Getas
588-602		Cnemon		Getas
603-619	Sostratus			Getas
				Getas
			CHORUS	
620-647	Sostratus (638)		Sicon	Simice (see above). For Gorgias in 635-8 a parachoregema needed.
648-665			Sicon	
			Empty stage	
666-690	Sostratus			
691-760	Sostratus	Cnemon		
760-775	Sostratus			Gorgias
775-783	Sostratus	Callippides		Gorgias
				Gorgias
			CHORUS	
784-873	Sostratus	Callippides		Gorgias
			Empty stage	
874-878				Simice, supernumerary.
879-889	Getas			" "
890-912	Getas			
912-969	Getas	Cnemon		
			Sicon	
			Sicon	

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PALLADAS ON TYCHE

PALLADAS can hardly be credited with either a religious creed or a philosophical system, but he held some powerful convictions which were not necessarily consistent but certainly reflected his emotional responses to a life embittered by poverty (A.P. 9. 169, 175; 11. 302, 303), a nagging wife (9. 168; 11. 378), and a profession which he detested (9. 171, 173, 174). In so far as he believed that a single power controls circumstances, it was Tyche, to whom he refers with frequent comments, usually hostile. By the latter part of the fourth century A.D. the ancient belief in Tyche had become intellectually respectable in certain Pagan circles. There were of course those who followed the Cynics in denying any importance to her (Stob. 2. 7. 21), and their rejection of her can be seen, in different forms and at different levels, in a Hermetic text which regards her as *φορὰ ἀτακτος, ἐνεργειας εἰδῶλον, δόξα ψευδῆς* (Stob. 1. 41. 1), in an anonymous couplet,¹ which looks as if it came from the last years of Paganism :

ἀτρεκέως μάλα πᾶσι πλάνη Τύχη ἐστὶ βροτοῖσιν
ἐστὶ γὰρ ἀδρανέη, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ πλέον οὐδὲ πέλουσα,
(A.P. 9. 135)

and in the Platonist Proclus, who said *τὸν σπουδᾶν οὐδέν . . . δεῖσθαι τῆς τύχης* (in *Plat. Tim.* 61 b). But despite this current of doubt and dissent, and despite, or perhaps because of, the rivalry of Christianity, there is no doubt of the high position of Tyche in the years from Julian to Theodosius. She had temples at Caesarea (Sozomen. 5. 4. 2), Antioch (Julian, *Apophthegm.* 176, p. 223 Bidez-Cumont), Alexandria (Liban. *Progymn.* 12. 25. 6), and Constantinople (id. *Or.* 30. 51). The last champions of Paganism held her in great regard. Julian, writing in 361 to his maternal uncle and namesake about the prospects of battle with Constantius, speaks of his intention *τῇ Τύχῃ τὰ πάντα καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπιτρέψας περιμένειν* (Ep. 28, p. 34. 18 Bidez-Cumont). His friend Sallustius, who shared and clarified some of his ideas, assigns her an unusually reputable place in the scheme of things: *ἡ τοίνυν τὰ διάφορα καὶ τὰ παρ' ἐλπίδα γυνόμενα πρὸς ἀγαθὸν τάττοντα δύναμις τῶν θεῶν Τύχη νομίζεται, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα κοινῇ τὰς πόλεις τὴν θεόν προσήκει τιμᾶν* (9, p. 20. 2 Nock). Libanius tells at length of the many occasions in which Tyche has helped him and at one point (*Or.* 1. 266) speaks of *θεῶν τε ἔργον καί, οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ πάντα, Τύχης*. In the latter part of the fourth century this view was common in Pagan circles, and it survived in them even later, when Eunapius speaks of *τῆς εἰς ἀπαντα νεωτεριζούσης Τύχης* (*Vit. Soph.*, p. 21 Boiss.). We might expect Palladas, who was an educated man, to share these views, but he goes his own way and develops his own view of Tyche, which has its roots in a different intellectual and social world and reveals striking idiosyncrasies. An examination of what he says about her throws light not only on his unusual personality but on his response to some events which he witnessed and perhaps on his personal history.

Palladas' conception of Tyche is founded on views which had long been held

¹ The third line given by the manuscripts is clearly a marginal note. Cf. P. Waltz, ad loc.

on her. In one place he shows an unusual detachment and speaks of her in traditional language:

πλοῦς σφαλερὸς τὸ ζῆντον χειμαζόμενοι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ
πολλάκις ναυηγῶν πταίομεν οἰκτρότερα.
τὴν δὲ Τύχην βιότου κυβερνήτειραν ἔχοντες
ώς ἐπὶ τοῦ πελάγους ἀμφίβολοι πλέομεν,
οἱ μὲν ἐπ' εὐπλοῖην, οἱ δὲ ἐμπαλιν ἀλλ' ἀμα πάντες
εἰς ἑνα τὸν κατὰ γῆς ὄρμον ἀπερχόμεθα.

(10. 65)

The conception of Tyche as the *κυβερνήτειρα* who guides human beings across the sea of life goes back through Philostratus, *Vit. Soph.*, p. 56. 22 Kays. 59. 11 *τύχης . . . κυβερνώσης ἄπαντα*, to Menander fr. 483. 9 K. *τύχη κυβερνᾷ πάντα*. Though Palladas does not deny or abandon what he says in this poem, it is in fact the kindest tribute which he pays to Tyche, since in it he says neither that she gives more ill fortune than fair nor that she favours bad men at the expense of good. He certainly does not see her as a transcendental automaton, and his anthropomorphic language reflects his belief in her as an active, personal power. His special view of her comes from the insistence with which he stresses certain aspects of her behaviour and the conclusions which he draws from them.

Precedents for Palladas' view of Tyche may perhaps be found in one or two moments of Attic Tragedy, when some inexplicable disaster provokes the suggestion that there is no reason or justice in the ordering of human affairs and that Tyche works in them at random. Something of the kind comes to Iocasta's mind in her agony about the fate of Oedipus (*Soph. O.T.* 977 ff.) and is more clearly expressed by Talthybius when he sees Hecuba in the full humiliation of her grief (*Eur. Hec.* 488 ff.). But Palladas may equally have been influenced by a humbler art, by the occasional denunciations of Tyche which are found on epitaphs; notably in such sentiments as ἀλλ[εσεν ἡ φ]θονερὰ τ[οῖς ἀ]γαθοῖσα Τύχη (Kaibel no. 489. 4), ἡ φθονερὰ δὲ ὑμᾶς πάντ' ἀδικοῦσα Τύχη (I.G. xiv. 2437. 5), μέτρον δὲ οὐκ ἵστε Τύχη δαίμων ται ἀλόγιστος ἔξανόνας πιέσθων (Peek no. 1350. 10-11). Yet such outbursts are after all natural expressions of grief in moments of loss, and none of them is nearly so comprehensive as Palladas' embracing view of Tyche. He seems to expand what the stricken or bereaved may feel in a tragic crisis to the whole of life, and to adapt conventional views of her to suit it. How he does this may be illustrated by a poem which goes much further than 10. 65 in its characterization of Tyche:

οὐ λόγον, οὐ νόμον οὐδὲ Τύχη, μερόπιν δὲ τυραννεῖ,
τοῖς ἴδιοις ἀλόγως ρέυμασι συρομένη.
μᾶλλον τοῖς ἀδίκοισι ρέπει, μισεῖ δὲ δικαίους,
ώς ἐπιδεικνυμένη τὴν ἀλογον δύναμιν.

(10. 62)

In his notion of her as a tyrant he advances upon such a popular idea as *δεσποτούνη Τύχης* (Kaibel no. 526. 2) or *πανδαιμάτειρα* (I.G. xii. 5. 303), and gives it a sharper edge. When he says that Tyche has no *λόγος*, he is not far from Eunapius' belief in her as *τὴν ἀλογον Τύχην* (*Vit. Soph.*, p. 25 Boiss.), but this is only a part of his whole conception, and the complete picture is built up by a series of strokes, of which each may in itself be familiar but the combined effect is

strikingly unfavourable to her. So when Palladas speaks of her *ρεύματα*, or caprices, he may have found the idea in Menander, who uses it to explain rapid changes of fortune:

τὸ τῆς Τύχης γὰρ ρέῦμα μεταπίπτει ταχύ.
(fr. 84. 5 K.)

What Menander regards as a self-evident fact to be accepted with patience Palladas denounces with indignation. In his eyes the caprices of Tyche are more likely to favour the unjust than the just. Whereas Menander is concerned with the instability of existence, Palladas is obsessed by its fundamental injustice.

The way in which Palladas shifts from the consideration of fair and foul fortune to the question of whether they come to those who deserve them can be seen from comparing two poems which are clearly related. In 10. 96 he is occupied by the unpredictable changes in human life and especially with the way in which Tyche makes the poor rich and the rich poor. He says nothing about the rights and wrongs of it: his complaint is that he cannot understand it and for this reason does not know how to face Tyche, but at the end he breaks out into virulent abuse:

*ποίω τρόπω γὰρ περιγένωμαι τῆς Τύχης
τῆς ἐξ ἀδήλου φαινομένης ἐν τῷ βίῳ,
πόρνης γυναικός τούς τρόπους κεκτημένης;*
(10. 96. 8-10)

To call Tyche a strumpet may be to anticipate Hamlet, but it is extremely violent for a Greek, and the occasion for it is simply that she is responsible for the ups and downs of human fortune. In confining her activities to this Palladas is still restricted by conventional notions of her, but in another poem he advances from them and sees her activities as a problem for ethics:

*ἄν μη γελάμεν τὸν βίον τὸν δραπέτην
Τύχην τε πόρνης ρέυμασιν κινοῦμενην,
δύνην ἔαντοις προξενοῦμεν πάντοτε
ἀναξίους ὄρωντες εὐτυχεστέρους.*
(10. 87)

In this poem Tyche is called a harlot because the unworthy prosper. The *ρέυματα* of Tyche are in their favour, and she deserves the name of *πόρνη* because of the inconstancy with which she bestows her graces and her preference for rich suitors. How outrageous the word would seem to a Greek public may be deduced from the fact that when the poem appears on the wall of a latrine at Ephesus, the second line has been changed to

*πινῶντες η τρυφῶντες η λελουμένοι.*¹

If even in this humble setting Palladas' words were thought to be excessive, we can gauge how strong they were, and how little respect he had for conventions when he wrote them.

Libanius, who himself held Tyche in high honour, admits that it is common form to revile her: *οὐ ράδιον ἐντυχεῖν, ὁ ἄνδρες, ἀνθρώπῳ μὴ λοιδοροῦντι τὴν Τύχην καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀδικον, αὐτὸν δὲ ἀτυχῆ καλοῦντι* (*Or. 6. 1*), and no doubt he

¹ E. Kalinka, *Wien. Stud.* xxiv (1902), 292-5.

had in mind the way in which men abuse their luck and revile the supernatural power which is thought to be responsible for it. Such abuse was not to be found among philosophers, and with them Palladas has little in common. His notion of an irrational, immoral Tyche, who treats mankind as her plaything, recalls the Greek romances. Achilles Tatius regards the world as *τῆς Τύχης γυμνάσιον* (5. 2. 3), and when things go wrong for his heroes and heroines uses such phrases as *παιζέτω πάλιν ἡ Τύχη* (4. 9. 7), *ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς Τύχης παιδιῷ* (5. 11. 1), *ἐκείνους μὲν πάντας (τοὺς θανάτους) ἡ Τύχη ἐπαιξε κατ' ἐμοῦ* (7. 5. 2). In a similar spirit Charito calls Tyche *βάσκανος* (1. 14. 7; 4. 1. 12; 5. 1. 4) and *φιλόνεκος* (2. 8. 3), and Nonnus, writing romance in verse instead of in prose, moves on similar assumptions in *ἀνδρομένην, πολύμορφη Τύχη, παιζοντα γενέθλην* (*Dionys.* 16. 220). Against this popular and unphilosophical background we may set a poem of Palladas:

παιγνίον ἔστι Τύχης μερόπων βίος, οἰκτρός, ἀλήτης,
πλούτου καὶ πενίης μεσσόθι ρεμβόμενος.
καὶ τοὺς μὲν κατάγοντα πάλιν σφαιρῆδον ἀείρει,
τοὺς δ' ἀπὸ τῶν νεφελῶν εἰς Αἰδην κατάγει.

(10. 80)

The belief in a frivolous Tyche who treats mankind as her plaything is transferred from romance, where it helps the improbable developments of the plot, to events of every day and becomes more sinister and more alarming.

If mankind is the *παιγνίον* of Tyche, the game is played on a world-stage, on which she is dramatist, producer, and sometimes judge.¹ The notion is of some antiquity, and the germ of it can be seen in Diogenes' words *ἡ τύχη ὥστε ποιητρία τις οὐδα* (Stob. 2. 7. 2), and there are several traces of it in Polybius, who speaks of her in such phrases as *τὰ ἐπεισόδια τῆς τύχης* (2. 35. 5), *τῆς τύχης ἐπὶ τὴν ἐξώστραν ἀναβιβαζούσης τὴν ὑμετέραν ἄγνουαν* (11. 5. 8), and calls her a judge, *βραβευτής* (1. 58. 1), and the bestower of prizes, *τύχην τὰ δόλα προτεθεικέναι* (3. 63. 3). The notion was taken up by other writers and developed in different directions. Lucian speaks of *ὥστε ἐν σκηνῇ καὶ πολυπροσώπῳ δράματι* (*Nigrin.* 20), but it is the novelists who make the most of it. Achilles Tatius tells how Tyche *συντίθεται κατ' ἐμοῦ δράμα κανόν* (6. 3. 1), Charito how *ἡ φιλόκανος Τύχη δράμα σκυθρωπὸν ὑπὸ περιτέθεικε* (4. 4. 2), and Heliodorus, with ingenious elaboration, how *τότε δὴ πῶς εἴτε τι δαιμόνιον εἴτε τύχη τις ἀνθρώπεια βραβεύοντα κανόν ἐπεισόδιον ἐπετραγώδει τοῖς δρωμένοις, ὥστε εἰς ἀνταγώνισμα δράματος ἀρχὴν ἀλλού παρεισφέρουσα, καὶ τὸν Καλάσιρν εἰς ήμέραν καὶ ἐκείνη ὥραν ὥστε ἐκ μηχανῆς . . . ἐφίστησαν* (7. 6. 4). Palladas was familiar with this notion and saw its implications and its possibilities. While for Polybius it was a means to unfold the dramatic story of Rome's rise to power, and for the novelists a suitable way of creating suspense and excitement, both used it both for good and for bad fortune. But Palladas assumed that the dramatic character of human life, devised and played by a supernatural power, could only cause distress:

σκηνῇ πᾶς δὲ βίος καὶ παιγνίον ἡ μάθε παιζειν
τὴν σπουδὴν μεταθεῖς ἡ φέρε τὰς ὁδύνας.

(10. 72)

Palladas has no illusions about the painful character of what happens, and he

¹ G. Herzog-Hauser, *R.-E.* vii A 1671 ff.; O. Waser in *Roscher, Lex. Myth.* v. 1319 ff.

offers two alternative solutions. The first is that we must not treat it seriously but make fun of it as it makes fun of us, and the second is that we must learn to endure its griefs. The couplet sums up his own dilemma and explains much in him that might otherwise seem paradoxical.

Palladas certainly had a grudge against life and especially against his own lot in it. In trying to come to terms with experience he tried both of the methods which he mentions above. Mockery was his strongest suit, and, as he himself says, he delighted in it:

ανίζειν μὲν ἄριστον, ὁ δὲ ψόγος ἔχθεος ἀρχή·

ἀλλὰ κακῶς εἰπεῖν Ἀττικόν ἔστι μέλι.

(11. 341)

The violence of some of his attacks on both public and private characters, whom he regards as receiving rewards beyond their merits or not living up to their principles or holding public office for their own advantage, are of a remarkable sharpness and even scurrility. He does not spare such persons as Themistius (11. 292) or Gessius (7. 681-8) or Maurus (11. 204) or Gennadius (11. 280), all of whom were prominent figures of his time, and his candour and courage in dealing with them are proof of his sincerity. In all he finds some conflict between what they get and what they really deserve, and his judgement comes down firmly against them and the system which allows such injustice. On the other hand, he knew that this was not the way to win happiness or prosperity, and of course it may well have been dangerous. That no doubt is why, as he says at 11. 340, he has sworn countless times not to write any more epigrams. The alternative was to do nothing, and this is what he urges in different forms at 10. 46, 51, 77, 78, 86. His savagery in attack arose from his strong sense of justice. What others might take more lightly aroused him to fury, and when the fury was on him, he could not but speak out in violence. And this sense of unrighteous anomalies in the world was strengthened by his belief that Tyche was responsible for them. In so far as he had a central principle in things, it was Tyche, and in her he saw a power for evil. What carries his poems about Tyche beyond all other Greek poems about her is precisely his outraged sense of justice, his injured conscience, his conviction that such things happen only because the scheme of things is irrational and wrong. He knew that he would be happier if he abandoned his furies and his denunciations, but it was extremely difficult for him to do so; for when he felt in this way, his poetry at least gave him some kind of relief from it in the consciousness that he was speaking the truth.

Palladas' view of Tyche was submitted to a peculiar test when her cult and popularity received an almost mortal blow in the intestine conflicts between Christians and Pagans in Alexandria. Four poems of Palladas are concerned with this from a special angle, and we may fix their date and circumstances from the simplest and shortest of them:

ἀνεστράφησαν, ὡς ὄρῳ, τὰ πράγματα

καὶ τὴν Τύχην νῦν δυστυχοῦσαν εἰδομεν.

(9. 181)

This is certainly to be connected with another poem which ends

ἀνεστράφη γὰρ πάντα νῦν τὰ πράγματα

(10. 90. 7)

and is concerned with the troubles of the *Ἐλλῆνες* or Pagans in the riots of 391,¹ when the edicts of Theodosius proscribing the performance of Pagan rites (*Cod. Theod.* 16. 10. 10 and 11) were voluntarily enforced, probably beyond what the Emperor intended, by the Bishop Theophilus and his fanatical monks, who destroyed the temples of Sarapis, Mithras, and Dionysus (*Socr.* 5. 16. 1; *Sozom.* 7. 15. 2-3; *Zosim.* 5. 2. 3). The temple of Tyche was not destroyed, and its doors were still standing in the seventh century (*Theophyl. Simocatt.* 8. 13), no doubt because the laws of the city were inscribed upon them, but like another temple, at Constantinople (*Ioh. Lyd. de Mens.* 4. 132), it was turned into a *καπηλεῖον* or tavern. Before its transformation we know something of it from Libanius, who says that it had a *τέμενος* in the middle of the town and contained statues of all the gods, but in the middle of them *Τύχης ἐστικεν ἄγαλμα στεφάνῳ δηλοῦν ἀλεξάνδρον τὰς νίκας. καὶ στέφεται μὲν ὑπὸ Τύχης ἡ γῆ, στέφει δὲ αὐτὴ τὸν νικήσαντα. Νίκαι δὲ τῆς Τύχης ἐκατέρωθεν ἀνεστήκασιν, καλῶς τοῦ δημούργου τῆς Τύχης δηλοῦντος τὴν δύναμιν* (*Progymnasm.* 12. 25. 6). The transformation of this majestic edifice, with all its proud associations, into a tavern struck Palladas' imagination very forcibly, and he responded with a characteristic irony and a special kind of wit, at once metaphysical and verbal, which he found appropriate when he had to deal with some surprising or paradoxical situation like this.

The way in which the degradation of Tyche affects Palladas may first be examined in a highly concentrated poem:

Τύχη καπηλεύοντα πάτα τὸν βίον,
ἀσυγκέραστον τὴν φύσιν κεκτημένη
καὶ συγκυκώσα καὶ μεταντλούσ' αὖ πάλιν,
καύτη κάπηλος ἔστι νῦν τις, οὐ θεά,
τέχνην λαχοῦσα τὴν τρόπων ἐπαξίαν.

(9. 180)

Here a single image dominates the plan and is put to special purposes. Tyche has always been a *κάπηλος* trafficking in human fortunes, but now she has been reduced to working in a tavern and selling wine, and her punishment fits her crimes. The wider implications of this image are exploited in lines 2-3, where each phrase makes a new point. When Palladas says that Tyche has an *ἀσυγκέραστον* nature, he uses the word in the sense of 'unmixed' (*Hesych. ἀκρατος· ἀμυής, ἀσυγκέραστος*), which is admirably appropriate to wine in its raw state and suggests that her nature has all the dangerous potency of wine not mixed with water. The metaphor has distant precedents in Aesch. *P.V.* 678 *ἀκρατος ὄργην* and in Plat. *Legg.* 4. 722 c, on the application of force without persuasion, *ἀκράτῳ μόνον τῇ βίᾳ*. It gives a vivid hint of Tyche's violent character. In the next line the image passes from what she is to what she does, and both participles carry a full meaning. *συγκυκώσα* refers to the confusion, in every sense of the word, which Tyche brings into everything and it awakes echoes of the classical use of *κυκάν* for stirring up trouble (*Archiloch. fr. 67. 1 D.*; *Sol. fr. 1. 61 D.*; *Sapph. fr. 137. 4 L.-P.*; *Ach. 531 συγκύκ.*); *μεταντλούσα* refers to her interferences with the proper functions and character of things. Palladas presents Tyche as a mischievous busybody who spoils everything that she touches. The skill of the poem lies in the translation of something powerfully felt into a neat and inclusive image which reveals the true character of Tyche's

¹ R. Keydell, *Byz. Zeitschr.* I (1957), 1-3.

activities before she was discredited by defeat. It is a good example of Palladas' poetical wit, which gives definiteness and precision to a situation which might otherwise be lost in general considerations, and it shows exactly what he feels.

In a third poem on the same situation Palladas derides Tyche for having become *ἀτυχής* and insists that she must draw the right conclusions from it :

καὶ σύ, Τύχη δέσποινα, τύχην ἀτυχῆ πόθεν ἔσχες;
ἡ παρέχουσα τύχας πῶς ἀτυχῆς γέγονας;
μάνθανε καὶ σὺ φέρειν τὰ σὰ ρεύματα, καὶ σὺ διδάσκου
τὰς ἀτυχεῖς πτώσεις ἃς παρέχεις ἔτεροι.

(9. 182)

In addressing her as *δέσποινα* Palladas ironically gives her the title which she held before her fall, and thereby contrasts her present state with her former *δεσποινή*, which was manifest not only in her magnificent temple but in her control of human affairs. Having lost this position, she must now suffer what she used to inflict upon others, especially the *ρεύματα*, which were her speciality (10. 87, 96), and the *πτώσεις*, or falls, which she used to distribute (10. 80). The point of the poem is that Tyche has now to endure her own attacks, and though this is expressed with wit and fancy in the notion that she has become *ἀτυχής*, it contains a serious idea, which is that such a power as Tyche, being essentially irrational and irresponsible, embodies in herself contradictions which work her ruin. Palladas' approach to the subject may be viewed from two angles. In the first place his attack could hardly fail to make an impression on those who still held Tyche in honour. In their world of mythological belief her collapse should indicate a real disaster. They might still believe in her existence, but they could hardly continue to believe in her omnipotence. Secondly, Palladas puts into a special, poetical form his own feelings about her. She, in whom he has undoubtedly believed even if he has hated her, is now manifestly humbled. The transformation of her temple is patent evidence that she cannot look after herself, and to this degree her old claims are discredited. This poetical approach masks another which may be called philosophical. What Palladas discerns in the fall of Tyche is that the irrational principle in control of things, to which he has hitherto adhered, cannot bear the test of events. There is something wrong in it, and he can no longer treat it seriously. His derisive triumph over Tyche reflects a triumph over something in himself.

The fourth poem picks up themes from the preceding three and looks as if it were intended to be the climax of the series :

καὶ σύ, Τύχη, λοιπὸν μεταβαλλομένη καταπαῖζου
μηδὲ τύχης τῆς σῆς ὑστάτα φεισαμένη·
ἡ πρὶν νηὸν ἔχουσα καπηλεύεις μετὰ γῆρας,
θερμοδότις μερόπων νῦν ἀναβανομένη.
νῦν δύις στένε καὶ σὺ τεὸν πάθος, ἀστατε δαῖμον,
τὴν σήν, ὡς μερόπων, νῦν μετάγουσα τύχην.

(9. 183)

Palladas begins by telling Tyche that she, who has made mankind her *παῖγνιον*, must now accept the fact that she has become such herself, and the word *καταπαῖζου* stresses what she must expect. The degree of her fall is marked by advancing beyond the transformation of her temple into a tavern to her own degradation in becoming a *θερμοδότις*. Stadtmauer follows the marginal

scholium, which says *θέρμους πωλοῦσσα τοῖς πένησιν*, and suggests that now Tyche sells the poorest kind of food, cakes made of lupines, to low-class customers. *θέρμοι* were indeed the food of the poor (Alex. frs. 162. 11; 266. 2 K.; Timocl. fr. 18. 4 K.; Ammian. *A.P.* 11. 413. 6), but this interpretation does not suit the text very well, since the termination *-δότης* surely excludes the notion of selling. It is easier to assume that *θερμοδότης* is the feminine form of *θερμοδότης*, the slave who brings hot water at baths, and whose task is *θερμοδοσία* (Herod. Med. ap. Orib. 5. 30. 19). The task of Tyche is not merely mean but slavish, and, as *ἀναφανομένη* proclaims, manifest to everyone. Her humiliation should be a lesson to Tyche, whom Palladas now calls *ἄστατε δαιμον*, and in these last words he sums up what he feels about her. The application of *ἄστατος* to Tyche is as old as Epicurus (*Ep.* 3, p. 65 U.), and Palladas no doubt uses it to dismiss not only his own belief in Tyche but a whole history of such belief which has lasted for centuries. So too the application to her of the word *δαιμον*, which does not occur in the preceding poems, takes account of the high regard in which she has been held. She who has been the mistress of everything must now lament her lot *ὅσιως*, and with this Palladas completes his lesson for her.

These poems indicate what kind of belief Palladas had in Tyche, and what degree of reality he ascribed to her. It is clear that she is much more real to him than are the Olympian gods, whose misfortunes in the riots of 391 raise no fundamental questions or regrets for him (9. 441, 528, 773), and evoke no more than a smile. To them elsewhere he pays almost no attention, and his only tribute is to say that Zeus would have been a parricide if his father had been mortal (10. 53). But just as he abounds in references to Tyche on other occasions, so in her hour of catastrophe he devotes special care to her because she has an unusual significance for him. She is a real figure in his depleted cosmology because she symbolizes the irrational and unjust scheme of things in which men live. Yet she is also more than a symbol; for she is an active living force who embodies all that Palladas hates and condemns in his own circumstances and whom he regards as responsible for it. His quarrel, which cannot be denied or dismissed, with the scheme of things he dramatizes as a quarrel with Tyche. Such a point of view is easily intelligible in the latter years of the fourth century A.D., when in Pagan circles a growing scepticism and sense of futility was matched by various efforts to treat mythical figures as manifestations of abstract, cosmic powers. Palladas shows both tendencies. In his rejection of the Olympian system and of any coherent philosophy he believes in an irrational universe, and for this he finds his symbol in Tyche. When he sees her temple turned into a tavern, he feels that somehow he has scored off her, and though these poems are built on ingenious tropes and have their full measure of verbal ambiguities, they reflect something entirely human and real in Palladas. He treated the crisis seriously and saw in it more than an imaginary humiliation of Tyche. Her fall delivered him from something that he had hitherto believed, and we must ask to what new conclusions this brought him and what gain, if any, he got from it.

At the start it is remarkable that Palladas should tell Tyche to lament her lot *ὅσιως*. In the ironical and satirical context the word stands out as more patently serious than anything else, and there is no reason to think that it has lost any of its pristine gravity or is not intended to strike home. Palladas tells Tyche that she must order herself reverently in her change of situation, and

such reverence implies some power to whom it must be paid. The obvious candidate for this is Christianity, which has visibly triumphed by depriving Tyche of her temple and her glory. This does not prove that Palladas accepts the Christian system. His very omission of any reference to it is significant. But it does show that he recognizes the existence of some power more worthy of reverence than Tyche, and when he tells her to accept her lot *όσιως*, he means, in plain language, that the old scheme of an irrational universe which called for abuse must give place to another scheme which calls for respect. We do not know what this is, but it is certainly implied, and we must conclude that in abandoning his belief in Tyche Palladas replaced it with something which he found more satisfying and more worthy of reverence. Tyche indeed, whose power and activity he has acknowledged, he has never reverenced, and now that he has seen through her claims he finds something else more deserving of his devotion.

A little light is thrown on this problem by some other lines of Palladas, which evidently come from a time when he said good-bye to Tyche, and may therefore be connected with his rejection of her after her humiliation. The manuscripts present them as a quatrain:

'Ελπίδος οὐδὲ Τύχης ἔτι μοι μέλει, οὐδ' ἀλεγίζω
λοιπὸν τῆς ἀπάτης· ἥλυθον εἰς λιμένα.
εἰμὶ πέντε ἀνθρώπος, ἐλευθερίη δὲ συνοικῶ·
ὑβριστήν πενίης πλούτον ἀποστρέφομαι;
(9. 172)

but it is probably right to treat this as two separate poems.¹ First, a parallel poem, almost certainly by Palladas, suggests that the main point is made in the first couplet:

'Ελπίς καὶ σύ, Τύχη, μέγα χαίρετε· τὸν λιμέν' εὐρον.
οὐδὲν ἔμοι χύμιν' παιᾶτε τοὺς μετ' ἔμέ.
(9. 49)

What works so successfully in one case would work equally successfully in another. Secondly, the second couplet is not tied to the first by any connecting particle, and though Palladas often dispenses with such links, here we might expect *γάρ*, and without it the transition is a little abrupt. Thirdly, the first couplet is not only complete in sense but ends dramatically with the word *λιμένα*, and any addition rather spoils a climax which is very much in Palladas' manner. There is clearly a case for dividing the poem into two, and then what concerns us is the first half. What is the haven that Palladas has found, and how does it relieve him of any care for Hope or Luck?

The two couplets in which Palladas bids farewell to *'Ελπίς* and *Τύχη* are curiously reminiscent of a theme which appears on Latin epitaphs:

euasi, effugi. Spes et Fortuna, ualete,
nil mihi uobiscum est, ludificate alios.
(C.I.L. vi. 11743)

actumst, excessi. Spes et Fortuna, ualete,
nil iam plus in me uobis per saecula licebit.
(ibid. ix. 4756)

¹ So Jacobs, followed by Stadtmauer and Beckby, but not by Dübner, Waltz, Paton, or Luck.

effugi tumidam uitam. Spes, Forma, ualete,
nil mihi uobiscum est. alios deludite, quaeso.
(*ibid.* xi. 6435)¹

In looking at these we are tempted to think that Palladas, in taking leave of 'Επίς and Τύχη, is writing his own epitaph. Like his two couplets, the Latin epitaphs leave the world of hope and chance to other men and regard the deliverance from it as a wonderful escape. Yet we may doubt whether this is quite what Palladas means. The image of the harbour could indeed be applied to death, as it is by him in 10. 65 in the form τὸν κατὰ γῆς ὄρμον, but it can easily be applied to other forms of refuge, and there is no reason to think that it is not so applied here. That Palladas has some other idea than death in his mind receives support from an anonymous poem, which looks as if it came from his own time or a little later and develops in its rather incompetent way a variation on his theme of deliverance:

'Ελπίς, καὶ σὺ Τύχη, μέγα χαίρετε· τὴν ὁδὸν εὐρον·
οὐκέτι γὰρ σφετέρους ἐπιτέρπομαι· ἔρρετε ἀμφω,
οὐνέκεν ἐν μερόπεσι πολυπλανέες μάλα ἔστε.
ὅσσα γὰρ ἀτρεκέως οὐκ ἔσσεται, ὑμεῖς ἐν ἡμίν
φάσματα ὡς ὑπνῷ ἐμβάλλετε οἴλα τ' ἔοντα.
ἔρρε, κακὴ γλῆνη, πολυώδην· ἔρρετε ἀμφω.
παιζούθ' θτε θέλοιτε, δσους ἐμεῦ δοτερον ὄντας
εύροιτ' οὐ νοέοντας, ὅπερ θέμις ἔστι νοῆσαι.

(9. 134)

Even if this poem is not actually derived from Palladas, and it certainly looks as if it were, it makes a point so like his that we may safely regard it as evidence for what he means. Such an idea may have been current in his time, and its use by more than one poet suggests that it had some vogue. The only difference between this poem and the two distichs of Palladas is that it speaks of a ὁδός while they speak of a λαμῆν. What the anonymous writer regards as a way of life, Palladas regards as a haven, and the distinction between the two is not great or very important. Both poets announce that they have escaped from the illusions and deceptions of Fortune and Hope, and while the anonymous poet stresses the positive side of this with an eye on the future, Palladas stresses the negative with an eye on the past. We may then conclude that when he speaks of having found a haven, Palladas means something psychological, a change in himself, in his outlook or his attitude or his assumptions.

In comparing this deliverance implicitly with death, as Palladas seems to do, he may perhaps be exploiting an idea which he uses elsewhere. For him certain conditions of life are no better than death and may justly be identified with it. Just as in the troubles of 391 he speaks of the defeated Pagans as νεκρῶν ἔχοντες ἀλπίδας τεθαμένας (10. 90. 6), so more generally he considers that the life of a poor man is itself a form of death:

μηδέποτε ζῆσας ὁ πένης βροτὸς οὐδὲ ἀποθνήσκει·
καὶ ζῆν γὰρ δοκέων ὡς νέκυς ἦν ὁ τάλας.
(10. 63. 1-2)

When he says good-bye to Tyche, he uses a similar language because his outward circumstances have not changed and may still be compared with death,

¹ G. Wissowa, in Roscher, *Lex. Myth.* iv. *funéraire des Romains*, p. 178 n. 2; *Lux Per-1295*; F. Cumont, *Recherches sur le symbolisme petua*, p. 123 n. 1.

but he sees the whole situation quite differently and now accepts it for the peace which he has found. We can surmise what his solution was. He often speaks of his desire for a quiet life, and though his outbursts of fury and derision were not calculated to secure it, he is obviously sincere when he speaks of it. One of his main obstacles was in himself and especially in his conviction, enforced by the conditions of his own life, that human beings are the playthings of Tyche's brutal and irrational tyranny. This he could not refrain from denouncing, if only to relieve his outraged feelings. The triumph of Christianity certainly shocked and shook him at first, but he seems to have accommodated himself to it and to have derived unexpected benefits. The first was that he ceased to be a schoolmaster, and he welcomed the liberation from a tedious and humiliating profession (9. 171). Though we do not know what source of livelihood he found afterwards, it may have been more congenial. Secondly, the religious strife of 391 discredited in his eyes the formidable figure of Tyche, in whose merciless omnipotence he had, despite all his scepticism, believed. The visible evidence of her ruin made him realize how foolish his belief in her had been. Once he was freed from this, he seems to have settled into a quiet mood and sought the *φάρμακον ἡσυχίης* which he had always to some degree admired (10. 46). We cannot doubt that in his own twisted way he passed through a crisis of the spirit and at the end of it found himself rid both of troubling elements in himself and of the supernatural power which had challenged and provoked them.

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EURIPIDES, *ELECTRA* 1093-5, AND SOME USES OF δικάζειν

εἰ δ' ἀμείψεται
φόνον δικάζω φόνος, ἀποκτενά σ' ἔγω
καὶ πᾶς Ὀρέστης πατρὶ τιμωρούμενος.

ALL commentators on these lines make two assumptions about the first clause, (1) that δικάζω means 'sitting in judgement', 'punishing', or the like, (2) that the φόνος which is its subject as well as that of ἀμείψεται is the *second* φόνος in a series of two: the subsequent slaying punishes or sits in judgement on the previous; thus the slaying of Clytaemnestra herself will sit in judgement upon that of Agamemnon, just as that had sat in judgement upon the φόνος of Iphigenia. Then opinions differ as to whether φόνον is to be taken as the object of both verbs, or of one but not the other. Thus Paley, taking it with both, translates 'if slaughter is to requite slaughter, as the avenger of it'; Keene, taking it with δικάζω (making ἀμείψεται absolute) has 'if bloodshed in judgement on bloodshed shall come in turn'; Wecklein makes ἀμείψεται govern φόνον and leaves δικάζω vague ('den Mord wird zur Sühne Mord vergeben'); while Denniston says 'φόνον is probably governed by ἀμείψεται, or by both ἀμείψεται and δικάζω. For δικάζω ("sitting in judgement") cf. S. O. T. 1214 δικάζει (χρόνος) τὸν ἄγαμον γάμον.'¹ The penalty (φόνος) is personified as the judge trying the case.'

None of these versions is satisfactory. When ἀμείψεσθαι means 'requite', its subject is a person, and the reward or penalty with which the requiring is done is put in the dative or the accusative.² I cannot find an instance of the middle verb used where the requiter is *itself the penalty*, where it (if it is a thing) substitutes itself (as it must do here) for the thing which it requires. This makes against Paley, Wecklein, and Denniston. On the other hand, Keene's translation of ἀμείψεται looks like a makeshift resorted to because his instinct told him that it could not govern φόνον (in the sense in which he took it): his 'shall come in turn' is flabby, and it seems unnatural to separate ἀμείψεται from φόνον.

These difficulties can be avoided (and the passage translated correctly) if it is remembered that δικάζειν can bear another meaning—not 'judge' but 'adjudge'—, and that just as δικάζω = judge can take an accusative of the case or charge judged (or tried),³ so δικάζω = adjudge can take an accusative of

¹ Jebb's note on that passage reads as follows: 'δικάζει (prop. "tries", as a judge tries a cause (δίκην δικάζει): here, "brings to justice", punishes: a perhaps unique poetical use, for in Pind. *Olymp.* 2. 59, which Mitchell quotes, ἀλτρά . . . δικάζει τις = simply "tries". Aesch. has another poet. use, *Ag.* 1412 δικάζεις φυγὴν ἔμοι = καταδικάζεις φυγὴν ἔμοι.' There seems to be a confusion in the first sentence between trying a *case* (δίκην δικάζειν) and trying an *offence* (ἀλτρά δικάζει; cf. Aesch. *Suppl.* 230 f. δικάζει τάμπλακήμαθ' . . . Ζεὺς ἀλλος.) But *Ag.* 1412 is, as we shall see, the true parallel to our passage.

² As in ἀμείψεσθαι τινα κακοῖς, etc.,

παντοῖς φιλότητος ἀμειβόμενα χάρην (S. *El.* 134). See the examples in Kühner-Gerth, i. 293 ff.

³ The person whose case is judged is normally put in the dative, a usage which goes back to the *Iliad* (Σ 506 τοῖον ἔπειτας φύσσον, ἀμοιβήδις δὲ δίκαιον, where τοῖον seems to belong also to δίκαιον, and 574 ἐς μέσον ἀμφοτέρους δικάσσατε). The facts suggest that δικάζειν was originally an intransitive verb (= state the right, according to H. J. Wolff's exhaustive study, 'The Origin of Judicial Litigation among the Greeks', *Traditio* iv [1946], 75). But cf. Arist. *Const. Ath.* 53. 2 τοῖς τὴν φυλὴν τοῦ φεύγοντος δικάζοντοι.

the *award or penalty* adjudged.¹ So the one *φόρος* (= the *first* in a series, not the second) might be said to 'adjudge' the other, i.e. to award or decree it; and Electra's words should be translated 'if one murder is to bring another in its train, decreeing it, then I and Orestes shall (of necessity) slay you!' The judge's sentence is absolute, and so *δικάζων* (in this sense) has a peremptory, authoritative tone which here answers well to Clytaemnestra's argument (lines 1018 ff.) that justice demanded (or that she might reasonably have regarded it as demanding, cf. 1030) that she slay Agamemnon, because *he* had killed Iphigenia: *εἴτε τὸν μὲν οὐ θανεῖν κτείνοντα χρῆν τάμ'*; (1044 f.)² For this meaning and construction of *δικάζων* cf. E. *Or.* 163 f. *ἀπόφονον ὅτ' ἐπὶ τριπόδῃ / Θέμαδος ἄρ'* *ἐδίκασε φόνον ὁ Λοξίας ἐμὰς ματέρος*, and for *ἀμειβεσθαι* used of evils bringing a penalty in their train cf. E. *Cycl.* 312 (πολλοῖσι γάρ) *κέρδη ποιητρὶ ζημιάν ἡμείφατο*). The editors were misled, it seems, into importing the wrong sense of *δικάζων* into our passage by the false parallel of *O.T.* 1214, the parallel, such as it is, consisting of the fact that that is the only other quoted passage where *δικάζων* has an abstract subject. Yet the personification of *χρόνος* (= a disinterested third party which looks impartially upon the deeds of men) as a judge is a natural one and rather different from Denniston's picture of the *punishment* sitting in judgement. The latter would be not so much a personification as a conceit, and no more easy or difficult than the conceit (of the *crime* adjudging) understood by my version: both of these figures, be it said, being well within the scope of a Greek poet's fancy.

Euripides, *Orestes* 576 ff.

ἐπεὶ δ' ἀμαρτοῦντος γῆσθετ', οὐχ αὐτῇ δίκην
ἐπέθηκεν,³ ἀλλ', ὡς μὴ δίκην δοίη πόσει,
ἔζημισσε πατέρα κάπεκτεν' ἐμόν.

¹ As in *Ag.* 1412 νῦν μὲν δικάζεις ἐν πόλεως φυγὴν ἔμοι. I do not know of an instance in prose of this accusative of the penalty (which Ed. Fraenkel, ad loc., takes as internal). But a command-in infinitive is not uncommon after this use of *δικάζων* (e.g. *lex Gort.* iii. 6, ὃν δέ κ' ἐκανεούστα, δικάσαι τὸν γνωτὸν ἀπομόνως κτλ.) (Since writing I have noticed an instance of the accusative at *Iscr.* 17. 52 τούτον μηδὲ μέλλοντος ποιήσαν ἀ ἑκίνων δικάσειν.) The use of the passive in *Lysias* 21. 18 (οὐκ ἀν εἶπεν ἔχοι τις . . . ὡς αἰσχρὰ δίκαια δεδίκασμαι (= 'that I have had shameful verdicts pronounced against me' (?)) and *Plat. Rep.* 558a ἡ πρότητη ἐνίων τῶν δικαιοθέντων might seem to imply an active usage of *δικάζων* (in this sense) with the accusative of the person against whom an award is made. But I know of no clear instance of such an accusative.

² Cf. the twin of our passage in *S. El.* 577 ff.:

εἰ δ' οὖν, ἐρῶ γάρ καὶ τὸ σὸν, κεῖνον (sc. Menelaus) θέλων ἐπωφελήσσαι ταῦτ' ἔδρα, τούτου θανεῖν χρῆν αὐτὸν οὐνεκ' ἐκ σέθεν; ποιώ νόμω;

ὅρα τιθέσσα τόνδε τὸν νόμον βροτοῖς μη πῆμα σαντῆ καὶ μετάγονα τιθῆς. εἰ γάρ κτενοῦμεν ἄλλον ἄντ' ἄλλον, σὺ τοι πρώτη θάνοις ἀν, εἰ δίκης γε τυγχάνοις.

To paraphrase: Clytaemnestra, by her argument, sets up a *nόμος*. A δικαστής dispensing justice under this *nόμος* could give only one adjudication (= δίκη). So εἰ δίκης γε τυγχάνοις in a case of *φόνος*, sc. another *φόνος*. Compare the picture provided by the Gortyn Code of the δικαστής commanded by law to pronounce (δικίσαι) a specified sentence in a specified case. So here the first *φόνος* itself, which leaves the judge no choice but to pronounce sentence of another *φόνος*, might be said, figuratively, δικάζειν that *φόνος*. Sophocles has exactly the same argument in mind as Euripides; but he expresses it in *extenso*, whereas Euripides is epigrammatic.

³ The phrase illustrates the Greek fondness (to be illustrated later) for the idea of by-passing judicial proceedings and becoming 'one's own judge', cf. *Hdt.* 1. 45, ἔχω, ὡς ξένε, παρὰ σεῦ πᾶσαν τὴν δίκην, ἐπειδὴ σεωτοῦ καταδικάζεις θάνατον.

πρὸς θεῶν—ἐν οὐ καλῷ μὲν ἐμνήσθην θεῶν,
φόνον δικάζων εἴ δὲ δὴ τὰ μητέρος
οιγῶν ἐπήνουν, τί μ' ἀν ἔδρασ' ὁ κατθανών;

If failure to recognize the adjudicative sense of δικάζειν has led to mis-translation in the *Electra* passage, here failure to recognize its *judicative* sense—when it means to 'judge' (a case)—has produced the same result, and has helped to perpetuate the fallacy that the active δικάζειν can mean 'to plead'. For this is the meaning assigned to the word here by LSJ., and they are followed by others (cf. Wedd in the Pitt Press edition "tis an inauspicious hour, I know, to call on Heaven when pleading the cause of murder", and Way 'By Heaven!—ill time, I grant, to call on Heaven, defending murder'). The fact is that the view that δικάζειν may mean 'plead' (*causam dicere*) of a litigant appears to depend, throughout the whole of Greek literature, only on this and one other passage.¹ Since both these passages may be interpreted better by giving δικάζειν one of its ordinary meanings, they can both only be regarded as confirming the rule that it is δικάζεσθαι, never δικάζειν, that means *causam dicere*.² φόνον δικάζω means here, as Paley and Wecklein saw, that Orestes is 'judging', weighing-up the rights and wrongs of Clytaemnestra's murder of Agamemnon.³ In other words, the *judicative* sense of δικάζειν is here employed metaphorically. Of course Orestes appears (as the context shows) otherwise as a *litigant* in the case Agamemnon+Orestes v. Clytaemnestra. But it would be an unwarranted restriction of the imagination therefore to forbid him, as he reviews the issues,⁴ also to regard himself as *judging* the case. And as an imagined judge of homicide he quite naturally feels that he ought not to pollute the gods by mentioning them, just as the Archon Basileus removes his sacred wreath when judging a homicide case.⁵

δικάζειν used of the litigant in prose

It seems appropriate to conclude with a list of passages⁶ illustrating a prose

¹ *Il.* Ψ 579, discussed below. LSJ. also quote Dio Cassius, 69. 18, for δικάζειν = plead. But examination of the passage will show that this depends upon a misreading, and that δικάζειν there means 'sit as a judge in court'.

² So that the whole sub-section I. 2b in LSJ. under δικάζειν should be cancelled. The fact is of the greatest importance for the interpretation of the famous Shield Trial-Scene (*Il.* Σ 497 ff.), where the theory that δικάζον refers to the litigants (*τοῖσιν ἔστιν* ησσον, ἀμοιβηδίς δὲ δικάζον, 506), and that the gold talents are to give to them (*κείτο δ' ἄρ' ἐν μέσουσι δύνα χρυσοῦ τάλαντα, τῷ δόμεν, δι μετά τοῖσι δίκην θύντατο εἴναι*) is thus seen to be impossible. It should be added that δικάζειν can be used of a litigant, but then (see below) it means *ius dicere*, and is metaphorical.

³ That φόνον means the murder of Agamemnon by Clytaemnestra, not that of Clytaemnestra by Orestes, is shown by considering the rhetorical function of Orestes' exclamation and parenthesis. Had he been thinking of his own killing of Clytaemnestra

(and of himself as a defendant), to draw attention to its pollutive qualities and to his own carelessness in breaking the taboos on a suspected homicide would be to aggravate the charge against him and to *weaken his own case*. This cannot be what Euripides intended. The point of the parenthesis is to draw attention to the pollutive qualities of Clytaemnestra's murder of Agamemnon: it expresses *indignation*, the indignation of the judge, not of the litigant. This is an inescapable fact of language; whether, dramatically speaking, Orestes has any *right* to assume this role, is another matter.

⁴ Like Zeus in the *Iliad* (A 541 f. *αἱρετος φύλον ἔστιν ἐμεν ἀπονόσφιν ἔόντα / κρυπτάδια φρονέοντα δικάζεμεν* and Θ 430 f. *κείνος δὲ τὰ δι φρονέοντα ἐν θυμῷ / Τρώσι τε καὶ Δαναοῖς δικάζετω, ὃς ἐπιεικές*), though Zeus does his weighing-up apart, and his situation is otherwise so unlike that of Orestes.

⁵ Cf. Arist. *Const. Ath.* 57. 4, *καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς ὅταν δικάζῃ περιαιρέται τὸν στέφανον*.

⁶ Which do not, of course, claim to be exhaustive, even for the orators.

usage whereby the litigant (or a person in an analogous situation) is said δικάσαι or δικαστής γενέσθαι, in his own or another's behalf:

Antiph. 1. 12 αὐτοὶ δὲ οφίσιν αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἡξίωσαν δικασταὶ γενέσθαι δόντες βασανίσαι τὰ αὐτῶν ἀνδράποδα.

Dem. 29. 53 ταῦτ' ἐμοῦ προκαλεσαμένου πολλῶν παρόντων, οὐκ ἀν ἔφη ποιῆσαι. καίτοι δοτις αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ταῦτ' ἔφυγεν δικάσαι (sc. by swearing an oath on the head of his daughter denying an allegation against him) κ.τ.λ.

30. 2 τὸν μὲν γάρ οἰόμενος δεῖν ἐν τοῖς φίλοις διαδικάσασθαι τὰ πρὸς ἐμέ καὶ μὴ λαβεῖν ὑμῶν πείραν οὐχ οἵς τ' ἐγενόμην πεῖσαι. τοῦτον (= Onetor) δ' αὐτὸν αὐτῷ κελεύων γενέσθαι δικαστήν (sc. by accepting πρόκλησις to submit slaves for torture, cf. 35 f.), ἵνα μὴ παρ' ὑμῖν κινδυνεύῃ, τοσοῦτον κατεφρονήθην κτλ.

43. 5 . . . οὐκ ἐτόλμησε παρακαταβαλεῖν ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἔαντῳ ἐδίκασεν (sc. by not being willing to risk the παρακαταβολή in support of his claim) ὅτι οὐδαμόθεν αὐτῷ προσῆκεν οὐδέποτε τοῦ κλήρου τοῦ Ηγυιον.

48. 8 αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐγώ ἐδίκασα τούτῳ καὶ οὗτος ἐμοί, τὰ ἡμισέα ἐκάτερον ἡμῶν λαβεῖν ὡν κατέλιπε Κόνων, καὶ μηδεμίαν ἀρδίαν εἶναι περαιτέρω (i.e. the disputants came to an arrangement which replaced a judicial decision, solved (mutually) their own several cases). Cf. 33 ἐγώ καὶ οὗτος ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς δικάσαντες κ.τ.λ.

52. 15 καίτοι οὕτω τινὲς ἀναίσχυντο τῶν οἰκείων τῶν τούτου, ὥστε ἐτόλμησαν μαρτυρῆσαι, ὡς ὁ μὲν Κάλλιππος ὄρκον τῷ πατρὶ δοίν, ὁ δὲ πατήρ οὐκ ἔθελοι ὄμοσαι . . . καὶ οἴονται ὑμᾶς πείσειν ὡς ὁ Λυσιθείδης . . . ἀπέσχετ' ἀν μὴ οὐκ εὐθὺς τοῦ πατρὸς καταδιαιτῆσαι, αὐτοῦ γε ἔαντῳ μὴ θέλοντος δικαστοῦ γενέσθαι τοῦ πατρός (sc. by taking an oath that he had not wrongfully withheld money from Kallippos).

The use of δικάσαι and δικαστής γενέσθαι in these passages plainly involves a metaphor, but it should be observed that there is at the same time a common thread¹ running through them which makes the usage almost literal. They almost all, that is to say, centre upon some sort of ordeal, whether it be the taking of a solemn oath, or submitting slaves for torture, or risking a heavy deposit in support of a claim for money. Such procedures tend to belong to the arbitratative and, generally, *pre-dicastery* stages of Athenian litigation. These stages were palpably more primitive in atmosphere than the dicastery-stages,² and to them may be applied H. J. Wolff's observation, 'the purpose of the formalized evidence of primitive law, such as duel, oath, or ordeal, is not the discovery of facts from which a decision on the right can be derived, but immediately to make clear the right itself'.³ In this kind of judicial procedure, it will be seen that the litigant may, in a very real sense, 'judge (or adjudge) his own case' by the simple act of submitting or refusing to submit to the automatic proof or disproof of an ordeal. Indeed, merely to *challenge* an opponent to such an ordeal (provided that the ordeal is suitable to the occasion and likely to appear to such third parties as are present as a superior method

¹ Which may explain the persistence with which the image recurs. But see p. 130, n. 3 above.

² For this curious difference between the arbitration-proceedings and the court-pro-

ceedings, and the more primitive attitude to evidence in the former, see L. Gernet, *L'Institution des arbitres publics* (in *Droit et société dans la Grèce ancienne*, pp. 163 ff.).

³ Loc. cit.

of solving the dispute¹) might be described metaphorically as *judging* it. And this seems to me to be the plain and obvious solution of the use of *αὐτὸς δικάσω* in *Iliad* Ψ 573 ff. There Menelaus invites the Achaean chiefs to decide his dispute with Antilochus over the second-prize in the chariot-race:

(573 f.) ἀλλ' ἄγετ', Ἀργείων ἡγήτορες ἡδὲ μέδοντες,
ἐς μέσον ἀμφοτέροισι δικάσσατε μηδ' ἐπ' ἀρωγῇ,

then changes his mind and says:

(579) εἰ δ' ἄγ' ἔγών αὐτὸς δικάσω, καὶ μ' οὐ τωά φημι
ἄλλον ἐπιπλήκτειν Δαναῶν ἴθεια γάρ ἔσται.
Ἀντίδοχ', εἰ δ' ἄγε δεῦρο, διοτρεφέσ, ηθέμις ἔστι,
στὰς ἵππων προπάρουσθε καὶ ἄρματος, αὐτὰρ ἴμασθλην
χεροῖν ἔχε ράδινην, η περ τὸ πρόσθιν ἔλανες,
ἵππων ἀφάμενος γαίηρον ἐνοσίγαυον
ομνυθε μὴ μὲν ἔκών τὸ ἐμὸν δόλω ἄρμα πεδῆσαι.

Bonner and Smith² say: 'Menelaus' words cannot be interpreted to mean that he intended to be judge in his own case. . . . The confusion arises from pressing the meaning of δικάσω too closely, owing to a desire to preserve a distinction between the active and middle voices.³ Menelaus simply means to say: "I'll make my right in the matter clear".' Latte rightly rejected Bonner and Smith's interpretation, and explains 'Menelaos meint mit den vielumstrittenen Worten lediglich er wolle selber sagen, was rechtens sei und auch die anderen als billig anzuerkennen müßten'.⁴ H. J. Wolff (describing Latte's view as 'closer to the real meaning but still too vague') explains: '(Menelaos) announces his intention, not to be his own judge, but to employ, through tendering an oath to Antilochus, a formal procedure by which it would become evident on whose side the right was. The purpose of the formalized evidence of primitive law etc.'⁵ Without disagreeing fundamentally with either Latte or Wolff, I should like to suggest that the words *αὐτὸς δικάσω* ought to be considered in relation to the passages (later in time but not necessarily in spirit)⁶ which I have quoted from the orators, and should be understood (involving as they do the same ancient appeal to decision by ordeal) as implying the same mixture of metaphor and actuality as they do. Menelaus really does 'judge', since he proposes a device (the ordeal of the oath) which does in fact settle the issue at stake. At the same time, since he is in the position of a litigant, his use of δικάσω is

¹ For lack of such an accommodating attitude Athena spikes the guns of the Eumenides (Aesch. *Eum.* 429 ff.):

Xo. ἀλλ' ὄρκον οὐ δέξαιτ' ἄς, οὐ δοῦναι θέλοι.

Aθ. κλίνειν δίκαιος μᾶλλον η πρᾶξαι θέλεις.

Xo. πῶς δῆ; δίδακον τῶν σοφῶν γάρ οὐ
τίνει.

Aθ. ὄρκοις τὰ μὴ δίκαια μηδικάν λέγω.

² *Admin. of Justice*, i. 28.

³ Hence they wish to dispense with the distinction in the Shield-Trial-Scene, op. cit. i. 36.

⁴ *Heiliges Recht*, p. 8 n. 8. ⁵ *Loc. cit.*

⁶ Two important differences, however,

between the Menelaus-passage and them should not be minimized: (1) that Menelaus is the challenger, whereas in them it is the challenged who is said to 'judge his own case'; (2) in them the litigants are ordinary people subject to the laws of a city-state, whereas Menelaus is a *senior-βασιλεύς* among his peers in a loosely knit aristocratic community. There is therefore perhaps something in E. Wolf's suggestion (*Griechisches Rechtsdenken* i. 88) that Menelaus proposes to give his verdict 'als δίκη-κundiger und δίκη-übender βασιλεύς'. Even so, δικάσω would still mean *ius* (not *causam*) *dicere*.

metaphorical. There is nothing in this to surprise us, or to suggest that δικάζειν here bears some special 'Homeric' meaning, essentially different from its meanings in classical Greek. 'I shall adjudicate myself', says he, 'and my adjudication will be a straight one.' To shake one's head over such a use of language is to overlook the nature of metaphor, and unduly to fetter the imagination. The Greeks were perhaps more inclined to draw imagery from law and the administration of law than we are, because they had an almost romantic passion for law (cf. the wealth of legal reference and imagery in, say, Aeschylus). There is room for further exploration of this tendency.

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DICTA SCIPIO NIC OF 131 B.C.¹

FOR the historian who aspires to the study of Scipio Aemilianus one of the happier features of his material is the considerable number of Scipio's *dicta* which have been preserved: sayings which are distinct from the extracts from formal speeches yet which in most cases were uttered in public.² This paper is concerned with a small group of such *dicta* which belong to the last period of Scipio's life, between his return from Numantia in 132 and his death in 129. The intention is not to provide an historical interpretation (which must be reserved for an extended discussion of Scipio's career) but simply to establish the content, context, and relationship of the sayings concerned. At the request of the editors I do not quote in full the passages which provide the evidence, most of which are reproduced, at least in part, on pages 131 f. of the second edition of Malcovati's *Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta*.³

I. IURE CAESUM VIDERI

'(Scipio) qui cum a C. Carbone tribuno plebis seditiose in contione interrogaretur quid de Ti. Gracchi morte sentire, responderit *iure caesum videri*' (Cic. *Pro Mil.* 8). This *dictum* is reported in six other passages,⁴ but a precise indication of the occasion is given in only one, Livy, *Epit.* 59, where it is stated that Scipio uttered the remark in his speech against the bill to legalize immediate re-election to the tribunate, proposed by the tribune C. Papirius Carbo in 131.⁵ Gaius Gracchus spoke in support of Carbo but C. Laelius and Scipio spoke against the measure, which was rejected.⁶ That the epitomator has erred is rightly held by Münzer and Fraccaro:⁷ since the other sources make it quite clear that Scipio was answering a question the remark did not form part of his formal speech. Nevertheless we may with considerable confidence follow Fraccaro⁸ in supposing that the incident occurred on the same occasion: for not only is this the easy and obvious explanation of the epitomator's error but the majority of the sources (including the better ones)

¹ I wish to express my thanks to Mrs. K. M. T. Atkinson, who very kindly read and commented upon a version of this paper, and to the editors of *Classical Quarterly* for a number of suggestions.

² In due course I hope to publish a complete collection of the *dicta*. A number of them are discussed by Fraccaro in his section on Scipio in 'Oratori ed orazioni dell'età dei Gracchi' in *Studi Storici*, v (1912), 362 ff. In this paper I express disagreement with Fraccaro's interpretation of certain points but I would not wish this to obscure my great respect for his valuable work.

³ The passages not quoted in *O.R.F.*⁹ are Grillius, *Comm. in De Invent. Cic.*, p. 598. 31 (Halm), Polyaeus, *Strat.* 8. 16. 5, and an important part of Plut. *Ti. Grac.* 21. 5. All these are given in full at the appropriate points in this paper.

⁴ Cic. *De Orat.* 2. 106; Vell. 2. 4. 4; Val. Max. 6. 2. 3; Livy, *Epit.* 59; (Victor) *De*

Vir. Ill. 58. 8; Grillius, *Comm. in De Invent. Cic.* p. 598. 31 (Halm). The last (not in *O.R.F.*) reads: 'Et Scipio, tantus vir, qui productus a tribuno pl. eos [both the Gracchi!] dixit *iure caesos videri*, favore nobilitatis hoc fecit.'

⁵ Fraccaro, *op. cit.*, p. 440 n. 2, maintains that Carbo's tribunate is to be dated 130, not 131, while Broughton, *M.R.R.* i. 502 ff., does not commit himself; but the arguments of Münzer, *R.E.* xviii. 3. 1017 f., seem decisive for 131 (which is accepted also by Badian, *Foreign Clientela*, p. 175 n. 2). I have used the conventional simplification of identifying the tribunician year with the calendar year to which it very largely corresponded, but for the possibility that the incident under discussion occurred at the very end of 132 see below, p. 139 and n. 2.

⁶ Livy, *Epit.* 59; Cic. *De Amic.* 96.

⁷ Münzer, *R.E.* iv. 1. 1457; Fraccaro, *op. cit.*, p. 388. ⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 393.

explicitly attest that the question was put by Carbo himself and that he was tribune at the time.

The only version of this *dictum* which exhibits any significant variation is that of Velleius, which reads *si si is occupanda rei publicae animum habuisset, iure caesum*. It is a natural assumption, made by several scholars,¹ that in his conditional clause Velleius has preserved a portion of the *dictum* which has been omitted in the other passages; and indeed it is not difficult to conceive of such a qualification dropping out. Fraccaro, however, holds that it is an inopportune addition, which he considers absurd.² He objects that Tiberius' recourse to violence was clear and beyond discussion; that this was enough in Scipio's eyes to justify his death and that Scipio had already made this clear at Numantia by his quotation from Homer;³ and furthermore that, given Scipio's proud character, it is not credible that he expressed himself thus ambiguously, subordinating his judgement to an hypothesis open to discussion. Finally, Fraccaro points to the absence of the qualification from the version of Valerius Maximus, which is not derived from Cicero and which is, if anything, rhetorically adorned.

These objections lack force. The absence of the qualification from Valerius Maximus proves nothing: it could have been omitted so readily that it may well have been missing in his source; and in any case the unqualified and straightforward *iure caesum videri* would probably appeal to Valerius, for all his elaboration, and would suit his context better. Fraccaro's other arguments would perhaps carry weight if Carbo's question was to be understood as simply an attempt to obtain information, to ascertain Scipio's personal opinion as being of interest or value. But clearly the question was not so innocent: its purpose was to place Scipio in a dilemma and to render him unpopular: to answer that the killing of Gracchus was unjustified would be to betray his own political associates⁴—and probably his own opinion; to say that it was justified would be to incur the odium of the mob—which Carbo no doubt confidently expected. The desire to escape the dilemma, and especially to avoid forfeiting popular favour, is the obvious and entirely plausible explanation of the qualification which, as Fraccaro points out, renders the answer ambiguous. Indeed it is not entirely unambiguous even without the qualification, for the use of *videti*, which is in all other sources and must be genuine, prevents an absolute and irretrievable commitment to the statement that Gracchus was *iure caesum*. I shall argue elsewhere that Scipio had strong general reasons for being anxious not to forfeit popular favour, but in any case if the incident is rightly associated with Scipio's opposition to Carbo's bill the immediate relevance of the ambiguous qualification is obvious enough. In short, Fraccaro has not given adequate reasons for dismissing the clause as a later addition. Any remaining

¹ Münzer, *R.E.* iv. 1. 1457; Meyer, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Gracchen*, p. 26 n. 2 (= *Kleine Schriften*, i. 408 n. 2); Carcopino, *Autour des Gracques*, p. 86; Lincke, *P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus*, p. 30 n. 28. Bilz, *Die Politik des P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus*, p. 73 n. 199, probably accepts the qualification but is not absolutely clear.

² Op. cit., pp. 389 ff.

³ Plut. *Ti. Grac.* 21. 4 ὅς διπόλοιτο καὶ ἀλλος δ τις τοιαῦτα γε φέρει.

⁴ It is sufficient for the present purpose to note that Laelius and P. Rupilius both participated in the persecution of the Gracchans in 132: Cic. *De Amic.* 37; Vell. 2. 7. 4; Val. Max. 4. 7. 1. Scipio Nasica Serapio, who incited and led the attack on Tiberius, may be another who had political links with Aemilianus independent of the Gracchan crisis, but his position is not completely straightforward and needs some discussion.

surprise that a portion of the *dictum* should be preserved only by Velleius may be met with the reflection that as used in the context of the two Ciceronian passages the point of the story lies in the use of *iure*, while the Epitome of Livy, the *De Viris Illustribus*, and Grillius, besides being in various degrees late, share the characteristic of great brevity. Indeed the only positive ground for suspecting Velleius' version seems to be that he has dropped *videri*, which is a slight matter. The qualification itself is perfectly comprehensible and consistent with the known circumstances. Thus, while the nature of the matter precludes positive and final proof, there is clearly a strong presumption that Velleius has preserved an extra portion of the original *dictum*.¹

II. THE NOVERCA SAYING

'Et cum omnis contio acclamasset, hostium, inquit, armatorum totiens clamore non territus, qui possum vestro moveri, quorum noverca est Italia?' This is the sentence immediately following Velleius' version of the *iure caesum videri* saying. The taunt to the crowd that for them Italy was *noverca* is reported in four further passages, all of which agree that the remark was provoked by an outcry.² The brief account of the *De Viris Illustribus* is alone in omitting the idea that Scipio is not afraid of the crowd and there can be no real doubt that this and the contrast with the noise of enemy armies (Vell.; Plut.; Polyaen.) are original. Doubt does arise, however, about further ideas found in the versions of Valerius Maximus and the *De Viris Illustribus*. Both read *taceant quibus Italia noverca*. . . . *Taceant* is plausible as part of the original *dictum* but is slightly suspect in that it appears only in these inferior sources, neither of which is to be relied on for accurate wording, and moreover it is a very obvious embellishment which someone might have added later. Rather more suspect is the implication that the mob consisted largely of persons whom Scipio himself had taken prisoner and sold. This too appears only in Valerius and the *De Vir. Ill.*; the two writers differ entirely in their wording;³ and the idea expressed is really a dramatic and blunt extension of that more neatly expressed in the *noverca* saying itself. On the other hand, although the doubts are considerable, it would be unsafe to assert positively that the idea *cannot* be original.

Velleius, Valerius Maximus, and the *De Viris Illustribus* all give a clear and plausible context for this *dictum*. The *iure caesum videri* remark produced uproar (the attempt at prevarication doubtless proving unsatisfactory to—and perhaps resented by—the pro-Gracchan mob⁴), which in turn provoked Scipio to make

¹ Badian, op. cit., p. 175 n. 2, argues that there is no need to think the addition an invention as it serves no tendentious purpose. This is not decisive, since it could conceivably have been the tendentious fiction of a pro-Gracchan writer anxious to make out that Scipio's judgement was not clear and definite, to minimize the hostility of the great man. Nevertheless Badian's argument carries weight to the extent that omission, tendentious or careless, seems much more probable than tendentious fiction.

² Val. Max. 6. 2. 3; *De Vir. Ill.* 58. 8; Plut. *Apophth. Scip.* Min. 22 (*Mor.* 201 c); Polyaen. *Strat.* 8. 16. 5 (not in *O.R.F.*); Σκεπίων ὅτε τοῦ δῆμου θορυβούμενος ἐμέ, ἔφη, οὐδὲ στρατιωτῶν ἐνόπλων ἀλλαγμός

ἔξπληξεν, οὐρι γε ουγκλύθων ἀνθρώπων θύρωσ, ἀν οἰδά γε τὴν Ἱταλῶν μητρουδά, οὐ μητέρα. The wording of Polyaenus is very similar to that of Plutarch, though lacking the latter's introductory clauses. Whether the longer version *noverca, non mater est* (*De Vir. Ill.*; Plut.; Polyaen.) is original or a later expansion (as is quite possible) is of little general significance and of none at all for the present discussion.

³ Val. Max.: *Non efficietis ait ut solutos verear quos adligatos adduxi. De Vir. Ill.*: Et addidit, *Quos ego sub corona vendidi.*

⁴ Doubtless Carbo and his associates had a group of followers ready to lead and encourage such a reaction. Indeed Mrs. Atkinson suggests to me that Scipio may have

this bitter and insulting comment. Fraccaro, however, holds that this link is false, a compression of events in order to produce a dramatic picture. He believes that the *noverca* saying really belongs to a later dispute, in 129 with Gaius Gracchus.¹ He has two main arguments. The first is that Plutarch's version is prefaced thus: ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν Νομαρχίαν ἐλὼν καὶ θριαμβεύσας τὸ δεύτερον πρὸς Γάιον Γράικον ὑπέρ τε τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τῶν συμμάχων κατέστη διαφορά. Fraccaro thinks this clearly refers to 129. Secondly, Scipio's remark represents a real break with the people, but such a break did not occur in Carbo's tribunate, for Scipio secured the rejection of Carbo's bill, and that the break really occurred in 129, after the affair of Tuditanus, is shown by Appian, *B.C.* 1. 19: καὶ μίσος ἐπεύθεν (from the affair of Tuditanus and its consequences) ἥρξατο εἰς τὸν Σκυπίανα τοῦ δῆμου καὶ ἀγανάκτησι, ὅτι αὐτὸν ἀγαπήσαντες ἐπιφθόνως καὶ πολλὰ τοῖς δινατοῖς ἐναντιώθεντες ὑπέρ αὐτοῦ ὑπατόν τε δις ἐλόμενοι παρανόμως, ὑπέρ τῶν Ἰταλιῶν ἀντιπεπραχότα σφίσιν ἔωρων.

The first argument misses the point that the dispute with Gaius Gracchus to which Plutarch refers was not confined to the episode in 129. It is true that the affair of the Italians may not have arisen as early as 131 (though it may have done so; the point is not decided by the fact that Scipio did not succeed in getting anything done about it until 129), but Plutarch also mentions the Senate and is surely referring to the general quarrel with the Gracchan faction after Scipio's return; hence the reference to Numantia and the triumph. It is obvious that Carbo's proposal was part of that struggle:² it was concerned with the very question which had led to the fatal riot of 133; it was almost certainly the occasion of the question to Scipio about Tiberius' death; and—most relevant to this discussion—Gaius Gracchus spoke in support.

Fraccaro's second argument also fails to prove his point. In any case Appian's remark should surely not be relied upon too heavily for precise chronology, but in fact there is proof that Scipio had lost popular support before 129, for it was in 131 that he failed utterly in his attempt to secure the command against Aristonicus, only two of the thirty-five tribes voting in his favour.³ Nor does the defeat of Carbo's proposal prove that Scipio had not become unpopular at that time. If enough leading senators combined against the proposal, arguing that it would undermine an important constitutional safeguard and using to the full the resources of their *clientelae*, the rejection might well have been secured in spite of the predilection of the mob for the Gracchans.⁴ In short, the same general conclusion applies to the passage from Appian as

intended to direct the *noverca* saying at just such a *claque* of freedmen. This is possible but even if this was Scipio's intention it is clear that the remark was interpreted as being directed at the whole crowd.

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 390 ff. The same conclusion is implicit in the remarks of Carcopino, *op. cit.*, pp. 84 ff., and in the opinion of Badian, *op. cit.*, p. 175, that Scipio's caution in his reply to Carbo enabled him to secure the rejection of Carbo's bill (an hypothesis with which, as will be seen, I disagree). Bilz, *op. cit.*, p. 73 n. 200, evidently favours 131, as does Lincke, *op. cit.*, p. 30, but both, like Fraccaro, think that Plutarch associates the *dictum* with a separate dispute in 129—

concerning which see below.

² Its relevance to Tiberius' attempt to secure re-election is of course recognized by Fraccaro, *op. cit.*, p. 393 n. 1.

³ *Cic. Phil.* 11. 18.

⁴ During his tribunate Carbo successfully promoted a bill to substitute the ballot for oral voting in legislative *comitia*, a measure which certainly made it harder to control the votes of clients (*Cic. De Leg.* 3. 35). There is no indication as to whether this preceded or followed the rejection of his bill concerning the tribunate, but the latter is obviously probable and the ballot law may well be a direct reaction to the defeat of the other.

to that from Plutarch: both are certainly compatible with 129 being the date of the *noverca* saying but there is nothing in either to contradict those sources which place it in the same context as *iure caesum videri*, therefore in 131.

The evidence of the three Latin sources is supported by a further passage of Plutarch:¹ καὶ Σκηπίων ὁ Ἀφρικανός . . . παρὰ μικρὸν ἥλθεν ἐκπεσεῖν καὶ στέρεσθαι τῆς πρὸς τὸν δῆμον εὐνοίας, ὅτι . . . τῶν περὶ Γάιον καὶ Φούλβιον αὐτοῦ δι' ἔκκλησις πυνθανομένων τί φρονοὶ περὶ τῆς Τιθερίου τελευτῆς, οὐκ ἀρεσκομένην τοῖς ὑπ' ἑκείνου πεπολιτευμένοις ἀπόκρισιν ἔδωκεν. ἐκ τούτου γὰρ ὁ μὲν δῆμος ἀντέκρουσεν αὐτῷ λέγοντι, μηδέπω τοῦτο ποιῆσας πρότερον, αὐτὸς δὲ τὸν δῆμον εἰπεῖν κακῶς προϊχθεί.

This may be analysed as follows:

- (a) Those who put the question were *οἱ περὶ Γάιον καὶ Φούλβιον*.
- (b) The question was clearly the one elsewhere attested as having been asked by Carbo.
- (c) Scipio's first reply, which provoked the outcry, was surely the *iure caesum videri* saying.
- (d) The insult he was led on to make was presumably the *noverca* saying.

Fraccaro sees in this passage another case of compression: Carbo's question and Scipio's answer have been transferred to the quarrel in 129, as is shown by the substitution of Gaius and Fulvius for Carbo. I do not believe that this is so. *οἱ περὶ Γάιον καὶ Φούλβιον* means 'Gaius and Fulvius and their supporters': one of their leading supporters was Carbo, and Gaius was involved, as an advocate of Carbo's proposal, in the events of 131. Plutarch does not say that Gaius and Fulvius actually asked the question (in any case they could not both have done so, or if it was a duet it might equally well have been a trio; more probably we should envisage a Gracchan faction shouting its support for Carbo). Surely in 131 Carbo as tribune was their spokesman, and Plutarch joins those witnesses who testify that both *dicta* were uttered on the same occasion.

Thus four sources, which if not all automatically to be trusted *per se* are certainly of extremely varied character, are agreed upon the point at issue. There is no contradictory evidence and no good reason for doubting the conclusion so clearly favoured, namely that the *noverca* saying was uttered in response to the outcry which followed the *iure caesum videri* remark. The whole incident occurred during the public discussion of Carbo's bill in 131 (or conceivably at the very end of 132²); I hope to show elsewhere its full drama and significance.³

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¹ *Ti. Grac.* 21. 4-5.

² As is well known, tribunes entered office on 10 December. If Carbo tabled his bill almost at once—and it surely represents a prepared attack, planned to vindicate the Gracchan cause—*contiones* might have been held before the end of the year. A fairly early date would tie in with Scipio's ignominious failure to secure the command against Aristonicus.

³ Plutarch, *Apophth. Scip.* Min. 23, has preserved one further *dictum* from the post-

Numantine period of Scipio's life: his proud reply to the cry of 'Kill the tyrant' raised by Gaius Gracchus and his followers. Fraccaro, op. cit., p. 391, holds that the incident occurred in 129. Although his arguments fall short of proof and it is conceivable that it occurred earlier, e.g. in 131, nevertheless it is quite possible that 129 is right. In any case there is no positive evidence to link the *dictum* with the group discussed in this paper.

PRODELISION IN GREEK DRAMA

PRODELISION or Inverse Elision (*ἀφαιρεσίς*) takes place when a word ending in a long vowel or diphthong is immediately followed by another word beginning with a short vowel. Though it is very occasionally found in inscriptions and in the manuscripts of certain prose authors, particularly those of Plato—almost uniquely *'κεῖνος* and its cases—it is to be considered as essentially a verse phenomenon, affecting as it does the metre of the line in which it occurs. Prodelision was unknown to Homer¹ and Hesiod, is rare in lyric, and seems only to come into real use with the dramatists of the fifth century. An examination of the practice of the three tragedians and of Aristophanes is not without interest in itself and may occasionally throw some light on points of textual criticism.

FREQUENCY AND PLACE OF PRODELISION

Prodelision is found in the plays of Aeschylus on an average once in every 250 lines; in those of Sophocles approximately once in every 77 lines; of Euripides once in every 154, and of Aristophanes once in every 43. If we may take the latter as typical of the Attic writers of comedy there seems to have been among them a growing tendency to restrict the use of prodelision as Old Comedy, from about the turn of the fifth and fourth centuries, passed through Middle into New. Percentages drop from 2·6 in the *Frogs* (405 B.C.) to 1·86 in the *Ecclesiazusae* (391 B.C.), and to just over one in the *Plutus* (388 B.C.). In Menander's *Dyscolos* (316 B.C.) it has sunk to 0·6.

Prodelision is occasionally found after a comma or a colon, e.g. S. *Ph.* 591 *λέγω· 'πί;* E. *I.A.* 719 *μέλλω· 'πί;* ibid. 1435 *παῦσαι· 'μέ* (if the reading is right: see below); E. *Rh.* 157 *ἡγώ· 'πί;* Ar. *Nu.* 1354 *φράσω· 'πειδή*, and possibly id. *Th.* 1224 (see below) *διώξει· 'σ.* Editors sometimes mark prodelision at the start of a line, but such cases nearly always turn out to be based on impossible texts, as is the *όσια | πύρωσας* of E. *Hel.* 1353/4, or to be due to false metrical division, as is the *ἔβδελυχθη | κεῖνος* of Ar. *Lys.* 793/4. There are, however, two undoubted cases in Ar. *Ra.*, viz. 596/7 *ἀνάγκη | 'σται* and 602/3 *παρέξω | μαυρόν*, both in the same short lyrical trochaic system.

VOWELS (1) CAUSING AND (2) SUFFERING PRODELISION

(1) These are the vowels *ā* (ᾳ), *η* (ῃ), *ω* (ῳ) and the diphthong *ov*. Other diphthongs must be considered separately.

η (with *ῃ*) is by far the most frequent; indeed in Aristophanes prodelisions caused by this vowel are more numerous than all the others put together. Next to *η*—*longo sed proxima intervallo*—come *ov* and *ω* (with *ῳ*). For obvious reasons *ā* (with *ᾳ*) comes very rarely into the picture. Aeschylus provides no instance, unless we accept Murray's *ā 'πί* at *Ag.* 255—an emendation rejected by both Fraenkel and Denniston-Page. Sophocles gives five—four if we reject Pearson's *αἰτίᾳ 'μβάλοι* at *Tr.* 940; the manuscripts give *βάλοι*—viz. *Ai.* 308 *κάρα 'θωνέν* (so Pearson and Jebb, for Tecmessa's is scarcely to be regarded as an ἀγγελική *ρήσις*); *O.T.* 215 *πεύκα 'πί*; ibid. 866 *οὐρανίᾳ 'ν* (a very probable conjecture of Housman's), and *Ant.* 895 *λουσθία 'γώ*. Euripides supplies some

¹ On *Πηλειδή, θέλ(ε)* in A 277 see Leaf's note.

four or five. Despite Murray's doubts *El.* 856 κάρα 'πιδεῖξων seems all right, and two other cases depend on (likely) emendations (i.e. *Supp.* 58 μελέα 'γώ; *ibid.* 69 ταλαίνη 'ν), though Nauck's κούρη 'σται (*El.* 187) is suspect, for nowhere else in tragedy is the epsilon of any part of εἰμί except εστί prodelided. *id. Hel.* 1353/4 we have already seen reason to doubt, and φίλα, 'πόδος at *Andr.* 843 can scarcely be possible. Aristophanes furnishes about fifteen, e.g. 'Ηρακλέα 'νεσκενίασσ (Ra. 523) and three cases of ὥπε 'στί.

-αι. There are no certain cases of prodelision after αι in tragedy: none in Aeschylus, and in Sophocles only one possible one: *O.C.* 1608 πεσοῦσσαι 'κλαῖον. So Pearson; but the manuscripts have κλαῖον, and that reading is retained by both Campbell and Jebb—rightly, for this is a messenger's speech. In Euripides there are four cases, but all are of dubious authenticity. These are (a) *Heracl.* 999, (b) *Hel.* 953, (c) *I.A.* 1396, and (d) *ibid.* 1435. (a) ἀκούσεται ('μοί) γ' ἐσθλά. Here the 'μοί' is Wilamowitz's; Canter suggested *τά*, Mekler γε χρηστά. (b) αἰρήσομαι 'γώ· 'γώ is Porson's; MSS. τό; Seidler τοι. In any case the line is very obscure; Hartung excised both it and the next. (c) γενήσομαι 'γώ is Reiske's simple emendation of the manuscripts' impossible γενήσομ· ἐγώ; it may or may not be right. (d) παῖσσαι 'μέ is, again, an emendation of Porson's. It is accepted neither in Prinz-Wecklein nor by England, who writes 'the emphatic 'μέ is out of place before the following ἐμοί'. In Aristophanes, however, most of the instances are above suspicion. There are seven cases of the first person singular middle or passive verb followed by ἐγώ: *Ach.* 62; *V.* 537; *ibid.* 825; *Av.* 445; *Lys.* 758; *ibid.* 1114; *Th.* 594. Besides these we find at *V.* 501 κελητρίσαι 'κελευνον and at *Th.* 473 ἔχουσας 'κενον—possibly paratragic, in which case κενον would be correct. At *Pax* 253 most editors accept Dindorf's χρῆσθάτέρω for the corrupt χρῆσθαι θάτέρω of the manuscripts. Brunck, however, took the words as forming not crasis but prodelision and printed χρῆσθαι 'τέρω. A similar uncertainty arises with regard to *Ar. Lys.* 736 (αὐτη 'τέρα or αὐθητέρα) and *Ra.* 509 where editors vary between περιόδομαι 'πελθόντα and the rather repulsive-looking περιόδομάπελθόντα.

-αυ. Prodelision after αυ is nowhere found. At *Lys.* 1098 the Oxford editors wrongly accept Enger's αδ 'πεπόνθεμες.

-ει. There are no instances of prodelision after ει in Aeschylus and the three to be found in the Oxford text of Sophocles are of doubtful validity. They are (1) *Ph.* 360 ἐπει 'δάκρυσα. Here 'δάκρυσα is an 'emendation' of Heath's, accepted by both Jebb and Pearson but rejected by Campbell, who rightly keeps the manuscripts' δάκρυσα on the ground that Neoptolemus' speech is tantamount to an ἀγγελική ρήσις and that therefore the aorist can and should dispense with its augment. (2) *O.C.* 1088 οθένει 'πνικείω. The manuscripts here give ἐπνικίω οθένει; the alteration is due to Hermann in the first instance. The line corresponds antistrophically to l. 1077; both are iambic dimeters, and an anapaest in the first foot is as good as an iamb. Further, though the form ἐπνικείω is, by analogy, a possible variant of the normal ἐπνίκιος it is nowhere else found. (3) *Ibid.* 1602 τάχει 'πόρευσαν. On this Jebb comments "πόρ. and πόρ. are alike admissible in this ρήσις". He and Pearson print 'πόρ.: Campbell πόρ. Euripides' single example, ει 'πιταξόμεσθα (*Supp.* 521), looks, it must be admitted, good enough, but it springs from foul ground. The line is scarcely translatable, for πράγματα (Prinz-Wecklein accepts Gompertz's νάματα) and οὐτως (Dobree suggested ὄντως) are both meaningless. Of the five cases in Aristophanes three certainly seem all right: *Lys.* 605 χάρει 's τὴν ναῦν, *fr.* 543

πωλήσει 's Χίον (where Casaubon's correction of πωλήσεις Χίον must be accepted), and *fr. 619 χωρεῖ πὶ γραμμήν*. At *Lys. 473 ἐπεὶ θέλω* the sign of prodelision is due to Bachmann: the manuscripts give θέλω; and the leader of the women's chorus may well have here used the Ionic form (see van Leeuwen on *Ar. V. 493*). *Th. 1224 διώξει 's τοῦμπαλν*; so Cobet; the manuscripts give διώξεις τοῦμ. It was Elmsley in his note on *Ar. Ach. 276* who started the theory that the correct Attic future of διώκω was the middle, not the active. Rutherford, though in the *New Phrynicus* (pp. 377-8) he supports Elmsley's contention, does not make out an entirely convincing case for it.

-οι. The exclamation οῖ causes the prodelision of the epsilon of ἔγώ in twenty-three passages in the tragedians.

In no other case is ε prodelided after -οι; and when the editor of the Oxford text of Euripides introduced at *Rh. 805 πολέμους δρασαν* and noted in the app. crit. 'πολεμίους δράσαι codd.: correxi', he made a very doubtful claim.

It should perhaps be mentioned here that the dative of the first and second personal pronouns does not cause prodelision when followed by ἐστι but makes crasis. Hermann rightly corrected the manuscripts' ἐμοὶ ὅτι to ἐμοῦστι at *S. Ph. 812* (cf. μονστι at *id. Ai. 1225*). At *Ar. Pl. 736* it probably better to read ὡς γ' ἐμούδοκει than (Brunck's) ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δόκει—if indeed the right reading be not ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν.

οῦ and οὐτῶ, which can bear the suffixes of, respectively, κ(χ) and σ, cannot cause prodelision; the Greeks wrote, for example, οὐτῶς ἐτί; never οὐτῶ πί. (R's οὐτῶ κείνος, not Γ's οὐτῶ κείνος should be accepted (*pace* Hall and Geldart) at *Ar. Lys. 816*.)

(2) The vowels which suffer prodelision are α and ε only. Of these the latter is very common, the former very rare.

By what is little more than a convention alpha privative is generally not prodelided in manuscripts and editions. A few examples will suffice: *A. Eu. 85, 691, 749 μὴ ἀδικεῖν*; *ibid. 86 μὴ ἀμελεῖν*; *S. Ph. 782 μὴ ἀτελῆς*; *E. Tr. 981 μὴ ἀμάθεις*. (All these are, of course, scanned as cretics.) The alpha which normally, though very rarely, suffers prodelision is that which begins the prepositions ἀπό and ἀνά and words compounded with those prepositions.

For ἀπό see *A. Pr. 651 μὴ πολακτίος*; *S. Tr. 239 ἡ πὸ μαρτεῖας*—the reading of *id. Ph. 933* is uncertain; *E. Hipp. 803* (so ALP; rell. ἡ ἀπό); *id. Andr. 843* ἡ φίλα, 'πόδος' (the text is most uncertain); *id. Supp. 639 μακροῦ ποπανῶν* (so P and I); *id. I.A. 817 ἡ παγ(ε)* (so P²; P and L give ἡ ἀπαγ(ε)). For Aristophanic instances see *Nu. 1278 μὴ ποδώσεις* (some manuscripts give μὴ ἀποδώσεις); *id. Lys. 734 ἀῶ πολέσθαι*. The manuscripts give at *id. Pax 772 μὴ ἀφαίρειτ*, at *id. Av. 1620 μὴ ἀποδιδῷ*, and at *Lys. 740 μὴ ἀποδείρῃς*. Dindorf gave all these three as crases. All we can conclude is that in the case of μὴ ἀπό (ἀπ-, ἀφ-) the choice between synizesis, prodelision, and crasis was felt to be a free one.

The alpha of ἀνά is prodelided perhaps only in two cases: *A. Th. 1076 μὴ νατραπήναι*—the authenticity of the last scene of the *Septem* has, as is well known, often been questioned—and *S. Ich. 160 μὴ νανοστήσαντες*.

One odd case merits attention: ἀστιβῆ πόλλων (*A. Th. 858*). This strange, not to say blasphemous, prodelision moved Ahrens to conjecture, not implausibly, *Παῦν*, regarding *(A)πόλλων* as an intrusive gloss.

The commonest type of prodelided epsilon is that of the prepositions ἐπί, ἐκ, ἐσ, and ἐν, whether alone or compounded with verbs, nouns, or adverbs: e.g. ἡ πί, οὐδὲ ἔθηκα, ἦδη πισκόπους, μὴ μπροσθεν. It is perhaps not unreasonable

to lump these from prepositions together, though the frequency of the prodelision of their epsilon varies greatly. *ἐπί* (*ἐπ-*, *ἐφ-*) is constantly found prodelided and *ἐκ* (*ἐκ-*, *ἐξ-*, *ἐξ-*) not uncommonly; but the prodelision of both *ἐσ-* (*ἐσ-*) and *ἐν* (*ἐν-*, *ἐμ-*) is very rare. Of *ἐς* indeed the only certain cases seem to be A. *Th.* 208 μὴ 's πρῷαν (the reading of M: *PV* μ' *eis* is impossible); Ar. *Lys.* 2 η 's Πανὸς . . . η 's Γενετυλλίδος; *ibid.* 605 χάρει 's τὴν ναῦν, and *id.* *Ra.* 186/7 η 's "Ονον πλόκας | η 's Κερβερίους η 's κόρακας; but Ruhnken's η 's μιλῶνa (E. *Cyc.* 240) is almost palmary, and Verrall's νομίζη 's οἴκον (at E. *Ion* 1562) is highly probable. (Wolf's προῖτα 's τὸ πρόσθεν in Ar. *Ach.* 242 for the manuscripts' προῖθ' ὡς (or *eis*), though accepted by Hall and Geldart, is neither necessary nor likely.)

Of *ἐν* (*ἐν-*, *ἐγ-*, *ἐμ-*)¹ the certain cases seem to be A. *Supp.* 228 μὴ 'ν Αἰδον; S. *Ai.* 1315 η 'ν ἐμοί; *id.* *O.T.* 112 η 'ν ἀγροῖς; *ibid.* 682 μὴ 'νδικον; *id.* *Ant.* 1063 μὴ 'μπολήσων; *id.* *O.C.* 400 μὴ 'μβαίνης; *id.* *Ph.* 467 η 'γγύθεν; E. *Supp.* 244 η 'ν μέσων; *id.* *I.T.* 770 η 'ν Αὐλίδι; *ibid.* 1313 η 'νθάδε; *ibid.* 1322 μὴ 'νταῦθα; *id.* *Hel.* 75 μὴ 'ν ξένη; *ibid.* 467 η 'ν δόμους; *id.* *Med.* 754 μὴ 'μμένων; *ibid.* 1362 μὴ 'γγελᾶς; *id.* *Ph.* 608 μὴ 'νθάδ(ε); *id.* *Or.* 803 μὴ 'ν δεναῖσον; *id.* *Rh.* 878 μὴ 'γκαλῆ. All these are actual manuscript readings: the following depend upon emendation, but are all likely and are all accepted into their texts by, respectively, Murray and Pearson: A. *Pr.* 741 μηδέπω 'ν προομίοις; *id.* *Ag.* 431 δόμων 'ν ἔκάστον—both these rejected by Fraenkel; the second accepted by Denniston-Page; S. *Tr.* 564 η 'ν μέσω; *ibid.* 940 αἵτινα 'μβάλοι (MSS. βάλοι; see above); *id.* *fr.* 330 λεύκων 'ν λίθω; E. *Supp.* 69 ταλαίνα 'ν χερί; *id.* *Hel.* 343 η 'ν νέκυσι; *id.* *Ba.* 842 μὴ 'γγελᾶν. In comedy the prodelision of *ἐν* (*ἐν-*) is fairly common.

Next in frequency comes the prodelision of the syllabic augment. (It may here be interjected that not uncommonly manuscripts and editions show as cases of this type of prodelision verbs in messengers' speeches which, by a well-known convention, are not as a rule augmented; e.g. A. *Pers.* 310 νικώμενοι [*']κύρισσον.]* Next comes the *ε* of the first person pronouns, *ἐγώ*, *ἐμώς*, *ἐμαντόν*, etc. Very frequent also is the prodelision of the *ε* of *ἐστί*, though, except in comedy, of no other part of *είναι*; e.g. εὐθημία 'στω (Ar. *Av.* 959); ἀνάγκη | 'σται (*id.* *Ra.* 597). For κούρα 'σται (E. *El.* 187) see above. Where an *ε* is an integral part of the stem of a word it is seldom prodelided. The following are, however, found: (a) verbs. We read δὴ 'χω at E. *El.* 870; but 'χω is only a conjecture of Canter's, and the manuscripts' γώ may well be right. However, prodelisions of the epsilon of *ἔχω* are well attested in comedy: Ar. *V.* 1121, *Pax* 801, *Lys.* 646, *Th.* 492, *Ec.* 794; further we find μὴ 'σθε (*Eg.* 1106), *ἐμοῦ* 'λθών (*Nu.* 1466), and μὴ 'λθοι (*Pax* 267); μὴ 'ρρήσθε⁰ (*V.* 1329); μὴ 'ρεῖς (*Ra.* 7). So with (b) substantives: δὴ 'χθρῶν (A. *Ch.* 790, strange and perhaps unparalleled), and in comedy η 'νιαντῷ (Ar. *Ra.* 18). Of (c) adverbs and conjunctions we find in tragedy μὴ 'ξω (S. *Li.* 742) and η 'γγίθεν (S. *Ph.* 467). At *id.* *Li.* 24 manuscripts and editions give both κάγω 'θελοντής and κ. θελοντής. In comedy there occur Εύρυπιδη, 'πειδήπερ (Ar. *Ach.* 437); δὴ 'πειτα (*V.* 665); μὴ 'τέρωσε (*Ach.* 828); η 'τέρα (*Ra.* 64); and αὐτη 'τέρα (*Lys.* 736).

¹ Ahrens (*De crasi et aphaeresi* [Stolberg, 1845 (= *Kl. Schr.* i. 79)], p. 24), having excoitated the arbitrary rule 'ut crasis aphaeresi praferatur ubicumque utraque fieri posse videatur', would regard the

collocation of -η and *ἐν* (*ἐν-*, *ἐμ-*) as forming crasis, not prodelision. This view was very properly controverted by Lucius, *De crasi et aphaeresi* (Dissert. philol. Argentor. 1885), pp. 42 ff.

Lastly there are a number of instances where the epsilon of *ēkeīnos*, in its various cases, is found prodelidied in Aristophanes (e.g. *Nu.* 195; *Pax* 547, 1213; *Lys.* 795, 816, etc.). (*keīnos* should, of course, not bear the mark of prodelision in paratragic passages, e.g. *V.* 750, *ι ὑπαρχοῦ· | κείνων.*)

What precedes may be set out in tabular form. (The first column gives the prodelidied and prodelidied vowels. *x + ?y* means *x* certain plus *y* uncertain instances; and by 'cert.in' is meant 'found in a manuscript' or 'attributable to a highly likely emendation'.)

	<i>Aeschylus</i>	<i>Sophocles</i>	<i>Euripides</i>	<i>Aristophanes</i>
-ā ā-	0	0	?1	0
-ā (q) e-	?1	4 + ?1	3 + ?2	15
-η (y) ā-	2 + ?1	2 + ?1	2	1 + ?3
-η (y) e-	common	common	common	common
-ω ā-	0	0	0	1
-ω (q) e-	4	19	22	63
-ai ā-	0	0	0	?1
-ai e-	0	?1	?4	9 + ?2
-εi e-	0	?3	?1	3 + ?2
oi 'γώ	7	3	13	0
-ov e-	2	14	30	82

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2. References. These should be in the following form:

(a) *To ancient authorities:*

Thuc. 3. 21

Pind. *Nem.* 6. 2

Tac. *Ann.* 3. 21. 1

Plin. *N.H.* 17. 169

(For suitable abbreviations Liddell-Scott-Jones's *A Greek-English Lexicon* and Lewis and Short's *Latin Dictionary* may be consulted.)

(b) *To modern authorities:*

(i) *Books:* Norden, *Die antike Kunstsprosa*, i. 165 ff.

Jacoby, *F. Gr. Hist.* i. 344-5.

Bell, *The Latin Dual and Poetic Diction*, pp. 264-78.

(ii) *Journals:* E. Fraenkel, 'The Culex', *J.R.S.* xlvi (1952), 1-9.
but E. Fraenkel (*J.R.S.* xlvi [1952], 1-9).

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Lastly there are a number of instances where the epsilon of *ēkeīnos*, in its various cases, is found prodelided in Aristophanes (e.g. *Nu.* 195; *Pax* 547, 1213; *Lys.* 795, 816, etc.). (*keīnos* should, of course, not bear the mark of prodelision in paratragic passages, e.g. *V.* 750, 1 ὑπισχροῦ | *κείνων*.)

What precedes may be set out in tabular form. (The first column gives the prodeliding and prodelided vowels. *x + ?y* means *x* certain plus *y* uncertain instances; and by 'certain' is meant 'found in a manuscript' or 'attributable to a highly likely emendation'.)

	<i>Aeschylus</i>	<i>Sophocles</i>	<i>Euripides</i>	<i>Aristophanes</i>
-ā ā-	0	0	?1	0
-ā (ā) ē-	?1	4 + ?1	3 + ?2	15
-η (η) ā-	2 + ?1	2 + ?1	2	1 + ?3
-η (η) ē-	common	common	common	common
-ω ā-	0	0	0	1
-ω (ω) ē-	4	19	22	63
-ai ā-	0	0	0	?1
-ai ē-	0	?1	?4	9 + ?2
-ει ε-	0	?3	?1	3 + ?2
oi 'γώ	7	3	13	0
-ον ε-	2	14	30	82

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